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What is Going on in the World? Everything is Now 4 GW

2004-07-30T13:56:00.000-07:00

What is Going on in the World? Everything is Now 4 GW:

A WORLD of 4GW - INSURGENCY LIFESTYLES AGAINST IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION;
by Jacques Dessalines and Misha B.

http://www.geocities.com/u_ge_l_f/doctrine.html

Each Section in the study: Taking Iraqi Strategies Beyond: Insurgent Rebellions and Imperialist Strategies of War; has a summary of key points and then links to the original article and other resources....
www.soldierrebelion.squarespace.com

-- A gripping vision of a not-so-future warfare. Latter-day Davids vs. the Empire’s Goliath with nation states fighting non-nation states -- clans or religious or ethnic groups -- in places like the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. And the Goliaths will often lose. It's not happening just on the West Bank and Gaza. A Somali clan drove the U.S. out of Mogadishu. Hezbollah ousted the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon. The Chechens have humbled Russia's army. A few thousand Iraqi insurgents have killed a thousand US troops and can continue to cost the US dearly as long as it stays in the Middle East region. This is a global war – a clash of cultures – a collapse of international structures – a war provoked by technology, accelerated social change and corruption among the leaders of the West.

-- The owners of the black banners and the secured community” are identical to al-Qa`idah and the Taliban: “I have no doubt that the leaders of the Mujahidin of Al-Qa`idah and the Taliban are the owners of the black banners who will assist the Mahdi.”
Decide whom to support: Qa`idat al-Jihad, Taliban, and the Mujahidin? The Arab and Muslim governments and their clerics and Islamic establishments, which insist on naming themselves Muslims? Or the Crusader West and the enemies of Allah on earth.
“Who is going to support the Mahdi except these men and clerics, and their followers? After this war, which has no precedence in human history and in the fight between the community of the believers and the Devil and its followers, does anyone doubt that these are the days of the Mahdi?” (A.1)

Dear citizens interested in turning the tide of USA-led fascism, I am a military strategist.
I write to you because a great war is breaking out that will make or break this planet. Call it the 4th World War (4WW) - the War of Global Imperialism or the spread of fourth generation warfare -- 5th generation if the Imperialists don't win soon. (A.2) I have worked in British intelligence services and for American security firms that directed the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. I have worked for the Iraqi resistance. I am a strategist and not much of a philosopher by training, but I can tell you of my experiences. I cannot tell you which political, social or religious systems work the best -- because what is the best or even what is good for the short or the longterm has been degraded and mystified in this existence that we call the modern world. People cannot talk about the definitions of important things or about why communications/understanding are so difficult.

I can tell you what I have seen. These are stories from behind the curtain of the rich and powerful. Wherever US-UK money goes it breeds the most vile corruption. From the sex-slavery of DynCorp in Bosnia to the same group and many other security contractors (MPRI, L-3 GSI, Vinell Corp, ArmorGroup, Logico, Blackwater, Titan, and Kellog, Brow & Root) committing torture, murder and atrocities in Iraq (A.3); from the jokes about the Colombian and Peruvian airlines/airforce drug smuggling to the hilarious naivete of US activists and eco-tourists. There are 100 stories of the tragedies tolerated or promoted by the USA government and its elite classes around the world. To know the details of these evil errors (evil -- but are they errors or intentional? Ah...) is to understand why for billions of people in the world -- and millions of insurgents everywhere - there is no turning back toward (false) ideas of peace or cooperation with the West or its ruling class imperialists.

There will be war, a fourth generation war, a war that the planet and the rich cannot win.

There are a variety of different and novel ways to structure your investigation of the world’s problems/solutions. This is what should be called Your Life When-You-Care-to-be-Aware – The key question is Why all these problems – from politics to ecology-racism-disease- and many more.

Is this mess that the ruling class has designed with such brilliant minds – this world we live in – the best that humans can do – does it matter how well we do things – Is everything really just a short term selfish pursuit of hedonism, pain avoidance and ?? – whatever the television advertisers tell us is important??

What drives conflict, what are the weaknesses of those in power, those who call the shots and shape conflict and the perceptions of conflict and solutions? Why are there infinite possibilities yet people (especially alternative or quasi-radical groups) see only one or two ???
We have to use what is available – the weapons the resources the people etc… We cannot wait – nor encourage others to wait – for some perfect moment – a perfect strategy – or the education and enlightenment of the masses (every indication is that people get more confused each day) – the government – media nexus is rife with psychological warfare manipulations. Shall we wage war against complexity, or un-reason or imposed confusion?

In the Series on military strategies: Beyond Iraq Strategies (www.insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com), we have sought to expose and analyze the strategy, tactics and direction of the military and intelligence forces of the US and their neo-imperialist allies. It is important to understand the enemy, but it is also important to move on and consider the capabilities and skills of the insurgent forces around the world. The areas of Imperialist policies that deserve more research concern: 1. changes in US strategy, tactics and weapons – particularly those concerning counterintelligence and counter-terrorist intelligence and US assassination strategies; 2. especially important is additional research on US and allied intelligence operations and capabilities. The inclusion of the large numbers of US Special Forces into intelligence gathering and covert operations is a troubling and difficult subject to report on; 3. research on the media savvy and propaganda efforts of the US is also worthwhile. (2.)

The US is spending a fortune on the war in Iraq ($300 billion by year’s end) while at the same time it is restructuring its entire military to combat fourth generation wars that will soon be common. The dramatic expansion of US Special Operations forces, the V 22 transports and the transformation of SOF into a quasi-illegal CIA paramilitary army will give the US awesome and flexible deployment options. With a wide array of listening devices and airborne - or space-borne - sensors the US will be able to attack small targets with devastation. These policies make sense once diplomacy, cooperation, compromise and any hope of a peaceful world are abandoned permanently. This is a one-way street and the response of the adversaries will be ingenious and unexpected... and so must ours...

A Good Defense Anticipates Enemy Offense: Rifleman democracy. 2004
-- Politics as a possible link: There is a theory of "rifleman democracy".

Machiavelli set out this theory: A man without a gun is in no way comparable to a man with a gun. He also proposed the democratic republic as a practical form of government exemplified by the city-state (agglomerations less than 10 million people) and Machiavelli felt this was a very possible (positive?) development. He believed these democratic republics would be established because of the development of more accurate fire-arms, namely, rifles. One rifle is carried by one man. So, basically, one rifle = one vote. That was the format of "rifleman democracy" which enabled Napoleon to transform Europe out of feudalism. Napoleon lost as an individual, but Europe was transformed forever.

Now we have a more complicated situation when viewing democracy as an expression of, or as determined by, realities of warfare. The U.S. did not even get involved in trying to disarm Iraqis from their AK-47's. RPG's, however, that's another matter. Anti-aircraft weapons, etc., are far more important than rifles. What it comes down to is that even individual snipers require a support system (extending to helicopters and control of the air-space) in order to function in their defense or attack roles.

Traditional individual fire-arms have, for good reason, been known as "equalizers". The days when an armored knight was equal, say, to 30 yeoman --- that period of history ended with the development of the modern rifle. Of course, it has been more complicated than one man, one rifle, one vote, for some time now. Napoleon's successes depended upon his ability to recruit, inspire and utilize riflemen --- but he was also known for his unequaled use of cannon fire in connection with infantry battles. Everything changed with the development of the machine gun about a century ago. Machine guns were operated by teams, rather than individuals, and machine guns gobbled up ammo so fast that considerable supporting infrastructure is required. Thus, the theory of "superior fire power" that was developed out of World War I and the millions of men sacrificed in futile efforts to attack and take fortified machine gun positions on static front-lines. Then came World War II --- air power and control of the air space are everything.

Warfare and revolution have been transformed by high-tech. Outcomes can no longer be forecast by counting heads. The whole is more than the sum of the parts. Revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box (or Box-cutter), teamwork and specialties. It's a complex calculation anymore. Falluja and Najaf (Iraq) support and yet also call into question this Rifleman analysis. Rifles do seem important - though the RPGs and anti-aircraft weapons (and mortars) may be more important. We are part way into a permanent war -- which is to say a long and complex war -- The Fourth World War. Groups opposed to the current power structure will have to master 4th and 5th generation mobile-chaos smart-targeting warfare. This kind of war relies on secret revolutionary/battle/sabotage cells, international media savvy, and connecting synergistically with each member and each group’s specialties: hackers, bombers, espionage, media, event-timing and logistics. The strength of Islamic fundamentalists lies in their cultural cohesiveness (teamwork) and their ability to combine cleverness, a feel for media-propaganda and news/action timing to create a powerful force to block the military power of the invader crusader (U.S.A.). The case of the FARC guerrillas in Colombia is another example of this interplay - riflemen and teamwork in a culture of resistance = political – territorial – military - financial power.

The al Qaeda insurgents take the long view that if Islam survives they win. Fundamentalist have cohesion and they have a weapon that powerfully combines the key elements of fourth generation warfare: People, Ideas and Hardware. The weapon is suicide bombers and suicide car bombers. The West has no defense against such weapons except to declare martial law and watch the global economy crumble in their hands. A sign of impending demise of the Empire is that the people at the top tend to believe their own propaganda. Hitler, for example, was told as early as 1939 about the U.S. (Boeing Aircraft) tooling up to be capable of making more bombers in a month than existed in all countries combined in 1939. Basically, Hitler was told that attacking Poland (Bush in Iraq) and starting World War II (Now WW 4) was bound to fail in the long run. Hitler fired the messenger and brought in someone who would tell him what he wanted to hear. That is the arrogance part of it. The other part of imperial break-down has to do with corruption. – A sinking ship brings out the rats… (1.)

-- In the fourth generation combat will be more dispersed. The battlefield will once again envelop entire societies, as it did in more primitive and ancient cultures. Military objectives will no longer involve annihilating tidy enemy lines, but rather eroding popular support for the war within the enemy's society.
-- Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions. The distinction between war and peace would be blurred to the vanishing point. Conflict will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' will disappear. (2.)

________________________The Wars We Live

Insurgency and 4GW: Understanding Iraq/Saudi War Strategies,
by Jacques Dessalines and Misha B.

-- Comprehension of The Grand Strategies of the Key Players -- and the Forces They Represent – is nowhere to be found...
-- There are many secrets... and plans that only a select few on each of the many sides have privy to… -- Awareness is a battlefield…

The ruling class employs three phases of escalation to control power and its uses:
Fake liberal democracy; sophisticated riot control and subversion of opposition groups; faked national crises leading to martial law and civil war. This final phase in the struggle against the ruling class will spread to most countries in a few years. At times all three phases overlap and so the government and the insurgents take advantage of tactics for influencing all three phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the grand or the priority strategies of either side -- amid this confusion of goals -- is no easy task.
The third and final phase of the struggle against the ruling class will see the development of sophisticated Guerrilla insurgencies employing Fourth generation Warfare (4GW) on the battlefield, the streets and the media: To build or disrupt alliances and to destroy the cohesion of the West and create doubt. (see: insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com) (2.)

The measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies and weapon systems. A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition.

A New Warfare to Fight the Permanent War of Totalitarianism: 4 GW

-- "Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge.” -- A Pakistani army brigadier, S. K. Malik, who elaborated on his country's philosophy of terrorism in his book The Islamic Concept of War.
-- (Quoted by Dr. Ajai Sahni, in his article “War and the ‘deluge’ of Terror,” A commentary published in March 25th 2003. See on-line in: www.satp.org)

4 GW describes any way of dealing with U.S. military forces other than confronting them on the battlefield. It includes all forms of terrorism, guerilla warfare, intifada-type urban unrest -- sometimes financed by relationships with criminal or narcotics networks -- and others that will evolve. 4GW is not just guerilla warfare under another name. Perceiving war as a contest marked by the use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragically simplistic, and fundamentally flawed view ... a future war among industrialized states, even if effective and efficient, could be virtually invisible – or it could evolve into a war of insurgents versus States – a judo war of cultural attrition. Which side can stand to lose what is important to their culture (civil rights, freedom, shrines, travel, vacations, air conditioning?) for the longest period of time?

In 4GW distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-22 aircraft by poisoning the squadron's mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even attacking schools and PXs back at the base. 4GW, while highly "asymmetric," is not the same as "asymmetric warfare," since maneuver warfare is also "asymmetric" and calls for creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses, rather than engaging and trying to reduce his formations and fortified positions directly. Since 2001, more than 50 major active conflicts are brewing, any one of which could be the spark for commitment of US troops.

We live in a world of "Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)" where the tactics of the weak confound the tactics of the strong. Nation-states confront criminal enterprises, fanatical opportunists, terrorists whose gang-like networks transcend national boundaries. This smorgasbord of actors often slips through the cracks of security, military, and legal bureaucracies. Sub-national insurgents use guerrilla tactics, insurrection, sabotage and terrorism to subvert nation-states and challenge the established international system. Governments, politicians, and state military-security apparatus of the West desperately want to engage their 4GW foes in the tried and true conventional ways of the past. America prefers combat where only the strongest wins. US fourth-generation foes prefer 4GW judo, avoiding a decisive fight, leveraging US addiction to technology and "throwing us" using the USA's bureaucratic weight to do so. The enemy's "weapons technology advantage" in the 9-11 attacks consisted of box cutters and ceramic knives, combined with a steely determination to die for a cause... it worked, and the modern world's vast military-security-enforcement bureaucracy was helpless to stop it… and will be again and again… (2.)

We are witnessing the early stages of a major geo-political transition. This shift is characterized by a global landscape of conflict where the division between combatant, criminal opportunist and civilian is blurred. In this potential global insurgency, the urban guerilla (not to forget their rural counterparts) may be a religious zealot or a child for hire with an RPG. As technophiles, Westerners are enraptured by modern weapons of great precision, but have lost sight that people and ideas are the essence of why wars are fought and for how long. In the traditional view, the low-tech approaches of 4GW are the "tactics of the weak." However, they have repeatedly been successful in circumventing the US military's far stronger conventional strategy, tactics, and thinking.

Well before the 9-11 attacks al-Qaeda recognized the power of asymmetric warfare and adaptive tactics for their jihad struggle. An article entitled "Fourth Generation Wars," (in an al-Qaeda affiliated Internet magazine Al-Ansar: For the Struggle Against the Crusader War) acknowledges that 4GW forms the foundation of al-Qaeda's combat doctrine. The author, Abu 'Ubed Al-Qurashi, (linked with Osama bin Laden) cites the landmark 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" as key to understanding contemporary global conflict. Only a few Western military analysts recognized the deadly nature of 4GW prior to 9-11-01. (3.)

If diverse factors are driving the evolution of conflict, then solutions must lie primarily within the realms of economics, diplomacy, and law-enforcement. Military force will play a smaller role, performing specific tasks to solve problems that are intractable through other means. The West is searching for a coherent grand strategy to ensure that military (destructive) actions harmonize with their overall objectives and do not undermine the public support needed to prosecute a fourth generation war to its successful conclusion. In grand strategy, the carrot is as important as the stick, and alliances are critical factors which could favor the US in 4GW against al-Qa'ida and those who support similar ideologies. (4.) The election of John Kerry could heal the US-EU alliance, but by then it could be too late to matter. GW Bush has been a formidable commander with his directness and willingness to break the rules (secrecy, torture and mass global detentions). It seems unlikely that the many fascists in the US will not return him to another term as President.

Technology is important, and may provide options, but the fact is that lack of suitable technology cannot explain America’s poor track record in fourth generation warfare. Any discussion of 4GW, since it involves conflicts of culture and religion, is likely to generate a high degree of emotion. (5.)

....... Between advance and retreat. Hidden dragon. Do not act. -- I Ching

Both sides in the 4thWW will employ-- - harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. Such a strategy reduces the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics... to win without fighting. (7.)
John Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- (OODA) pattern (also called decision-loop) to operate inside his opponent's decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To sustain high operational tempos he codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army. (8.)

There are 3 fundamental points to the 4GW: 1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs. 2. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware, however, a hypothetical US strike force (with a hardware component) can be compared to the ancient and news ways of thinking about conflict and maneuver warfare. 3. First attack your enemy’s strategy then his alliances and cohesion.

Summary of the US 3-4 GW Evolutionary Strike Force:
A. Personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[And- for insurgents - to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy -- especially among the leaders of US strike forces]
B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas.
[Insurgents and other anti-American forces will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare ]
C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around:
U.S. Marine Corps, Army 82nd Airborne Division, Special Forces, Rangers, Delta Force, SEALs and other unconventional forces, carrier and land-based tactical air, and Intra-theater lift of heavy armor & mechanized infantry. These would be enhanced through: robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation; and increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations. (10.)

-- The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won.

Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions as the ruling class. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US -- though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast! (11.)

The condition of a military force is that its essential factor is speed, taking advantage of others' failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect, attacking where they are not on guard. Future wars will be fluid with no defined fronts or formations; decentralized armies where troops act on their own with high initiative as opposed to centralized command structures where troops ask permission and wait for orders; war designed to place the enemy in a dilemma, to suck him in to traps of his own creation, taking advantage of his stupidities and weaknesses and avoiding his strengths; war where soldiers act on judgment not on rules; war without rules; war that seeks to penetrate the enemy rather than push opposing lines backwards and forwards; war waged by a cohesive team that is like a family or tribe with a common culture and common outlook; a willingness to fight close, not just applying firepower from a long standoff, but infiltrating when the opportunity arises. (12.)

Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
The strategy devised by Sun Tzu fit the circumstances perfectly. It rested on two major and complementary elements, one internal and one external. Harmony on the inside is The Way (Tao) of war. All else flows from this basic idea, and without it, there is little reason to press forward into the stress of military operations. Externally, Sun's goal was to create confusion in the opposing side and then exploit it. The focus was not on winning through superior tactics or individual fighting technique (although these are important), the enemy commanders must become confused and if possible, driven insane. The tool for accomplishing this was quickness, which helps create ambiguity and also increases the effectiveness of deception, security, and intelligence. (13.)
Foreknowledge enables an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others even when the opponent is stronger or wealthier. Foreknowledge must be obtained from reliable people, people who know the conditions of the enemy. Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem conducted before and during combat operations can unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. If one fails to spot mismatches between what one believes to be going on and what really is, (i.e., between Orientation and the real world), one has become "mentally isolated." If adversaries can keep us in this state -- operating inside our OODA loops -- then as setback after inexplicable frustration befall us, we will become disoriented, confused, indecisive, fearful, etc. A competent enemy will create, locate, and exploit vulnerabilities leading, in the case of maneuver warfare, to envelopments, ambushes, high prisoner counts: phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change. Ill-treatment of POWs cannot be tolerated: A battlefield commander wants them to surrender, and needs to make it as easy as possible. (14.)

Threats to U.S. National Security
The most likely cause for introducing US military forces would be a large-scale attack against a country that the U.S. considers a "vital national interest" (Israel, Taiwan. Saudi Arabia). U.S. forces could face anything from a conventional attack to what is called "fourth generation warfare" (4GW). This term describes any way of dealing with U.S. military forces other than confronting them on the battlefield. It includes all forms of terrorism, guerilla warfare, intifada-type urban unrest -- sometimes financed by relationships with criminal or narcotics networks -- and others that will evolve. (16.)

Grant Hammond of the Air War College notes, 4GW is not just guerilla warfare under another name: Perceiving war as a contest marked by the use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragically simplistic, and fundamentally flawed view ... a future war among industrialized states, even if effective and efficient, could be virtually invisible. In 4GW distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-22 aircraft by poisoning the squadron's mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even attacking schools and PXs back at the base. 4GW, while highly "asymmetric," is not the same as "asymmetric warfare," since maneuver warfare is also "asymmetric" and calls for creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses, rather than engaging and trying to reduce his formations and fortified positions directly. Since 2001, more than 50 major active conflicts are brewing, any one of which could be the spark for commitment of US troops. Survival of the US does not have to be the issue; survival of the current political leadership will suffice. (18.)

-- Soon the technology, wealth and desperation of the rich nations will combine to form a deadly – if not invincible – force – with nothing but a few rag-tag groups standing in the way of imperial planetary conquest. (20.)

LINKS for the Series: BEYOND IRAQ STRATEGIES
(The Best Version is at Soldierrebelion.sqaurespace.com)

1. ) Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058642.html
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000453356&zorpiasid=537057735b0e2aa5bdaee1f920f2ba37
2. Rifleman Democracy (plus INTRODUCING IMPERIALIST STRATEGIES OF CONTROL & AGGRESSION (long w/footnotes plus)
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/05/good-defense-anticipates-enemy-offense.html
4. Section II. National Defense Review – June 18
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/section-ii-us-national-defense-review.html
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000380294&zorpiasid=6c3126873f1df1f1af3dfc56134f5cde
5. Section III. Boyd, Sun Tzu and Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18601
6. Section IV. Threats to U.S. National Security
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058691.html
http://insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournal?moduleId=31058
7. Section V. Sun Tzu and Boyd on the Utility of Military Force
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/059016.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18817
8. Section VI. Military Force vis-à-vis Other Options and Considerations
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18818
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=19094
9. Section VII. What Makes a Military Force “Effective”? - Sun Tzu’s and Boyd’s Perspective
http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=Soldierforum&type=journal&zorpiasid=fe7fd06c088bed188556a25b6c0ac96f
http://insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=31058&entryId=19428
10. Section VIII. Creating Forces: Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060395.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18999
11. Section IX. Enhanced Third Generation Warfare: The Warfare of Rapid Maneuver
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060399.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18998
12. Section X. Cohesion, Training and Leadership
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=20512
http://zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=soldierforum&type=journal&start=0
13. Section XI. Equipment and Organizations for Maneuver Warfare
http://zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=soldierforum&type=journal&start=0
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=20469
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=19075
14. Section XII. Force Structure Options
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060829.html
15. Section XIII. Technology and Effectiveness in the 4GW World of Conflict
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060827.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=19076
16. Section XIV. Below is long Version of new Intro – Rifleman – Stuff Plus 4 GW --
17. Section XV.
18. Section XVI.
19. Secdtion XVII.
20. Section XVIII –New Intelligence – New soldiers
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000449773&zorpiasid=d7d1b63fd2867eb17386b5067adb506e
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/066849.html

21. Section XIX. Assessing 4GW forces

22. Conclusions on War and 4GW
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/067799.html

http://www.tblog.com/templates/index.php?bid=guerrillawar&static=224762

–

24. Additional Sections: Versions of Executive Summary: http://barcelona.indymedia.org/newswire/display/105657/index
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000449773&zorpiasid=d7d1b63fd2867eb17386b5067adb506e
July 14 – Final draft of Executive Summary – Series ( new)
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/07/our-lives-are-war-understanding.html

25. Link to a 2nd draft of new series – ex summary –
http://www.tblog.com/templates/index.php?bid=guerrillawar&godate=07/01/2004

http://houston.indymedia.org/news/2003/10/17016.php">http://houston.indymedia.org/news/2003/10/17016.php

RESOURCES, REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES ON WAR, 4gw AND Insurgency

2004-07-30T13:51:00.000-07:00

RESOURCES, REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES ON WAR, 4gw AND Insurgency

PART I.: http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/072334.html
PART II.: http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/072335.html

Article III, Section 3, of the Untied States Constitution states:
“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”
“The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason…”

** NOTE: We apologize for the incomplete and haphazard nature of these references. We have too many projects on-going and our poverty has driven us to hunger and weakness of body – however – so be it – and our spirit grows ever stronger – many new projects of advanced foresight are springing forth from the writers and researchers who follow our path.

The tidal wave is poised…

A. I. a – BACKGROUNDER :
ON FASCISM AND USA Decadent Thought Processes; see:
http://atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/FG27Aa01.html
While groupthink is undoubtedly to blame for the Iraq war's false premises, the full implications of the "groupthink" that occurred, as well as that which is ongoing, appear to have yet to emerge.

Highlighting a disturbing reality, Burston had noted parallels between the social psychology of the present and that of the 1930s. In a further parallel to the 1930s, on July 9 the conservative Chicago Sun-Times (one of the United States' top 50 papers) ran a commentary on US fascism, stating that "fascism' is not an exaggeration", and adding that anyone who doubted this "doesn't know what fascism is". It went on to note: "Some liberals suggest that the administration is capable of canceling the November election on the grounds of national security if it looks like Bush would lose. I doubt this." But on July 11 and 12, news of the administration seeking legal authority for just such an election postponement - a delay in the November election for national-security reasons - widely broke.

Burston had said he believed the US could be poised "on the verge" of a corporate fascism, and eminent political scientist Dr Michael Parenti (Yale PhD in political science and author of 18 books) spoke similarly. And indeed, the slippery slope of "groupthink" in effect provided the basis for the psycho-dynamics dominating the rise of 1930s fascism, its proponents of a "new order" perceiving endless lies, propaganda, repression, mass violence, and even mass murder as legitimate means to what they perceived as their "noble" ends, versus tragic and criminal delusions. Students of history will note the "groupthink" evidenced in Germany's 1930s mass rallies at Nuremberg, though the realization of what was then occurring didn't fully emerge until the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals of the 1940s.

As discussed in ATol's July 8 article, the process of groupthink then in effect spawns "'socially patterned defects' that enabled large groups of people to adjust themselves comfortably to a system that, humanly speaking, is 'fundamentally at odds with our basic existential and human needs'". Burston then noted that this resulted in "deficiencies, or traits, or attitudes which don't generate internal conflict when, in fact, they should". He then cited "Nazi mass-murderer Adolf Eichmann as representing the 'prototypical example' of what the phenomenon of 'socially patterned defects' can engender", emphasizing that "with one very questionable exception, Eichmann tested normal on all psychological tests that were administered to him by mental-health experts before his trial".

In discussing questions of contemporary fascism with Asia Times Online, Dr Parenti said, "When fascism came to power [in the 1930s], what it did was cut back on the public sector, privatize a lot of state-owned industries, abolish inheritance taxes and other taxes on the rich, abolish corporate taxes, cut wages, destroy labor unions, and destroy or undermine opposition parties." He described fascism as simply a tool employed by ruthless power-elites in achieving their ambitions. He added: "There's a concern that we're [the US] heading towards fascism, or that we're replicating fascism today."

Parenti saw citizenry being mobilized by "waving the flag in their face, and wrapping the flag around the leader, and telling them that they're being threatened by one menace or another, from abroad or within." In a parallel, Bush critics have long charged his administration with precisely this. Parenti cited Nazi Field Marshal Hermann Goering's similar explanation of popular motivation, which emerged from the period of the Nuremberg Tribunal. In a purely American vein, Parenti recalled that former US secretary of state John Foster Dulles had said: "To get the people to support large military budgets and intervention, you've got to conjure up a threat, and you've got to make this scenario of 'one nation is a hero, another nation is a villain'. It's got to be hero versus villain." And the Senate Intelligence report does aid parallels between Dulles' vision and the Iraq war.

"You fool the people into thinking that you're protecting them, you're watching out for their interests, and you get them to vote against their own interests," Parenti charged.

Comparing today's United States to the 1930s, Parenti addressed the recent US Supreme Court decision allowing Vice President Dick Cheney and the Bush administration to refuse public access to the documents of Cheney's so-called Energy Task Force. Indications exist that oil-war questions were discussed within this group, a September 2003 Inter Press Service article, "Oil war questions surround Cheney energy group", addressing such concerns. Parenti strongly emphasized the implications of the court decision.

"The Supreme Court decision does, in effect, lift the executive power to an unaccountable and undemocratic status. So you really have no way for Congress or the public to hold these people accountable for what they're doing. You're, in effect, setting up a cloak of impunity on their actions under the guise of 'executive privilege' ... so what we're getting here is many of the same things that the fascists accomplish, while maintaining a democratic veneer," Parenti claimed, adding: "You're getting enormous tax cuts for the rich - there are now corporations that are making billions of dollars in profits that are paying no taxes - you're getting the rollback of trade unions through outsourcing, closing down unionized factories ... you're getting depressed wages, wages aren't keeping up with inflation; increasing spending in the military sector - this is just exactly what the fascists did. So you're accomplishing a lot of these same things without having to 'go all the way' and destroy every little shred of democracy." Parenti then proceeded to draw a firm parallel with the Italian 1930s "corporative state".

"In practice, the big decisions regarding the political economy were made by the industrialists," Parenti noted, but prefacing that by saying all groups within the Italian corporative state were "supposed to" share the decision power. He likened the large Italian industrialists' group to America's National Association of Manufacturers, saying, "in effect, those were the guys who were really thoroughly incorporated, and most of the ordinary people were left out in the cold, as subjects of the state". After a moment, Parenti quickly observed that "the people always get a share of this action, though. The American people get a share of it, the Italians did ... their share is the taxes and the blood. They pay the taxes, and they send their sons off."

Notably, with the Nuremberg Tribunals, society long ago determined that those who may commit criminal acts while influenced by groupthink are nevertheless criminals, and should be judged accordingly. (Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

FOOTNOTES Useful for the Series: Beyond Iraq Strategy and Associated Articles.

Part I.

Pre-Appendix Notes:

A. 1.
Link to the Black Banners of the Mahdi
(a.) July 25, 2004; http://meta.popdex.com/link/1494
Kidnappings In Iraq Juan Cole writes about the recent surge of civilian kidnappings in Iraq.
The tactic of attacking the civilian employees of companies doing work in Iraq is actually not new, and is only one of a number of current guerrilla tactics. Another is to assassinate municipal, provincial and federal officials. A significant percentage of municipal council members has been assassinated, though only The Guardian has reported on this deadly campaign at the local level.

As for the trucker kidnappings, the Black Banners are a symbol of revolution in Islamic history, and not only among Shiites. The corrupt Umayyad kingdom was overthrown by the Abbasids around 750 CE when revolutionaries raised black banners in the East. The Abbasid dynasty, which created Baghdad and ruled for centuries, is seen by Iraqis generally and by Muslims generally, including Sunnis, to have created a Golden Age when the Muslim world was more glorious than Europe. So the term "Black Banners" could have a Shiite implication, but does not necessarily do so. Even secularists or Marxists could adopt black banners as a revolutionary symbol, with reference to the Abbasid revolution. posted by Sullivan at 06:07PM CST [trackback]

(b.) Analysis: Iraq's 'changing' war; By Claude Salhani; UPI International Editor
http://www.washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040722-084908-1295r.htmWashington, DC, Jul. 22 (UPI) -- The "war" in Iraq is suddenly taking a very different turn, and regrettably, not one for the better. After first targeting the military, then changing tactics by kidnapping hostages and holding them in exchange for the withdrawal of Coalition troops -- and one may add with some success -- the "insurgents" are now going after the soft underbelly of Iraq, its fragile economy.

A new rebel group, hitherto unknown, calling themselves the "Black Banners" is the latest to surface. They join the plethora of armed groups opposed to the presence of foreign forces, particularly American soldiers, in Iraq. The Black Banners have detained six hostages: three Indians, two Kenyans and an Egyptian, all nationals from "neutral" nations.

The abducted men work as simple truck drivers for a Kuwaiti company. The kidnappers have threatened to behead one of their captives every 72 hours, beginning Saturday, if the Kuwaiti company does not agree to withdraw from Iraq by the set deadline.The intriguing development in this new incident is that none of the countries involved in this latest round of abductions contribute troops to the U.S-led coalition serving in Iraq.

Furthermore, the Black Banners abductors demand that the countries concerned -- Kenya, Egypt and India -- withdraw all their citizens from Iraq, and stop doing business with the Americans. This request may be somewhat complicated to initiate.As far as the Kenyans are concerned, withdrawing their nationals from Iraq should not be too difficult. There could not be too many Kenyans working in Iraq. But when it comes to the Egyptians and Indians, the issue becomes far more complicated.

India, a country with the world's second-largest Muslim population, after Indonesia, has long maintained excellent relations with Iraq. Even during Saddam Hussein's rule and throughout the more than a decade of U.N.-imposed economic sanctions, the two nations maintained cordial ties. The exact number of Indians working in Iraq is difficult to establish as some have entered the country illegally, coming from Kuwait.
Currently, it is estimated that there might be anywhere from 1,200 to 5,000 Indian workers employed throughout Iraq, working in mostly menial jobs. Prewar estimates were as high as 100,000. Egypt, too, has most probably tens of thousands of its nationals working in Iraq. Most of them are also employed in low-paying jobs. Repatriating such large numbers would require a monumental effort and would create an exodus of Biblical proportions, similar to the massive evacuation of foreigners that had to be undertaken after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

So why would an insurgent group -- purported to be acting in the national interest -- demand the forced removal of people involved in rebuilding their country? One could only presuppose that having successfully pressured several nations, such as the Philippines, Spain and a number of Latin American states to withdraw their forces, the insurgents are now re-directing their efforts to undermine Iraq's economy. The aim of such a move would be to push Iraq into an economic abyss, hoping that the United States' post-invasion effort of rebuilding the country and "bringing democracy" would be guaranteed failure.

Cripple the economy and the country comes to a standstill. The rebels may be applying the old communist theory that in order to "win," they must first run the system into the ground. Why else would they demand the departure of people and businesses involved in reconstructing Iraq's war-tattered infrastructure and frail economy? People with no ties to the "occupation forces."
The answer may well be found upon further analyzing who would benefit from a weakened Iraq. That, in itself, may not be easy to interpret as the list could be long. First, is Iraq's timeless rival, Iran, with whom Iraq fought a bloody eight-year war. The Iraq-Iran war caused around a million deaths and saw the deployment of chemical weapons (by Iraq). Iran is not likely to forget that. The mullahs in Tehran remain extremely wary of a reconstituted and re-militarized Iraq. But on the other hand, an unstable Iraq can also be very unsettling for Iran, as well as Iraq's other neighbors.The fact that the group is calling itself the Black Banners may offer a hint regarding their identity. Members of the Shiite community traditionally fly black banners, usually during certain religious holidays, such as Ashoura, or at funerals.

Then again, the Black Banners could just as easily be a cover name used by a number of groups working for any of Iraq's enemies who would like to see it remain in a weakened state. Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi comes to mind.
Zarqawi is a fundamentalist Sunni with deep loathing of the Shiites, and could have used the name to make it seem as if the Shiites are behind these abductions, discrediting them. The symbolism of the "black flags" is so obvious, that it immediately conjures up a certain doubt. The name was most certainly chosen to add confusion, a probability confirmed by a former intelligence specialist familiar with the region."I really don't see Shiite organizations engaging in these types of kidnapping, especially given the general negative reaction to the beheadings," Matt Levitt, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who specializes in terrorism, told United Press International. "There is just no precedent for this in the Iraq context." In sum, this new phase in hostage taking might be the start of a distressing new trend in the Iraq war, one that could further damage the economy if hundreds of thousands of workers who help make the country function were to suddenly leave. (Comments may be sent to Claude@upi.com.)

A. 2.
a. Links to 4 GW see: Footnote number 2, below in main footnote section.

A.3.
Fifth Generation warfare refers to a situation where many countries have embraced 4GW and developed weapons, trained defenders and compelling ideas (belief in their country, cause and skills). In coalition and through the development of appropriate weapons (stand off, anti-aircraft missiles, electronic jamming devices, secure communications) these insurgent nations can hold off, deter and stand up to the imperialists.

A.4. FARC ( Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
a.

b. www.anncol.org

Part II. Main Section of Footnotes

1.) A. Suicide Bombs – form one of the slides – www.blackwaterusa.com or www.emergency.com – title: s Improvised Ex Devices -

B. Bin Laden- and Iraqi Insurgents
(1) "Declaration of Jihad," "Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants," Available on the internet at: http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm
(2) "Iraqis deceive Marines at Nasiriyah," Sanders, K. MSNBC, Available on the internet at:: http://www.msnbc.com/news/890065.asp
(3) FBI Most Wanted Poster: Available on internet at: http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/teraladel.htm
(4) Viewpoint on clashes in Falluja and other Iraqi flashpoints, – June 21
http://www.jihadunspun.com/intheatre_internal.php?article=6698&list=/home.php
(5) Battle in Iraq – failed Assassination – Health Min – Jun 20 –
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/20/iraq.main/index.html

C. Al Q story – netwar -
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/07/18/INGHQ7668C25.DTL

D. Link on Chechen and Algerian Islamacists
http://beirut.indymedia.org/ar//2004/03/1032.shtml

2.) Fourth Generation Warfare (Continued)
http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/4gw_continued.htm

C. Grau, Lester W. and Ali Ahmed Jalali. 1999. The Other Side of the Mountain:
Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps
Studies and Analysis Division.

D. Grau, Lester W. and Timothy L. Thomas. 2000. Russian Lessons Learned From the
Battles For Grozny. Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 84, no. 4, April 2000: 45-48.

E. (1.) Lind, William S., Colonel Keith Nightengale, U.S.A., Captain John F. Schmitt, U.S.M.C., et. al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989; available at http://www.d-n-i.net.

(2.) See also the 1997 update of the original FMFM-1, Warfighting, pub. 1989. Available on the Marine Corps site, http://www.usmc.mil.

F. ) http://www.g2mil.com/Jun2004.htm

G. 4GW: Tactics of the Weak Confound the Strong, By G.I. Wilson, John P. Sullivan, and Hal Kempfer - Military.Com - September 8, 2003
http://www.military.com/NewContent?file=Wilson_090803
We live in a world of "Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)" where the tactics of the weak confound the tactics of the strong.

H. 4GW: Tactics of the Weak Confound the Strong
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/comments/c490.htm

I. For other threats to US National Security see:
A. Series: Beyond Iraq Strategies: Section IV. Threats to U.S. National Security
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058691.html
http://newswire.indymedia.org/en/newswire/2004/06/804624.shtml

J. Although 4GW concepts are still evolving, Boyd and Sun Tzu certainly believed that the mental agility, rapid tempo of operations, and consideration of mental and moral effects demanded by maneuver warfare would also carry over to what we now call fourth generation warfare.

K. Why a Fourth Generation?
• continued exponential increase in the world population
• decline in standards of living in certain Third World countries
• continuing international AIDS epidemic
• rise of mega-cities (Jakarta, Cairo, Delhi, Mumbai, etc.)
• increasing scarcity of arable land and water
• explosion in drug trafficking, with associated money flows & corruption
• fall of the Soviet Union and continued instability in the FSU
• end of the bipolar world order and of the interpretation of events through a Cold War filter
• ready availability of small arms and other inexpensive weapons
• resurgence of violent transnational ideological groups
• continued growth in wealth and influence of transnational corporations
• emergence of US as the only conventional / economic superpower
• growth of worldwide connectivity (CNN and the Internet, for example)
• ease of global transportation (24 hours between any two points)

What Will the Fourth Generation Look Like?

L. http://www.emergency.com/2003/urban_warfare_considerations.htm
Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW): This style of warfare was based on the trends identified in the earlier generational shifts. They believe that future war would be characterized by: very small independent action forces (SIAF) or cells acting on mission-type orders; a decreased dependence on logistics support; more emphasis on maneuver; and psychological goals rather than physical ones. This latter objective of psychological warfare meant that the enemy’s will to fight had to collapse from within. Wilson, et al, posed that the “idea-based fourth generation may be visible in terrorism”. They did not propose that terrorism was the fourth generation, but rather, they suggested that terrorism would take advantage of fourth generation warfare. Finally, the authors identified three basic constructs of 4GW:
(1) the loss of the nation state’s monopoly on war,
(2) a return to a world of cultures and states in conflict, and
(3) internal segmentation/division along ethnic, religious, and special interests lines within our own society.

In a set of chilling predictions, the authors suggested that in fourth generation warfare:
(1) There will be a shift in focus from the enemy’s front to his rear;
(2) The practitioners of 4GW would seek to use the enemy’s strength against him;
(3) They would use freedom’s openness against itself; and finally,
(4) The 4GW force would not need a lot of money to wage fourth generation warfare.(8)

Characteristics of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) and Situation in Iraq Today According to Wilson, et al, So the war has taken on a blurry admixture of strategy, operations, and tactics in fourth generation setting:
An elusive enemy who doesn’t fight “fair”
Difficult terrain –
Uncertain allies - Problematic identification of friend from foe
Experienced and hardened enemy fighters - Underground enemy (9)

Typical Tactics of Urban Guerillas and Practice of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW)
The urban insurgent works alone or in small cells.
a. Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage.
b. Generating widespread disturbances designed to stress the resources of the opposing force.
c. Creating incidents or massing crowds to lure the opposition force into a trap.
d. Provoking the opposing force into overreacting, which would provide hostile propaganda.
e. Provoking inter-factional strife.
f. Sniping at roadblocks, outposts, sentries, and individuals.
g. Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.
h. Planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or at random, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public morale.
i. Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters.

Tactical/Technical Lessons/Considerations in Urban and 4th Generation Warfare:
* Rigorous communications security is essential, even against relatively primitive enemies.
* Night operations are especially difficult to carry out in an urban environment.
* Tanks and armored personnel carriers cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support.
* Trained snipers are very cost effective, but likely to be in short supply.
* If patrolling is central to the strategy of the security forces, it will be different from conventional combat patrolling and must be well coordinated.
* Fratricide is a serious problem when fighting in cities because it is harder to identify friend from foe.
* Major civilian structures in cities (e.g., hospitals, churches, banks, embassies) are cited in such a way as to be tactically useful locations, command key intersections, and/or are built of especially solid construction. Therefore, such facilities are especially useful to urban defenders. We have already seen examples of Iraqi usage of a hospital as a staging area and for the storage of WMD protection equipment.
* Direct-fire artillery and anti-aircraft artillery can be a valuable tool in urban combat, provided one does not care about collateral damage. Unfortunately, "collateral damage" will be used in Iraqi propaganda
* Small unit leadership, especially at the junior non-commissioned officer level, is critical to tactical success in urban operations.
* Recovering damaged armored vehicles is more difficult in urban areas.
* Intelligence, especially from human sources, is absolutely critical to successful urban operations.
* Hit-and-run ambushes by small groups are the favorite tactic of urban paramilitary forces. We have already seen such tactics in Iraq.
* Tracked vehicles are preferable to wheeled vehicles in situations where there is likely to be large amounts of rubble in the streets. Otherwise wheeled armored vehicles are faster and preferable.
* Helicopters have extreme difficulties operating in an urban combat environment (See BlackHawk Down in Somalia), but are quite useful in redeploying forces and supplies to just behind the forward edge of operations.
* The Soldier's equipment load must be dramatically reduced because urban warfare requires greater individual agility and stamina. Special emphasis must be given to ammunition loads, medical supplies, and water.
* Small arms, though not usually decisive in large battles, play a disproportionately significant role in the outcome of urban battles.
* Individual flak jackets significantly reduce urban casualties.
* Smoke enhances survivability in urban situations, but carries significant operational penalties (e.g., impedes visual communications, taxes driving skills of vehicle operators, and slows the overall rate of advance).
* Mortars are highly regarded by both attackers and defenders in urban operations, but may be less effective than supposed.
* Machine-guns may be more valuable than assault rifles for urban combat.
* Air defense guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets.
* Heavy machine-guns still offer good defense against close air attack, especially helicopters.
* Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) are omnipresent and very effective weapons in urban combat. We can expect extensive use of RPG's by irregular Iraqi forces.
* Armored vehicles require more protection when operating in cities and that protection needs to be distributed differently than for conventional battlefield.
* Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) can provide real-time intelligence, but analysts have considerable difficulty interpreting it correctly.
* The enemy often employs home-made weapons, even including chemical weapons, against security forces.
* Lightly protected armored vehicles are of limited value in heavy urban terrain.
* Combat engineering equipment, especially armored bulldozers, are critical assets in urban combat.
* Cluster munitions are very effective in cities, provided one is not concerned about collateral damage. (See previous note on the use of collateral damage as an enemy propaganda tool)
* Although available, artillery-fired precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were seldom used in urban operations.
* “Bunker busting” weapons can be invaluable for urban warfare.

M. 1. [10] Vincent J. Goulding Jr., "Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare," Parameters, Winter 2000-2001 (source from original article in Arabic).

N.) (1.)http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP34402
(2.) Extensive research can be found at communitydefense.blogspot.com

O. See Section 2.5 and 2.6 from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-19-30/ch2.htm

P. Counterinsurgency: In modern usage, the term (and the strategy) originated with the British campaign against communist insurgents in Malaya after World War II. In the words of Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner to Malaya in the early 1950s, “The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble. The other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us” (Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1991, p. 259).

Q. DeGroot, Gerard J., “Vietnam: What Went Wrong?” Defending America, April 25, 2001 (available at http://www.sftt.org). Dr. DeGroot is Department Chair at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland and has published widely on the Vietnam War.

R. The Battle(s) of Grozny, by Ib Faurby, Royal Danish Defence College, available on the internet at: http://www.caucasus.dk/publication1.htm

S. The Second Intifada and the Lessons of Jenin Dealing with the Grim Realities of Urban Warfare, by Cordesman, A., Center for Strategic and International Studies, available on the internet at: http://www.csis.org/features/second_jenin.pdf

T. The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation-LtCol Thomas X. Hammes-Marine Corps Gazette-September 1994
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm

U. http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&q=4GW

3. A. Countries/conflicts where US may intervene: Syria, Iran, N. Korea, Colombia, are the likeliest; Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and the Sudan are dangerous long-shots.

B. (1.) Information on Saudi Oil facilities and an interesting series of comments on US intervention in Saudi affairs – some miss the point. http://www.almuajaha.com/newswire/display/5893/index.php

(2.) Harpers Magazine, 1975;
C. A cloud over civilization; JK Galbraith - Thursday July 15, 2004
http://www.jihadunspun.com/index-
This is an edited extract from The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time, by JK Galbraith, published by Allen Lane. T

4. Bin Laden references :
a. 04/27/98. Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The Coming Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces By: Staten, C. L. ERRI http://www.emergency.com/asymetrc.htm

b.

FOOTNOTES SEC II.:
4. Huang places the life of Sun Tzu from 534 B.C. to possibly 453 B.C., although he notes that the book may not have been written in his lifetime. Griffith places the date of its writing at between 400 and 320 B.C. Cleary merely places it during the Warring States Period (5th – 3rd Centuries B.C.). I primarily used the translation by Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala, 1988) and citations without any other identifier refer to this edition. I have crosschecked certain passages with the classic translation by retired Marine Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1971 paperback) and these are identified as “Griffith,” and with the heavily annotated translation by J. H. Huang (New York: William Morrow, 1993), indicated by “Huang.”
In 1972, near the town on Linyi in Eastern China, Chinese archeologists uncovered a set of 200 bamboo slats containing a version of Sun Tzu dating from roughly 100 B.C. Although very close to later versions, there are some differences that have caused translators to revise certain passages. For more information, see Huang, 21. The basic classics of Taoism are usually known in English as the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tzu Book. Both are widely available in translation. A very approachable introduction to Taoism is Alan Watts’ Tao, The Watercourse Way, Pantheon 1975. For a readable discussion of the complex relationship between Taoism, Buddhism, and Zen, see Ray Griggs’s The Tao of Zen, Alva Press, 1994.
The period of nearly continual warfare known as the “Warring States” began with an attack by several states on another in 453 B.C. – Griffith’s date, (other historians use dates as late as 404 B.C.) – and ended with the rise of the Qin dynasty in 211 B.C. Two of the eight large states did not participate to any great degree. By the end of the period all of the minor states had disappeared. This period of constant experimentation in warfare among a myriad of smaller players resembles the situation in Italy which inspired Machiavelli’s Art of War or in what is now Germany in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which led to Clausewitz’ On War.
Readers may be interested in Griffith’s speculation on why the Chinese appeared to abandon Sun Tzu in the latter stages of the Korean War in favor of human wave tactics (55)
Blumenson, Martin, Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885∞V1945, Berkeley, 1987, p. 156. Patton was very much in the Sun Tzu tradition and was considered our most dangerous general by many German officers.

5. .) A. Interested readers can download Boyd's major briefings at Defense and the National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net
Much of the inspiration and background for this paper came from: What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review?; Chester W. Richards- May 2001, A product of the Center for Defense Information’s Military Reform Project. http://www.cdi.org/mrp/, Marcus Corbin, mcorbin@cdi.org, 202-797-5282.
Boyd’s works have not been “officially” published. Page numbers refer to his 1986 version of the Discourse on Winning and Losing. Each presentation within the Discourse is separately numbered. Citations in this paper use the following system: POC refers to “Patterns of Conflict,” SG to “Strategic Game of ? and ?,” and OD to “Organizational Design for Command and Control.” These can all be downloaded from http://www.d-n-i.net. Boyd’s comments on Clausewitz appear at POC 42.

B. General Boyd Strategies see:
http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/boyd_military.htm

C. A nice presentation of Boyd (through Chester), with tables, graphs and summaries of their recommendations for a new US Strike Force is found at:
http://www.d-n-i.net/richards/sword_4_boyd.pdf

D. The most approachable biography of Boyd is probably F. C. Spinney’s “Genghis John,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, July 1997, also available at http://ww.d-n-i.net. A professional biography by Dr. Grant Hammond of the US Air War College, The Mind of War, has just been published by the Smithsonian Institution (May 2001), and an as yet unnamed biography by author Robert Coram is scheduled for release in early 2002 from Little, Brown.
F. C. Spinney, personal communication, March 2001. The Discourse is the collection of Boyd’s work on strategy. It includes “Patterns of Conflict” (1986 – indicated by POC in these endnotes), “Strategic Game of ? and ?” (1986 – SG) and “Organic Design for Command and Control” (1986 – OD) as well as several others not cited here.
Boyd’s involvement in the F-15 and the Lightweight Fighter Prototypes (which became the F-16 and F/A-18 programs) is documented in Cowan, Maj. Jeffrey L., U.S.A.F., “From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, His Theories on War, and their Unexpected Legacy,” Thesis, U.S.M.C. Command and Staff College, 2000 (available at http://www.d-n-i.net), and Hammond, Grant T., “The Essential Boyd,” 1997 (available at http://www.belisarius.com).
Boyd, SG, 42.

6. FOOTNOTES SEC III.: Boyd, Sun Tzu and Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18601

Foot Section IV. Threats to U.S. National Security
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058691.html

http://insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournal?moduleId=31058

Foot Section V. Sun Tzu and Boyd on the Utility of Military Force
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/059016.html

http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18817

Foot Section VI. Military Force vis-à-vis Other Options and Considerations
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18818

http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=19094

7. Foot Section VII. What Makes a Military Force “Effective”? - Sun Tzu’s and Boyd’s Perspective
http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=Soldierforum&type=journal&zorpiasid=fe7fd06c088bed188556a25b6c0ac96f
http://insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=31058&entryId=19428

Foot Section VIII. Creating Forces: Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060395.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18999

Section IX. Enhanced Third Generation Warfare: The Warfare of Rapid Maneuver
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060399.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18998
FOOTNOTES SEC IX.:
Boyd warned (p. 33), aboput inward looking due to complexity

Foot Section X. Cohesion, Training and Leadership
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=20512
http://zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=soldierforum&type=journal&start=0

Foot Section XI. Equipment and Organizations for Maneuver Warfare
http://zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=soldierforum&type=journal&start=0
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=20469
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=19075

Foot Section XII. Force Structure Options
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060829.html

Foot Section XIII. Technology and Effectiveness in the 4GW World of Conflict
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060827.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=19076

FOOTNOTES SEC. XIV.:

8. Footnotes: Section XV. :
1. A. Black market rockets and missiles are killing American soldiers. Here is how we'll fight back. Captain Scott C. Jansen. "The Story of the Rocket Propelled Grenade." RED THRUST STAR. April 1997.
B. Jane's Infantry Weapons. Terry J. Gander and Ian V. Hogg, editors. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1995, p. 303-305.
C. http://www.defense-update.com/products/r/rpg.htm
D. Grau, Lester W. 1998. The RPG-7 On the Battlefields of Today and Tomorrow. Infantry.
Vol. 88, no. 2, May-August 1998: 6-8.
E. Puttré, Michael, “Facing the Shoulder Fired Threat,” Journal of Electronic Defense, April 2001.

9.

10. A.

B. For more on concepts for countering snipers, see Alan Vick et al., Aerospace
Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts, RAND, MR-1187-AF,
2000, pp. 131–138.

11. PREDATOR B - MQ-9 HUNTER/KILLER
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/predator/

12. http://www.defense-update.com/events/2004/summary/defexpo04uav.htm

13.
14.

15. http://www.manuelsweb.com/neutronbomb.htm
reference: http://www.virtualschool.edu/mon/Outlaws/faq1

16. http://www.zealllc.com/commentary/neutron.htm

17. Our Hidden WMD Program: http://slate.msn.com/id/2099425/
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020408.htm

18. Bush Nuclear Policy
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm

19. A. NEW US WEAPONS SYTEMS
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1481&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=23&typeID=(4,5)&from_page=relateditems.cfm
The United States is the world’s largest small arms producer. The United States is home to the largest number of companies of any single arms producing country. It is also a major exporter of small arms, and has one of the world’s largest domestic markets for firearms. The United States is estimated to export approximately 400,000 small arms, including military firearms, every year. This is one more reason why United States has the responsibility to lead, not merely comply with existing international agreements.

B. http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm?ProgramID=39&issueid=49

C. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm

D. http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4

E.http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1635&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&typeID=(8)&from_page=relateditems.cfm

E. Advanced 120mm Mortar Munition - Under development by Talley Defense Systems

XM984 Extended Range Mortar Cartridge (ERMC) is currently under development for the US Army 120 mm M120/M121 mortar system. Compared to a conventional M934 bomb fired from this system will reach a maximum range of 7,200 metres, the XM984 is expected to almost double the range, to reach 12,000 m'. The range extension being produced by a nose-mounted rocket motor that cuts in at a pre-determined point during the bomb's trajectory. The rocket will fire 12 seconds after the launch, and burn for a period of four seconds. After a predestinated delay, 54 M80 grenades will be released from the bomb, effecting a target are 233 percent larger than an HE bomb.

F. Ceramic Armor Materials
Current design trends indicate wider use of ceramics, for vehicle armoring as they lower the overall weight, while enhancing abilities to defeat ballistic threats. Composite ceramics can be used in layered formations, matrixes of different materials or monolithic elements. Typical materials used for this application are Alumina, silicon carbide (SiC), boron carbide (B4C) and titanium carbide and titanium diboride, these are lighter than most metals, including titanium, by a factor of 2 -- 3. While monolithic ceramic elements can be used, most vehicle protection applications are utilizing composites of several materials, which offer improved endurance tenacity, imperative for advanced protection and survivability.

The physical properties of ceramic materials have been recognized for many years. However, manufacturing techniques limited their utilization to relatively small parts and simple shapes. Recent advances in manufacturing process offer lower cost production techniques of larger, more complex structures. Some of these cutting edge procedures are also employing exotic technologies which dramatically improve the physical characteristics of the end product. Among these are the Fibrous Monoliths (FM) and Displacive Compensation of Porosity (DCP) ceramic materials manufacturing technologies, the use of nanoparticles in raw material powders and coating, and new concepts for treatments of metallic structures -- such as metal matrix composites (MMC), and liquidmetal.

FOOTNOTES SEC XVI.:
20. a. http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=41&ItemID=5684
First of all, and maybe the most important and negative consequence of the invasion, but which is likely to have long-lasting effects, is a deep hatred for Americans in large parts of the world, and even more for Israelis and Jews, seen, at least in most of the Muslim world, as pulling the strings of US policy. But that is exactly why wars are so dangerous (they fuel desire for revenge and hatred) and why the whole notion of humanitarian war is so insane.
More positively, the resistance has blocked the US army for the time being; just after the fall of Baghdad, the question was: who is next, Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea? Now all these countries can more or less breathe easy; they will be subverted by the usual means, but not invaded.
The divide between Europe and the US grows deeper. That is not just due to the war; the extreme arrogance of American leaders has helped considerably in that respect

FOOTNOTES SEC XVII.: Intelligence
21. A. Short CIA and SOF – Newest Paramilitary – could add indicted CIA –ex-Ranger contractor story (charged w/ murder).
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/us-special-operations-forces-are-cia.html

B. http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/066849.html

22. FOOTNOTES SEC XVIII.:

23. Foot Section IX. Assessing Forces: 4GW

24. Foot Section XX. Conclusion
a. http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/067799.html

b. newer conclusion – (final ) (plus comment has long version of Exec. Summary)
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000459470&zorpiasid=3f86deb51c0750d908f27dc30544710a

c. Urban Warfare
Grau, Lester W. and Timothy L. Thomas. 2000. Soft Log And Concrete Canyons:
Russian Urban Combat Logistics In Grozny. In The City’s Many Faces:

(6) "Task Force Ranger: A Case Study Examining the Application of Advanced Technologies in Modern Urban Warfare," Akers, F., for DOE, prepared by NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM OFFICE, Y-12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX, OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE 37831-8260, Available on the internet at: http://www.at.y12.doe.gov/ranger.pdf

(7) 2. Charles C. Krulak, "The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas," presented at National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1997, Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997, p. 139.

(8) 5 May 2002 -“Military Response to Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan,” By Wilcox, G. and Wilson, G.I., Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/2002/4gw5may02.htm

(11) "Training for Urban Operations In the 21st Century," by Gangle, R. Col., Marine Corps Gazette - July 2001, available on the internet at: http://www.urbanoperations.com/training2.htm

(12) "Military Operations on Urban Terrain [MOUT]," by Global Security.org, available on the internet at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/mout.htm - With numerous other useful links
The Urban Operations Journal - MOUT/FIBUA - Small Wars - Cultural Intelligence: available on the internet at: http://www.urbanoperations.com/
ERRI and the EmergencyNet News Service, 2003.6348 N. Milwaukee Ave., #312,Chicago, IL. 60646
; http://www.emergency.com webmaster@mail.emergency.com

1. The operations of Philippine forces against Abu Sayef Group (ASG) rebels provide a recent example of this. Over the course of several months, U.S. special forces in-country trained with their Philippine counterparts, focusing on individual soldier skills and small-unit tactics. New equipment, including rifles and ammunition, was also provided. U.S. forces also offered assistance in planning patrol operations. The result was more frequent and more effective patrols that led to the freeing of one American hostage and the elimination of several terrorists. Follow-on training missions are planned. Similar “Successes” have occurred in Nepal and Colombia.

2. A. Air Force helicopters used for infiltration and exfiltration of special forces can also provide battlefield medical evacuation capabilities. U.S. capabilities for nighttime medical evacuation by helicopter were said to be particularly valuable to Philippine forces engaged in the hunt for members of the ASG in 2002

B. Grau, Lester W. and William A. Jorgenson, D.O. 1998. Handling the Wounded in a
Counter-Guerrilla War: the Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and
Chechnya. US Army Medical Department Journal. January-February 1998.
Available from http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/handlwnd/
handlwnd.htm.

3. Counterinsurgency: In modern usage, the term (and the strategy) originated with the British campaign against communist insurgents in Malaya after World War II. In the words of Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner to Malaya in the early 1950s, ÏThe shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble. The other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind usÓ (Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948Ò1960, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1991, p. 259).

4. For more on the integration of psychological operations and air operations, see Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941Ò 1991, RAND, MR-576-AF, 1996, especially pp. 199Ò202.

5. For more on concepts for countering snipers, see Alan Vick et al., Aerospace
Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts, RAND, MR-1187-AF, 2000, pp. 131- 138.

6. U.S. air forces deployed to Operation Desert Storm included more than 250 fixedwing aircraft that were capable of delivering laser-guided bombs. They were supplemented by several squadrons of British Tornadoes and a handful of other PGM capable allied aircraft.

7. For an overview of emerging sensor technologies and their potential to support operations against dispersed groups of enemy personnel, see Alan Vick et al., Enhancing AirpowerÌs Contribution Against Light Infantry Targets, RAND, MR-697-AF, 1996, pp. 13 - 30.

8. For a review of the current state of the art in imaging sensor technologies and their potential for miniaturization, see Alan Vick et al., 2000, pp. 83-- 107.

9. In some situations, such sensors can be emplaced by agents on the ground. In others, delivery by air might be preferred. The Internetted Unattended Ground Sensor (IUGS) program, initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is developing an air-delivered body with magnetic, seismic, acoustic, chemical, and environmental sensors that can detect human and vehicular movements. See Alan Vick et al., 1996, pp. 26Ò27.

10. Military Reconnaissance Satellites (IMINT)
When detailed reports of geographical areas, military installations and activities, troop positions, or other picture-based intelligence are required, policy-makers and analysts turn to data provided by IMINT (Image Intelligence) satellites. Operating in low, near-polar orbits at an altitude of between 500 and 3,000 kilometers, and maintaining the same orbit around the Earth, they make about 14 revolutions per day. IMINT satellites use either photo-optic, electro-optic infrared, or radar technology to scan a new swath of ground with each orbit

http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=399&IssueID=49&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&issueID=49
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_3.htm#REF29h4

Notes and References
(1.) U.S. Military Commands: See Global Commands Photo at:
http://www.cdi.org/issues/usforces/commands.html
The U.S. is the only state which divides the entire globe into military commands with a general or admiral in command of each region and designated forces. This practice began during World War II when global warfare forced the U.S. armed services to change from small, separate branches into an integrated armed force that deployed vast land, sea, and air forces around the globe. This practice of assigning U.S. military forces responsibility for specific regions worldwide is known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Recent changes in US Military Command are: the merger of U.S. Strategic and U.S. Space Commands. From Oct. 1, 2003 there are 9 Unified Commands (composed of units from two or more military services):
Geographical Responsibilities:
I. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) (Bases/HQ in Colorado Springs and Washington DC)
II. Pacific Command (USPACOM) (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii)
III. Central Command (USCENTCOM) (Headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida)
IV. European Command (USEUCOM) (Stuttgart, Germany
USEUCOM Special Forces: The special operations forces under the operational control of COMSOCEUR include the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) located at Panzer Kaserne, Germany; Naval Special Warfare Unit Two also located at Panzer Kaserne, Germany; Naval Special Warfare Unit Ten located at Rota, Spain; and the Air Force 352d Special Operations Group located at RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom. The Director and Commanding General of Special Operations Command Europe is BG Thomas R. Csrnko, USA. The Director, Special Operations (ECSO) also serves as the Commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). Organization: Special Operations Personnel and Administration (SOJ1); Special Operations Reserve Affairs (SORA)
Many photos of US military personnel at: http://www.eucom.mil/Photo_Gallery/index.htm
V. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) (Miami, Florida, & Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico)
Functional Responsibilities:
VI. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (Miami; Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; and Tacoma, Washington)
VII. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
VIII. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
IX. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
NORTHCOM AND SOUTHCOM/USSOCOM are the primary tools for the Western Hemisphere.

2.) Based on the work of Chester W. Richards- May 2001, Center for Defense Information Military Reform Project. HYPERLINK "http://www.cdi.org/mrp/" http://www.cdi.org/mrp/

3.) Weapons and tactics best suited to 4th and 5th GW:

4.) See: US Special Operations forces are CIA Paramilitaries without Geneva Convention Protection; www.communitydefense.blogspot.com

5.) Generalized strategies like Boyd's or Chester's are introductory and foundational --Much of the "debate" over 4th generation and new US strategies are intentionally or otherwise misleading -- The real world - where the US charts a course of domination -- is ever more complex than analysts describe Ò are the Imperialists and the Bush neo-cons ignorant, partially blinded or hyper-Machiavellian? Though this will soon be a moot point as war spreads across the planet, the motivations and the mindset of adversaries is always a worthwhile endeavor.

6.) Actually a moot point as the US designed the world economy long ago to require the US to dominate and secure its resources

7.)
8.)

9.) Conduct of Operations: The following is a description of a cycle of activities for a large special forces operation similar to one that will soon be launched into Colombia from Peru and Ecuador. Its objective is to kill or capture guerrilla leaders. The US may wait to launch this attack until it decides to assassinate Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.

The intelligence element belonging to the task force will search and locate a guerrilla force moving far from the front-line. Forces are scrambled to engage the guerrilla force and one force is flown to the designated area in order to engage the guerrilla. A special force of the airborne unit, deployed by assault helicopters nearby the guerrilla unit, uses laser designation systems to mark it for attack by air. Simultaneously, attack aircraft loaded with precision anti-personnel munitions takes off towards the guerrillas for the completion of the mission. Assault helicopters manned with an airborne elite unit are deployed in ambushes on the expected retreat routes of the guerrillas, in order to capture the survivors.

Throughout the entire procedure of scramble and engagement, contact is maintained with the guerrilla force by means of data collection (UAVs or sensors attached to guerrillas, spies or equipment) and would designate targets by laser designators and other means for aircraft and helicopters. The goal of the first wave attack is to destroy a part of the force and to 'freeze' the rest of it in place. At this point, after the guerrilla force has lost its maneuverability and mobility, since movement would expose it to additional volleys, attack aircraft and attack helicopters continue to destroy the guerrilla force. Finally, the elite unit would close in and finish off the battle. The few guerrillas who succeeded in escaping would probably run into the ambushes and be hit by them.

How could guerrilla counter this strategy and these types of operations? How could they turn it into a trap ... or a defeat? Surface to air missiles, decoys and better intelligence could enable the guerrilla to inflict heavy casualties.

11.) 4th, 5th and versions mixed with maneuver warfare also site :

12.) Dr. Hammond; JOURNAL OF BATTLEFIELD TECHNOLOGY, VOL 5, NO 3, NOVEMBER 2002 31; http://www.argospress.com/jbt/Volume5/5-3-7.htm

13.)
14.) For Boyd the primary national goal was to Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment. Some would argue that Bush sought to preserve national unity by allowing the 9/11 attacks to occur much as FDR allowed the Pearl Harbor attacks. All sides in the currently spreading 4th World War have difficulty maintaining alliances and a focused purpose. Bush seems to believe that the worse the war gets the more people will become unified -- but this may require pushing the conflict to more regions and to a higher level of destruction which could feedback into higher energy prices, global recession and the inability of US people to travel anywhere in the world.

15.) Pax Americana, -- refers to the idea that as the sole remaining superpower, it is in the long-term U.S. interest to intervene militarily to ensure peace and stability anywhere around the world, that it is better to stamp out brushfires than fight major conflagrations. A RAND study concluded that “We learned [in the last decade] that American economic and military strength is as important as ever and that much of the world still depends upon us to be engaged and to lead.

16.) It is probably redundant to note that this advice was widely ignored during the ensuing Chinese Warring States period. And the U.S. government’s ignoring of it in Vietnam produced entirely predictable effects, which are a hallmark of 4th generation warfare: The French and the Americans resorted to force because of the supremacy of the Communists in the political arena. They learned (or should have learned) that force by itself was inappropriate, because the application of force made the political appeal of the insurgency all the greater. The harder they tried to win the war, the more disruption they caused, and the more remote victory became. The same failed strategy seems to be playing out against Islamic Fundamentalists: the cannot win politically, morally, spiritually; the west is unwilling or too late to win through bribery and so now it is trapped in a military confrontation that only aids the strengthening of the adversary’s recruiting and alliance building.

17.) Actually, the US seems to be speeding up and diversifying its forces and strategic development investments.

18.) a DISCUSSION OF THE APPARENTLY catastrophic strategy of Bush in Iraq -- 2003-2004 and beyond.

19.)
20.) -- OR 16 -- 17 ?? Boyd, Chester and most liberals miss the point of Bush's actions. Having grasped the seriousness of Boyd's predictions about 4GW, the US has been forced to accelerate its program of global domination. Though some mistakes were made as in all conflicts Bush seeks to draw out potential large nation enemies so that the US can destroy their conventional forces and reduce their support to insurgents. Then the US will only face 4GW and strategic threats of a diminished nature.

(21.)
(22.)
(23.) Insurgents fighting U.S.-led occupation force have increased the sophistication, coordination and aggressiveness of their tactics, Army officers and soldiers involved in combat here said. As several thousand U.S. troops pushed south this week from the Baghdad area to this new base in central Iraq, one highway bridge on their planned route was destroyed and two others were so heavily damaged that they could not be used by heavy Army trucks and armored vehicles. Those attacks on convoy routes, which U.S. forces were using for the first time, revealed a previously unseen degree of coordination among insurgent groups, said Army Col. Dana J.H. Pittard, the commander of a brigade-size task force now assembling for possible combat operations against the forces of radical Shiite Muslim cleric Moqtada Sadr in or near the holy city of Najaf. "The dropping of the bridges was very interesting, because it showed a regional or even a national level of organization," "When we first got here, it was just IEDs," the roadside bombs known as improvised explosive devices, "and mortars," said Sgt. James Amyett, a scout with the 1st Infantry Division who arrived in Iraq just over a month ago. "Then all of a sudden, it's full-scale ambushes."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9532-2004Apr13.html

(24.) Gotowiki --

(25.)

(26.)

(28.) Spanish Civil war on loosing momentuum

(30.) The remainder of this 107-chart tour de force supplies the historical background, comparisons with other countries' military systems, and detailed recommendations for implementation. Those charged with improving the effectiveness of U.S. military forces would get more benefit from studying Vandergriff's work than from any of the institutional defense reviews now underway. The entire briefing is available at Defense and the National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net.

(31.) So the first step Boyd and Sun Tzu would take is to recommend measures, such as a return to the regimental system, to improve cohesion. In addition to VandergriffÌs proposals, defense leaders might wish to study the recommendation first made by management theorist W. Edwards Deming to eliminate the annual merit review (officer and enlisted performance reports). These reports, especially when ranked, pit one individual directly against another and provide strong incentives that work against unit cohesion.

(32.) This is one area where funding will probably have to be increased. Free play exercises must be carried out frequently enough so that new commanders and their units can experiment as they are learning their jobs. Not only must the exercises themselves be funded, but costs of the depreciation on the equipment also must be covered, since to be effective in developing leadership and doctrine, these exercises must be as frequent and as realistic as possible.

(33.) This is a somber, awesome responsibility and as Vandergriff has noted, should be awarded sparingly, and only after a rigorous training and selection process. Most jobs in the military do not require commissioning and could be performed as well by enlisted, NCOs, warrant officers, or civilians. It is not clear, for example, why one must be commissioned to operate an aircraft in the Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps, but not in the Army.

4. For more on the integration of psychological operations and air operations, see Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941– 1991, RAND, MR-576-AF, 1996, especially pp. 199–202.

5. For more on concepts for countering snipers, see Alan Vick et al., Aerospace
Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts, RAND, MR-1187-AF, 2000, pp. 131–138.

6. U.S. air forces deployed to Operation Desert Storm included more than 250 fixedwing aircraft that were capable of delivering laser-guided bombs. They were supplemented by several squadrons of British Tornadoes and a handful of other PGMcapable allied aircraft.

7. For an overview of emerging sensor technologies and their potential to support operations against dispersed groups of enemy personnel, see Alan Vick et al., Enhancing Airpower’s Contribution Against Light Infantry Targets, RAND, MR-697-AF, 1996, pp. 13–30.

8. For a review of the current state of the art in imaging sensor technologies and their potential for miniaturization, see Alan Vick et al., 2000, pp. 83–107.

9. In some situations, such sensors can be emplaced by agents on the ground. In others, delivery by air might be preferred. The Internetted Unattended Ground Sensor (IUGS) program, initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is developing an air-delivered body with magnetic, seismic, acoustic, chemical, and environmental sensors that can detect human and vehicular movements. See Alan Vick et al., 1996, pp. 26–27.

http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=399&IssueID=49&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&issueID=49

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_3.htm#REF29h4

Below is on Kosovo -
http://www.tupbiosystems.com/articles/kosovo_conflict.html

Insurgents Display New Sophistication -- Campaign Leaves Bridges Heavily Damaged, Hampering Military's Push South
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9532-2004Apr13.html

http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm?ProgramID=39&issueid=49

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1635&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&typeID=(8)&from_page=relateditems.cfm

Military.com discussion forum -- http://forums.military.com/1/OpenTopic?a=cfrm&s=78919038&f=81519858

http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=399&IssueID=49&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&issueID=49

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_3.htm#REF29h4

Saudi Security Forces Aid to AL Qaeda – in Beheading
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/20/saudi.militants/index.html

http://www.4armedforces.com/product/2005_USMC_AV8_1

http://insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=31058&entryId=20575

Below is link with nice photos and US casualty update – June 21
http://newswire.indymedia.org/en/newswire/2004/06/804684.shtml

Below is key Saudi oil facilities
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html

Below new viewpoint on clashes – Falluja and others – June 21
http://www.jihadunspun.com/intheatre_internal.php?article=6698&list=/home.php

Link on Chechen –algerian Islamacist
http://beirut.indymedia.org/ar//2004/03/1032.shtml

Battle in Iraq – failed Assassination – Health Min – Jun 20 –
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/20/iraq.main/index.html

Bush told he is playing into Bin Laden's hands. Al-Qaida may 'reward' American president with strike aimed at keeping him in office, senior intelligence man says (ANONYMOUS)
Julian Borger in WashingtonSaturday June 19, 2004-- The Guardian

On Psyops see: http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/lind_5_25_04.htm

This is from emergency.com -- Psychological Implications and Operations - 4GW and Asymmetric Warfare
In the Post-Cold-War era, our enemies, including Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Yasar Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and any number of others have discovered that they can win the "hearts and minds" of the world's people through the selected use of real information, disinformation, manipulation of the press, propaganda, and other psychological (Psy-Ops) warfare methods.
 In fact, some would even go so far as to suggest that Mr. Hussein actually won the latest stand-off with the United States (early 1998), over Chemical/biological Weapons and inspections of his palaces, as he was able to manipulate public opinion in the United States and elsewhere and split the former allied Persian Gulf coalition.

For Grant, see J.F.C Fullers, Grant and Lee; A Study in Personality and Generalship, Eyre and Spotiswoode, 1933 (widely available in paperback). For Patton, one might start with Blumenson, op. cit. General Fuller was one of the primary authors of the Blitzkrieg and one of the first major strategists to rehabilitate Grant. BoydÌs own -- Patterns of Conflict -- is probably the best summary of the power of maneuver warfare (available at http://www.d-n-i.net).
Wolfe, Frank, -- Senate Passes Budget Resolution Amendment With $8.5 Billion More For Defense, -- Defense Daily, April 6, 2001.

Pork is in the eye of the beholder,(Sen. Trent) Lott recently explained to reporters. Ï Where I'm from, that's federal programs that go north of Memphis. In Murdock, Deroy, -- Defense Spending, The Barons Of Pork Lose Priorities, -- Atlanta J. and Const., April 23, 2001. Sen. Lott (R-Miss.) is the Senate Majority Leader.
I wish I could take credit for this observation, but it was Basil Liddell Hart who commented that having spent so much money on the Maginot Line, French doctrine just had to support it. See History of the Second World War, Da Capo Press, 1999 and Strategy, Meridian Books, 1991.
During those years (1909-1916), I had, as the boys in the back room would say, a swell racket. Looking back on it, I feel that I could have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents.U.S.M.C. Major General Smedley Butler on his operations in Central America (a longer selection from this 1933 speech is available at http://www.fas.org/man/smedley.htm). Smedley Butler was, as far as I know, the only Marine officer to win the Medal of Honor twice.

“Quickness” is often translated as “speed.” However, it is important to distinguish between the physical property of velocity, which is simply distance divided by the time it takes to traverse it, and the quality advocated by Sun Tzu, which is more like mental agility, rapidity in operational tempo. The ability to move rapidly over the ground can be a valuable tactic in certain situations, but nowhere does Sun Tzu advocate training the troops to march faster or developing faster chariots as the paths to victory.
Again, many translations available. It should be noted that Clausewitz died before his book was finished and so he may well have revised his final conclusions.
67.

168.
172.
Griffith, 147.
Huang, 112.
Musashi has a strong Zen orientation. Unlike Sun Tzu, Musashi does not dwell on the dynamics of people in groups but concentrates on the Zen concepts of “empty mind” and intuitive knowledge. However he is very much in the Sun Tzu tradition by insisting that the spirit of the enemy is the true focus of effort and that the enemy must be defeated mentally and morally before one risks an attack with cold steel. His book gives specific advice on how to accomplish these goals. Boyd’s favorite translation was The Martial Artist’s Book of Five Rings, by Hanshi Steve Kaufman, Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1994. My personal favorite is the translation by Nihon Services Corporation, Bantam, 1982.
Boyd, POC, 132. These three criteria, taken together, define the phrase “operating inside the opponent’s OODA loops.” Nowhere in the Discourse does Boyd write that just executing the “observe to orient to decide to act to observe” cycle more rapidly than one’s opponent was the key to victory. For one thing, he always included “more inconspicuously” and “with more irregularity.” For another, those four arrows represent only half of the eight relationships in the “loop” and omit the Zen-like implicit guidance and control feeds that are the true keys to its effectiveness.

Boyd, POC, 88.
Boyd, SG, 36.
Boyd, POC, 114.
Huang, 25.
Tao Te Ching, trans. Stephen Mitchell, New York, Harper & Row, 1988, 31.

Hammond, Grant T., “Paradoxes of War,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994. Dr. Hammond is professor of international relations and director of the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College. His book on Boyd, The Mind of War, was published in May 2001 by the Smithsonian Institution.

Gen. Charles Krulak, U.S.M.C. (Ret.), personal communication, May 25, 2001.

Smith, Col. Daniel, U.S.A. Ret. “The World at War,” available at http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001/issue1/world.html. Perhaps the best near-term candidate would be Macedonia. See: Wright, Robin, “Hands Off Stand on Macedonia May Backfire for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2001.
68-69.
69.
Boyd, POC, 10.
Boyd, POC, 139.
Boyd, POC, 141.
Griffith, 39; the phrase “to one’s own side” was added for clarity.
For example, STRATFOR.com, “Consequences of a New U.S. Defense Strategy,” March 1, 2001.
Ed Offley, “Bush Gets Roadmap For Launching New Defense And Foreign Policy,” Stars and Stripes Omnimedia, January 11, 2001.
Lehman, John F. and Harvey Sicherman, “America The Vulnerable: America's Military Problems And How To Fix Them,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Volume 9, Number 3, February 2001.
68
Mitchell, 61.

Smith, CDI, op. cit.

One of the newest possibilities for involving US troops in a fight over vital resources is the somewhat exotic metal tantalum. Required for a variety of electronics and aerospace applications, it is found in rich deposits in Congo, Nigeria, Malaysia as well as Spain, Canada, and Australia, but not in the United States. For more information, see Vick, Karl, “Vital Ore Funds Congo’s War,” Washington Post, March 19, 2001.

America’s premier large fighter, the F-15, was approved for initial production in 1973. Its replacement, the F-22, should be approved for production this year (2001) but will not be available in any quantity until around 2010. The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, ensures that the F-15 will remain the dominant air superiority fighter for the foreseeable future.
United Press International, “Former Defense Secretary Calling For Increased Budget,” January 30, 2001.

Krauthammer, Charles, “The Bush Doctrine,” Time, March 6, 2001. The exact quote is: “America is in a position to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and implacable demonstrations of will.”
Goure, Dan, “Coping With Chaos,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 17, 2001.
“Bully Run,” editorial, Times of India, February 21, 2001.

Gorbachev, Michael, “Mr. Bush, The World Doesn’t Want to Be American,” International Herald Tribune, December 30, 2000.

Browne, Vincent, “No Whisper of Challenge to Clinton,” Irish Times, December 20, 2000.
Boyd, SG, 53ff., POC 139.

Hughes, Patrick, Lt. Gen., U.S.A., Ret., “Military Missions in the Millennium,” Letter to the Editor, Washington Times, March 4, 2001.
Interested readers may want to put themselves in Lyndon Johnson’s shoes and see if Sun Tzu’s factors would have indicated probable victory in Vietnam.

Griffith, 39; readers should note that this powerful assessment applies to any form of human conflict: war, business, politics, sport, etc.
Both lists, of five and of seven, appear in the first chapter of Sun Tzu. Huang translates the fourth point as “which side has stronger weapons and people.” This is the only place in any of the translations where the idea of “stronger weapons” is raised. Huang, 39 [[ AND INDEED THIS IS A KEY DIFFERENCE _ THEN TO NOW!!! ]]
.
Griffith, 66.
80. Although a ruler should not personally intervene in the duties of the commanders, this passage is not a license for commanders to assume they have a totally free rein while in the field. They are still very much subject to the overall control of their feudal lord. See Huang, 135.
Griffith, 71.

Griffith notes that this was a period of rapid technological change, with the introduction of hard irons (and perhaps even early steels) that could keep an edge, and particularly the widespread adoption of the crossbow. This weapon, Griffith notes, would have “made colanders of Greek and Macedonian shields” of the time, and probably ended the useful military life of the chariot. (Griffith, 36) Gunpowder was apparently known, but was not used for weapons in this era. Cavalry was introduced shortly after the writing of The Art of War.

There is an interesting new book out on intuitive decision making, Klein, Gary, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, MIT Press, 1998. If you study the OODA loop diagram, pay careful attention to the “implicit guidance and control” arrows, which represent the intuitive (and very rapid) aspects of the “loop.”
Perhaps the best introduction to Zen from the military point of view is Thomas Cleary’s Japanese Art of War: Understanding the Culture of Strategy, Shambhala Press, 1992. This was a personal favorite of Col. Boyd’s.

Those familiar with Col. Boyd’s presentations will note that he shortened it to simply auftrag. He spoke little German, but said that one of the German generals he interviewed told him it was acceptable.
This is Boyd’s translation of the German schwerpunkt.
Boyd, POC, 132 (“Second Impression”).

95. Readers might also wish to consult Griffith’s comments on cheng / ch’i (41-42) from the standpoint of a professional warrior.
Recently reiterated in our gross inability to predict what would cause Milosevic to surrender or when. Our original prediction of 3 days eventually turned into 70, and even now the reasons for his capitulation are not clear. See Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege and Maj. Jacob D. Biever “Power Projection,” Army, April 2001.
128.

Boyd, SG, 51. These effects are difficult to produce in a fully computerized “model,” although they can be induced to some extent in war games with human players.
Griffith, 39. This is from the first page of Griffith’s chapter entitled “Sun Tzu on War,” where he brings his personal experience as a military professional to bear on the interpretation of Sun Tzu.
Schlesinger, James and Harold Brown, “What About Defense?” Washington Post, December 20, 2000.

Tirpak, John, “Providing Vigilance, Reach, and Power,” Air Force, April 2001, quoting U.S.A.F. Chief of Staff General Michael E. Ryan.
Simon, Steven and Richard Sokolsky, Bridging the Military Generation Gap, Wall Street Journal Europe, April 4, 2001.

Tirpak, John, “The Indispensable Fighter,” Air Force, March 2001.

Bowden, Mark, Blackhawk Down, Atlantic Mon. Pr., 1999.
There were reports that the Serbian forces were able to cause havoc with our anti-radiation missiles by jury-rigging microwave ovens. Whether this story is true or not, it does illustrate the type of countermeasures we may face in the future.
112, 113.

See particularly Boyd’s discussion of WWI “infiltration tactics” POC 56-61. He notes that these, as well as guerilla tactics by T. E. Lawrence and the German Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, provided a “way out” of the stagnation and enormous attrition caused by the tactics of both sides earlier in the war.
To cite one example, radar guided air-to-air missiles were justified by predicted probabilities of kill well over 50%. In actual use in Vietnam against fighter-sized targets, they achieved slightly less than 12%. See Goartz, Robert D., “An Analysis of Air-to-Air Missile Capability in Southeast Asia,” Maxwell AFB, AL, June 1968, cited in Hammond, Grant T, The Mind of War, Smithsonian Institution Press, May 2001.
Boyd, POC, 176.
Boyd, POC, 12.

66.
152. As one of the canonical commentators, Chen Hao, explains, “to take advantage of unpreparedness, lack of foresight, or lack of caution on the part of opponents, it is necessary to proceed quickly; it won’t work if you hesitate.” (153) This interpretation fits with the idea that it is mental quickness–as in Boyd’s OODA loop – that conveys advantage and not just physical velocity.
Wyly, Col. Michael D., U.S.M.C. Ret., “Thinking Like Marines,” 1991, available at http://www.belisarius.com. Col. Wyly was the founding Vice-President of Marine Corps University and one of the prime originators of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps.
Leonhard, Lt. Col. Robert R., U.S.A., “Classical Fire Support vs. Parallel Fires,” Army, 2001. Colonel Leonhard has published extensively on maneuver warfare, including Principles of Warfare for the Information Age, Presidio, 2000, and The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle, Presidio, 1999.
Lind, William S., Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview, 1985.

For Sun Tzu, as we have seen in this paper, all warfare is to be as irregular as possible. That is, he made no distinction between third generation maneuver warfare, and what is called 4GW. Boyd also noted that the same concepts underlie both, although they are applied differently. See POC 69, and 107-109.

The size of the defense acquisition workforce comes from Bill Landaeur, “Pentagon Devises Plan To Bolster Procurement Ranks,” Defense Week, October 2, 2000.

Vandergriff, Maj. Donald, The Revolution in Human Affairs. Maj. Vandergriff’s study of the Army personnel system is covered in more detail below.

Comments taken from the Chief of Staff of the Army’s “Leadership Survey,” Ft. Leavenworth KS, 2000. Available at http://www.d-n-i.net.
Briefing by Lt. Gen. Timothy Maude, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel, October 19, 2000. Figure 4 is Chart 25. Available at http://www.d-n-i.net
81.
99.
98.
See, for example, Shay, Dr. Jonathan, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, Touchstone, 1995. Several papers by Dr. Shay on trust and cohesion are available at http://www.belisarius.com.
Boyd, SG, 18.

This is the title of an excellent paper by Dr. Jonathan Shay, at http://www.belisarius.com. Wyly, op. cit. also addresses this topic as does MCDP 1, Warfighting.

Available at Defense and the National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net.
For documentation of the current state of leadership within the Army, see the Leadership Survey commissioned by the Chief of Staff in 1999 – 2000 and the report of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to the October 19, 2000 Commanders Conference. Both are available at http://www.d-n-i.net.
Boyd, OD, 37.

“Poor leadership” is a key problem in dealing with the effects of our current high personnel, operating, and deployment tempos. Adding additional free play exercises should provide a sharp razor for identifying our very best combat leaders. See the report by former US Army officer and decorated Vietnam veteran John F. C. Tilson, “Reducing the Impact of Tempo,” Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-3508,
October 1999, http://www.ida.org, also available at http://www.d-n-i.net.

As Gen. Krulak observes, although service in the ranks prepares superb junior officers, the focus must change as they ascend in rank. At the senior levels, they require a broader education such as that offered by the academies (personal communication, May 25, 2001). There are numerous proposals for retaining but reforming the service academies. A successful tour in the ranks, for example, could be required before admission to the academies, which, unlike officer candidate schools, would still feature a broad, four-year education.

“Warriors can use any weapon they choose if they understand my strategy.” Kaufman trans., 88.
But not always. If the enemy believes that he has discovered our plans for using heavy forces as cheng and as a result starts looking for a ch’i attack elsewhere, then a surprise attack by our armor could in fact be ch’i. Even a direct assault on a fortified position can be ch’i, as was Col. Emory Upton’s attack at Spotsylvania Courthouse, May 10, 1864. This is one reason for Sun Tzu’s admonition that you can’t specify these things in advance. (This is a major theme of Sun Tzu. See, for example, 55, 113,127, 155)

“Be extremely subtle, even to the point of formlessness.” (109) “Therefore the consummation of forming an army is to arrive at formlessness.” (111)

Japanese swordsmen tried to cause an instant, which they called suki, during which their opponent hesitated and became vulnerable to a fatal strike (Musashi, Nihon trans., 31). Very high mental agility, “quickness,” was needed to sense and exploit this fleeting vulnerability, but not brute physical speed. “Speed, not being necessarily good, can only cause you to lose control.” (Kaufman trans., 98)
Boyd, POC, 132, 151.
Boyd, POC, 55.

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult … Friction is the only conception which distinguishes in a general way real war from war on paper.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Penguin, 1968, 164 (based on the 1908 translation by Col. J. J. Graham). While Clausewitz was obsessed with minimizing friction on his own side, Boyd, following Sun Tzu and Musashi, was equally obsessed with creating it in the other. See POC 41-42.
Perhaps the most extensive collection of data documenting that Eisenhower’s warning was well founded appears in two presentations by Pentagon analyst F. C. Spinney, “Defense Death Spiral,” and “Defense Power Games.” Both of these are available at http://www.d-n-i.net.
“Sen. Landrieu Proposes $100 Billion Defense Spending Hike,” Aerospace Daily, March 20, 2001. The commercial analogue of maneuver warfare is generally known as “lean production.” It was created in Japan by Toyota and relies on the same Taoist / Zen framework as maneuver warfare.
There is a large set of data that supports this conclusion. A good place to start is George Stalk and Thomas M. Hout, Competing Against Time, Free Press, 1990, and Richard D’Avenni, Hypercompetition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic Management, Free Press, 1994.

“Lean production” refers to implementation of the set of production system design principles and management practices created by Toyota in the immediate post-war years. The core ideas are to establish single piece flow within cells (as opposed to batch production), pull (just-in-time, which implies bottom-up organic control) between cells, and a management climate that encourages people to continuously improve the system. A functioning lean production system will constantly reduce production spans, defects, and costs while producing exactly at the rate customers are buying. Because of its emphasis on using time as a weapon to shape markets, and its reliance on trust, harmony, and initiative, lean production is the only manufacturing system that fits into a competitive strategy based on the principles underlying maneuver warfare.

More recently, Nokia has all but driven Ericsson and Motorola out of the cellular telephone business, and Dell recently displaced Compaq as the world’s largest maker of personal computers. Both Nokia and Dell employ many of the ideas behind maneuver warfare. I have recently completed a paper on lean production and the defense industry that presents these arguments in more detail. The paper is available from the Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C., http://www.cdi.org.

Vandergriff, Maj. Donald, U.S.A., editor, Spirit, Blood, and Treasure, Presidio, to be published June 2001. I have a chapter in that book.

For arguments that support this assertion, see “The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and the Operational Art,” by then-LtCol. G. I. Wilson, U.S.M.C.R., Marine Corps Gazette, June 1991. Colonel Wilson was one of the original members of the small group that initiated maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps.

If it were a cheng maneuver, it could have been performed much earlier and with a greatly reduced force.

At the end of the Gulf War, seven months after the invasion of Kuwait, the “premier Army National Guard Infantry Brigade”, the 48th Mechanized, was still at the National Training Center in California. Air National Guard and Reserve fighter squadrons, by contrast, are among the most ready and often defeat their active duty counterparts in fighter competitions. Not only are they staffed and led by highly experienced pilots, but their years of training together often gives them tremendous cohesion and esprit. There is no reason why we could not use this restructuring of our land forces as an opportunity to create similar armor and mechanized infantry units. (The author, it should be noted, is a retired Air Force reservist.)
The Airmobile units are highly mobile once they, their equipment, and their support arrive in theater. As the Task Force Hawk episode shows, however, deploying these elements to undeveloped areas of the Third World can be a logistical and training nightmare. This area requires study and experimentation. We may, for example, want to keep this capability, but transfer it to the reserve components.
To this point, I have used “land forces” in lower case to indicate that I am not recommending that as its name. I would personally prefer something like US Strike Force or US Mobile Force.
This interval is arbitrary, but should reflect how long we think it would take some threat to develop a credible conventional capability.

For a highly entertaining story of how technology could assist 4GW in the future, read The Devil’s Footprint by Victor O’Reilly, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1996. The weapon called “Dilger’s Baby” is real. For a true story of experimentation in today's combat environment, see Commander (Now Captain) Dan Moore's paper on fast OODA loops in Bosnia, “Bosnia, Tanks, and ... ‘From the Sea,’ ” US Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1994.

Task Force Hawk was the deployment of 24 Apache attack helicopters from Germany to Albania in April of 1999 (during the NATO – Serbian War) to participate in some fashion in our air attack on Serbian forces in Kosovo. By the time the episode ended, we had spent at least $700 million, used 550 C-17 sorties, deployed 10,300 pieces of equipment, moved an entire corps headquarters, crashed 2 helicopters on training missions, and failed to generate one combat sortie. See Dana Priest, “Army's Apache Helicopter Rendered Impotent In Kosovo,” Washington Post, December 29, 1999. The after-action report issued by TF Hawk’s commander, Brigadier General Dick Cody, is available at http://www.d-n-i.net.

For a concise summary, see: Murray, Lt. Cdr. William S., U.S.N., “A Will to Measure: An Examination of Military Measures of Effectiveness,” Parameters (scheduled for publication).
The “Lanchester Square ‘Law’” was proposed by F. W. Lanchester in 1916 to describe attrition in early air combat. Roughly, it says that at any moment in time, the loss rate on each side is the product of the number of weapons on the other side times the killing rate of those weapons. After some mathematics, one can show that the “effectiveness” of each side is the killing rate of its own weapons times the square of the number of those weapons. The more “effective” side will attrite the other to zero. What this law actually describes is something like a (piece of a) Civil War skirmish line, where each soldier is in range of all the enemy soldiers and neither side retreats or maneuvers. This is about as far from maneuver warfare as one can get. Despite this, the square law, or something very much like it, lies at the heart of every computerized combat model in use today. For a thorough discussion, see Darilek, Richard, Walter Perry, Jerome Bracken, John Gordon, and Brian Nichiporuk, Measures of Effectiveness for the Information Age Army, Rand Publication MR-1155-A, 2001, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1155/.

Some readers may have noticed that the Strike Force also has a mission of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, tactical aircraft operating from the CVNs present a need for joint cooperation. So the Hydra of Jointness has not been completely eliminated but should be shrunk to nuisance dimensions.

Donhowe, Peter, The Bush Military Blueprint, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 17, 2001.
Covault, Craig, “Russian Air Force Faces Deepening Crisis,” Av. Week and Space Tech., March 5, 2001.

Kan, Shirley A., Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke, “China's Conventional Arms Acquisition: Background and Analysis,” Congressional Research Service, October 20, 2000.
Mann, Paul, “Strategic Reconnaissance at Issue in Sino-US Tiff,” Av. Week and Space Tech., April 9, 2001.

For those still determined to increase the U.S. defense budget, note that including the spending of our likely allies (NATO, Japan, Australia) would boost our advantage over a combined Russia-China-“rogue states” threat to roughly five to one. Data are available at http://www.d-n-i.net.
This “fine sense” is, of course, a vital element in the commander’s fingerspitzengefühl.
Wall St. J., “Building a Defense,” April 16, 2001.
Despite President Bush’s Gulf War boast of being able to hit a bullet with a bullet, there is no evidence to suggest we destroyed even one SCUD warhead. A “successful” Patriot intercept meant that the SCUD warhead simply exploded in a different part of the city. Roughly 10% of our combat casualties in the war resulted from a single SCUD that destroyed a building housing Army reservists in Dhahran, 25 Feb 1991. I was in Riyadh in February 1991 during the last two weeks of SCUD attacks, and the inhabitants thought that our claims of destroying SCUDs were hilariously funny.
Inside Missile Def., “Analyst Warns of Increasing Foreign Interest in Cruise Missiles,” April 18, 2001. The analyst is David Tanks, of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.
Retaining the initiative under any circumstance lies at the heart of Sun Tzu’s strategy. Even momentary lapses can lead to disaster. Griffith has an excellent discussion on p. 41.
108. The “Maginot Line Syndrome” refers to any belief that something will make us safe. It is the exact opposite of the title of Intel CEO Andy Grove’s book, Only the Paranoid Survive, Currency (Doubleday), 1996. The “something” can be physical, as in the real Maginot Line built by France between the world wars, it can be a belief in a “core competence,” a simple feeling that we’re smarter than they are (as Hitler felt towards the Soviets in 1941), a belief that spending more provides safety – anything that reduces the sense of urgency and humility that leads one to seek out problems at a very early stage (to “confront the difficult while it is st

http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/066849.html
Above is Section XVIII – long version Intelligence –

FOR Section – XVIII –
Footnotes
TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 for the conduct
of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements
of the United States Government:
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(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
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(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department
of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
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Stryker Brigade Combat Team?
The proposed plan is to transform the 2ndBrigade, 25th Infantry Division (L), based at
Schofield Army Base, into a Stryker Brigade Combat Team.
The goal of a Stryker Brigade is to be able to deploy anywhere in the world and be engaged in battle within 96 hours. The Brigade would be equipped with a variety of high-tech equipment –including more than 300 Stryker urban assault vehicles. In the Army’s words, Hawaii’s Brigade will be trained in urban warfare, and will prepare soldiers to “resolve urban unrest, infiltrate and clear buildings, and fight at close range.”
What is t he Stryk er? The Stryker is a tank that is designed for urban
warfare. It looks like a tank, but is “lightweight,” weighing about 20 tons each. (For comparison, a conventional Abrams tank weighs about 60 tons -- a Humvee about 1½ tons). It has eight rubber tires instead of tracks, and is designed to travel
on roads. Each Stryker carries a maximum of 11personnel and is equipped with a high-tech computer command center. It travels up to 65 miles per hour and can be equipped with a hugevariety of weaponry. The Stryker is not designed for conventional warfare. Its armor is not strong enough to withstand rocket-attack or bombs; it requires improved roads and is not fit for rough terrain.

What w i l l t he Stryker Be Used For?
Strykers are designed to be used against civilians. In the Army’s own words, they will be
used to “resolve urban unrest.” Bush says “you’re either with us or against us”.
The reality is that the majority of the world is against the U.S.’s immoral and illegal “war
without end” and the military needs to change their strategy and tactics to wage war against that majority.

The Stryker Brigades (and the Strykers) will be used against people who oppose U.S.
empire - people who protest the presence of the U.S. military in their country, people who fightagainst U.S. occupation of their countries, people who struggle against globalization and war. The Army says it chose Hawaii for the Stryker Brigade because “its location within the Pacific Rim is a critical area of interest for the United States”. In other words, the Brigade trained inHawai‘ i will be ready to be sent to places like: The Philippines, where there is a liberation struggle against U.S. imperialism; Indonesia, where protests against U.S. globalization frequently rock the country; South Korea and Okinawa, where people often hold huge protests against the presence of
U.S. military bases; 3DFLILF ,VODQG QDWLRQV, where indigenous
people are demanding independence.

So there are different ways to structure your investigation of the world’s problems/solutions. This is what should be called Your Life When-You-Care-to-be-Aware – The key question is Why all these problems – from politics to ecology-racism-disease- and many more.

Is this mess that the ruling class has designed with such brilliant minds – this world we live in – the best that humans can do – does it matter how well we do things – Is everything really just a short term selfish pursuit of hedonism, pain avoidance and ?? – whatever the television advertisers tell us is important??
TYhis bit belkow not in CONC.

Well not if we ask people accurately – for this world is mostly designed by the tastes and pleasures of a small percentage of rich white humans. But why – why any of this ?

What drives conflict, what are the weaknesses of those in power, those who call the shots and shape conflict and the perceptions of conflict and solutions?

Why are there infinite possibilities yet people (especially alternative or quasi-radical groups) see only one or two ???

We have to use what is available – the weapons the resources the people etc… We cannot wait – nor encourage others to wait – for some perfect moment – a perfect strategy – or the education and enlightenment of the masses (every indication is that people get more confused each day) – the government – media nexus is rife with psychological warfare manipulations.

III. STRATEGY - Study power and pipeline grid for key industry connections and key expensive sites - with a mind to avoid excess loss or eco harm -Always look for weakness - in structure - morale - designs - unprotected areas - people - towns - facilities - anything of value -Truck bombs on substations - and horizontal mortars -
Write up a whole series of strategy articles – a call for indigenous tribes to takeover drug trafficking - a new organizational structure for guerrillas, a command and a political front - a parralell political force - like soviets (councils of soldiers and workers) -Cuban - for looks (strength projection) - education – and as balancing checks and to promote women. Have a new leader or two - of each type and one or the next in commands should be women .
THINK _ back and forth – all the time and when new info or developments come in - what are weaknesses and strengths of them and you - which of yours can be improved or covered - long and short term and the same for theirs - which can be exploited or further weakened - how will and does this effect new strategies - and tactics .
Hit the defense ministry - in Bogota on the way to airport

New rules were created for dealing with 700 terrorist suspects who've been held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed off on a list of about two dozen permissible interrogation techniques, many of which veered from official Army manuals. The military says the techniques included heat, cold and sensory assaults such as loud music. Human-rights groups that interviewed suspects released from Guantanamo said they were told of beatings and sexual humiliation.

The question of which techniques are so harsh that they violate the 1994 international ban on torture that the U.S. signed remains in dispute. None of this, however, was supposed to apply in Iraq. There, the conventions were supposed to be obeyed. Rumsfeld said so early in the Iraq war as he complained about the treatment of captured U.S. soldiers.... But as the world now knows, that's not how it turned out.
Last August, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, who oversaw the Guantanamo interrogations, arrived in Iraq to pump up useful intelligence obtained from Iraqis detained as suspected insurgents. He quickly applied the lessons learned in Cuba. Miller denies his methods sparked abuses at Abu Ghraib. But Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba's report concludes that Miller's approach violated Army doctrine.

At the same time, habits learned in Afghanistan were being transferred to Iraq. A military-intelligence platoon that interrogated suspects in an Afghanistan detention center where two prisoners died also questioned prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Meanwhile, military reservists acting as guards at the prison didn't receive the Geneva Convention training that regular soldiers do. Why has not been explained.

Nor is Abu Ghraib the whole story. Only one of the 30 deaths occurred there.
So the chain of events seems to have worked like this: Rules violating the Geneva Conventions were invented for dealing with proven terrorists in specific places or circumstances. But they gradually came to be applied to hundreds of suspects, many of them innocent. Military officials said 70% to 90% of the Iraqis swept up for interrogation were arrested by mistake, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported.

There's no evidence of a high-level order to engage broadly in torture. Just the opposite. But neither can the problem be blamed on a few bad actors. At the very least, it suggests indifference and conflicting goals at the highest levels that encouraged the abusers.

Repeated warnings from human-rights investigators were ignored or pushed aside. Iraq ground commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez said two months passed before he learned of a Red Cross report on abuses that was submitted Nov. 6, even though the Red Cross monitors the Geneva Conventions.

The civilian chain of command also knew about the abuses. Last July 15, a United Nations (news - web sites) envoy met with Administrator Paul Bremer to alert him to the problem. But not until photos emerged, with public outrage assured, did the investigations become serious. And then it was too late.

In short, the U.S. soldiers violated their training because they got the wrong message, from their commanders, the Pentagon and the White House. Repeatedly, President Bush (news - web sites) referred to the insurgents as "terrorists." To soldiers accustomed to the rules of Afghanistan or Guantanamo, that could easily mean the conventions do not apply.

The result is a scandal that aids the enemy, endangers U.S. soldiers and insults the nation's most basic standards of decency. It is reason for the congressional committees investigating the abuse to look not just at lower military ranks for blame, but at the leadership - uniformed and civilian - as well.

Lay it out – States’ Soveriegnty – global autonomy – Sage Brush and Himalayan reform – rebel –
I. Goal – Abolish USA – Establish State constitutional assemblies – conventions – popula r forums – to design a new structure of economics and production – and security and politics - post – imperial world.
II. Philosophy – decentralization, elite and foreign bankers have drawn us deep inot entanglements as they seek to dominate economics – change and energy supplies – in Israel – Arabian Peninsular region and Iraq – also Colombia – ec. – Afghan – Pakistan and the WTO By designing this no-way –out system they have destroyed the intent and the meaning of democracy – checks and balances and free will – ( Use Militia terms - ? ) Then cite constitution or dec.of independence – fight all the way – extra on foreigners – investments – bankers –
Strategy

Tactics

Geurrilla war – book –

There is a broad insurgency that is uniting to arm itself – the people – in most countries – these are simple people with a simple goal – to cut the USA and its allies down to size – and restore the power of people – culture – and stability to chart their own course – defend their resources and their culture beliefs.
Designs for the first phase of this war are clearly visible . The ruling class nowhere has moral, religious or popular legitimacy. The promises of prosperty – ring hollow – the promises of modernity are sickly false…

side_external.php?article=10529&list=/home.php&Corporate power is the driving force behind US foreign policy - and the slaughter in Iraq
Defence and weapons development are motivating forces in foreign policy. For some years, there has also been recognised corporate control of the Treasury. And of environmental policy.

We cherish the progress in civilisation since biblical times and long before. But there is a needed and, indeed, accepted qualification. The US and Britain are in the bitter aftermath of a war in Iraq. We are accepting programmed death for the young and random slaughter for men and women of all ages. So it was in the first and second world wars, and is still so in Iraq. Civilised life, as it is called, is a great white tower celebrating human achievements, but at the top there is permanently a large black cloud. Human progress dominated by unimaginable cruelty and death.

Civilisation has made great strides over the centuries in science, healthcare, the arts and most, if not all, economic well-being. But it has also given a privileged position to the development of weapons and the threat and reality of war. Mass slaughter has become the ultimate civilised achievement.

The facts of war are inescapable - death and random cruelty, suspension of civilised values, a disordered aftermath. Thus the human condition and prospect as now supremely evident. The economic and social problems here described can, with thought and action, be addressed. So they have already been. War remains the decisive human failure.

http://www.emergency.com/2003/iraq_brief2003b.htm
The applicable US Army field manual, FM 3-06, Dtd. 22 Nov 2002, says: "Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted only when required and that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than risking a costly, time-consuming operation in this difficult environment."

Tim Ripley of the Center of Defense Studies at Lancaster University said: "The basic problem with urban warfare is that you have buildings, streets, bridges, and civilians to negotiate. It is impossible to use stand-off weapons [weapons used at a distance] and you don't have a clear view of the terrain." The Washington Post explains the "horns of US dilemma": The impending "Battle for Baghdad" confronts US forces with a problem that goes to the heart of the complex mission in which they are engaged: They can maximize the advantages of their overwhelming firepower and bomb a wily adversary hiding heavy weapons in built-up areas, which would inflict civilian casualties and set back the US campaign in public opinion. Or they can try to attack precisely with low-flying helicopters and ground forces, which could mean higher casualty figures for U.S. troops.

Addtnl. Reference: JP 03-06: Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (2002 - PDF)

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate
In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate

PRESENTATION
To those champions who avowed the truth day and night......Andwrote with their blood and sufferings these phrases... -*-The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostateregimes does not know Socratic debates...,Platonic ideals..., nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun. ***... Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been
by pen and gun
by word and bullet
by tongue and teeeth

Introduction
Martyrs were killed, women were widowed, children were orphaned, men were handcuffed, chaste women's heads were shaved, harlots' heads were crowned, atrocities were inflicted on the innocent, gifts were given to the wicked, virgins were raped on the prostitution alter... After the fall of our orthodox caliphates on March 3, 1924 and after expelling the colonialists, our Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the Moslem nation. These .rulers turned out to be more infidel and criminal than the colonialists themselves. Moslems have endured all kinds of harm, oppression, and torture at their hands.

Those apostate rulers threw thousands of the Haraka Al-Islamyia (IslamicMovement) youth in gloomy jails and detention centers that were equipped with the most modern torture devices and [mannedwith] experts in oppression and torture. Those youth had refused to move in the rulers' orbit, obscure matters to the youth, and oppose the idea of rebelling against the rulers. But they [the rulers] did not stop there; they started to fragmentthe essence of the Islamic nation by trying to eradicate its Moslem identity. Thus, they started spreading godless and atheistic views among the youth. We found some that claimed that socialism was from Islam, democracy was the [religious] council, and the prophet-God bless and keep him-propagandizedcommunism. Colonialism and its followers, the apostate rulers, then started
to openly erect crusader centers, societies, and organizations
like Masonic Lodges, Lions and Rotary clubs, and foreign schools.

They aimed at producing a wasted generation that pursued everything that is western and produced rulers, ministers, leaders, physicians, engineers, businessmen, politicians, journalists, and information specialists. [Koranic verse:] "And Allah's enemies plotted and planned, and Allah too planned, and the best of planners is Allah." They [the rulers] tried, using every means and [kind of] seduction, to produce a generation of young men that did not know [anything] except what they [the rulers] want, did not say except what they [the rulers] think about, did not live except according to their [the rulers') way, and did not dress except in their [the rulers'] clothes. However, majestic Allah turned their deception back on them, as a large group of those young men who were raised by them [the rulers] woke up from their sleep and returned to Allah, regretting and repenting.

The young men returning to Allah realized that Islam is not just performing rituals but a complete system: Religion and government, worship and Jihad [holy war], ethics and dealing with people, and the Koran and sword. The bitter situation that the nation has reached is a result of its divergence from Allah's course and his righteous law for all places and times. That [bitter situation] came about as a result of its children's love for the world, their loathing of death, and their abandonment of Jihad [holy war].

Unbelief is still the same. It pushed Abou Jahl-may Allah curse him-and Kureish's valiant infidels to battle the prophet -God bless and keep him -and to torture his companions -may Allah's grace be on them. It is the same unbelief that drove Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Gadhafi, Hafez Assad, Saleh, Fahed -Allah's curse be upon the non-believing leaders -and all the apostate Arab rulers to torture, kill, imprison, and torment Moslems. These young men realized that an Islamic government would never be established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide or make a truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it. The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.

The young came to prepare themselves for Jihad [holy war], commanded by the majestic Allah's order in the holy Koran.
[Koranic verse:] "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (thehearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and
others besides whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know."

Below is long Version of new Intro – Rifleman – Stuff Plus 4 GW --
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000453356&zorpiasid=537057735b0e2aa5bdaee1f920f2ba37

http://barcelona.indymedia.org/newswire/display/105657/index.phpBelow is newest long version (2 links) – link for section XVIII – New Intelligence – New soldiers

http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000449773&zorpiasid=d7d1b63fd2867eb17386b5067adb506e

http://houston.indymedia.org/news/2003/10/17016.php">http://houston.indymedia.org/news/2003/10/17016.php

http://www.almuajaha.com/newswire/display/6214/index.php

1.. A link to a 2nd draft of new series – ex summary – pretty good –
http://www.tblog.com/templates/index.php?bid=guerrillawar&godate=07/01/2004

2.. A link to additional weapons – PT 2 –
http://www.tblog.com/templates/index.php?bid=guerrillawar&static=224762

3. Newest version – July 14 – final - ? of Ex Summar y – Series ( new)
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/07/our-lives-are-war-understanding.html

2

Below is Reagan-miscpoli article
Your story is http://istanbul.indymedia.org/news/2004/06/7536.php

http://www.joeuser.com/Forums.asp?MID=2&AID=17886
above is Draginols right wing looped froum

http://www.command-post.org/nk/2_archives/012766.html
more weird right wng above - (XVIII. 7 & - Intelligence –

Our Lives are War: Understanding Iraq/Saudi War Strategies

2004-07-13T15:09:00.000-07:00

This is an executive summary of our Concept-Packed Series
- Beyiond Iraq Strategies - Insurgency and 4 GW

- For complete series visit:

www.soldierrebellion.squarespace.com

A WORLD OF 4GW
- INSURGENCY LIFESTYLES TO
SURVIVE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION

It's a gripping vision of the not-so-future warfare. Latter-day Davids vs. the Empire’s Goliath with nation states fighting non-nation states -- clans or religious or ethnic groups -- in places like the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. And the Goliaths will often lose. It's not happening just on the West Bank and Gaza. A Somali clan drove the U.S. out of Mogadishu. Hezbollah ousted the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon. The Chechens have humbled Russia's army. A few thousand Iraqi insurgents have killed a thousand US troops and can continue to cost the US dearly as long as it stays in the Middle East region.

Dear citizens interested in turning the tide of USA-led fascism, I am a military strategist. I write to you because a great war is breaking out that will make or break this planet. Call it the 4th World War (4WW) - the War of Global Imperialism or the spread of fourth generation warfare -- 5th generation if the Imperialists don't win soon. (See Authors notes at bottom – or at www.soldierrebelion.squarespace.com)
There will be war,
a fourth generation war, a war that the planet and the rich cannot win.

A Good Defense Anticipates Enemy Offense: Rifleman Democracy
Fire-arms have, for good reason, been known as "equalizers". The days when an armored knight was equal, say, to 30 yeoman --- that period of history ended with the development of the modern rifle. Of course, it has been more complicated than one man, one rifle, one vote, for some time now. Napoleon's successes depended upon his ability to recruit, inspire and utilize riflemen --- but he was also known for his unequaled use of cannon fire in connection with infantry battles. Everything changed with the development of the machine gun about a century ago. Machine guns were operated by teams, rather than individuals, and machine guns gobbled up ammo so fast that considerable supporting infrastructure is required. Thus, the theory of "superior fire power" that was developed out of World War I and the millions of men sacrificed in futile efforts to attack and take fortified machine gun positions on static front-lines. Then came World War II --- air power and control of the air space are everything.
Warfare and revolution have been transformed by high-tech. Outcomes can no longer be forecast by counting heads. The whole is more than the sum of the parts. So, to be successful, revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box (or Box-cutter!), teamwork and specialties. It's a complex calculation anymore. Falluja and Najaf/Karbala (in Iraq) support and yet also call into question this Rifleman analysis. Rifles do seem important - though the RPGs and anti-aircraft weapons (and mortars) may be more important. We are part way into a permanent war -- which is to say a long and complex war -- The Fourth World War. Groups opposed to the current power structure will have to master 4th and 5th generation mobile-chaos smart-targeting warfare. This kind of war relies on secret/ revolutionary/battle/sabotage cells, international media savvy, and connecting synergistically with each member and each group’s specialties: hackers, bombers, espionage, media, event-timing and logistics. The strength of Islamic fundamentalists lies in their cultural cohesiveness (teamwork) and their ability to combine cleverness, a feel for media-propaganda and news/action timing to create a powerful force to block the military power of the invader crusader (U.S.A.). The case of the FARC guerrillas in Colombia is another example of this interplay - riflemen and teamwork in a culture of resistance! = political – territorial – military - financial POWER.
Al Qaeda takes the long view that if Islam survives they win. Fundamentalist have cohesion and they have a weapon that embodies the most powerful elements of 4GW warfare: People, Ideas and Hardware. The weapon is suicide bombers and suicide car bombers. The West has no defense against such weapons except to declare martial law and watch the global economy crumble in their hands. A sign of impending demise of the Empire is that the people at the top tend to believe their own propaganda. Hitler, for example, was told as early as 1939 about the U.S. (Boeing Aircraft) tooling up to be capable of making more bombers in a month than existed in all countries combined in 1939. Basically, Hitler was told that attacking Poland and starting World War II was bound to fail in the long run. Hitler fired the messenger and brought in someone who would tell him what he wanted to hear. That is the arrogance part of it. The other part of imperial break-down has to do with corruption. – A sinking ship brings out the rats...
A New Warfare to Fight the Permanent War of Totalitarianism: 4 GW
4 GW describes any way of dealing with U.S. military forces other than confronting them on the battlefield. It includes all forms of terrorism, guerilla warfare, intifada-type urban unrest -- sometimes financed by relationships with criminal or narcotics networks -- and others that will evolve. 4GW is not just guerilla warfare under another name. Perceiving war as a contest marked by the use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragically simplistic, and fundamentally flawed view ... a future war among industrialized states, even if effective and efficient, could be virtually invisible – or it could evolve into a war of insurgents versus States – a judo war of cultural attrition. Which side can stand to lose what is important to their culture (civil rights, freedom, shrines, travel, vacations, air conditioning?) for the longest period of time?

In 4GW distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-22 aircraft by poisoning the squadron's mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even attacking schools and PXs back at the base. 4GW, while highly "asymmetric," is not the same as "asymmetric warfare," since maneuver warfare is also "asymmetric" and calls for creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses, rather than engaging and trying to reduce his formations and fortified positions directly. Since 2001, more than 50 major active conflicts are brewing, any one of which could be the spark for commitment of US troops.

We live in a world of "Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)" where the tactics of the weak confound the tactics of the strong. Nation-states confront criminal enterprises, fanatical opportunists, terrorists whose gang-like networks transcend national boundaries. This smorgasbord of actors often slips through the cracks of security, military, and legal bureaucracies. Sub-national insurgents use guerrilla tactics, insurrection, sabotage and terrorism to subvert nation-states and challenge the established international system. Governments, politicians, and state military-security apparatus of the West desperately want to engage their 4GW foes in the tried and true conventional ways of the past. America prefers combat where only the strongest wins. US fourth-generation foes prefer 4GW judo, avoiding a decisive fight, leveraging US addiction to technology and "throwing us" using the USA's bureaucratic weight to do so. The enemy's "weapons technology advantage" in the 9-11 attacks consisted of box cutters and ceramic knives, combined with a steely determination to die for a cause... it worked, and the modern world's vast military-security-enforcement bureaucracy was helpless to stop it… and will be again and again…

We are witnessing the early stages of a major geo-political transition. This shift is characterized by a global landscape of conflict where the division between combatant, criminal opportunist and civilian is blurred. In this potential global insurgency, the urban guerilla (not to forget their rural counterparts) may be a religious zealot or a child for hire with an RPG. As technophiles, Westerners are enraptured by modern weapons of great precision, but have lost sight that people and ideas are the essence of why wars are fought and for how long. In the traditional view, the low-tech approaches of 4GW are the "tactics of the weak." However, they have repeatedly been successful in circumventing the US military's far stronger conventional strategy, tactics, and thinking.

Well before the 9-11 attacks al-Qaeda recognized the power of asymmetric warfare and adaptive tactics for their jihad struggle. An article entitled "Fourth Generation Wars," in an al-Qaeda affiliated Internet magazine Al-Ansar: For the Struggle Against the Crusader War acknowledges that 4GW forms the foundation of al-Qaeda's combat doctrine. In doing so, the author, Abu 'Ubed Al-Qurashi, reputed to be closely linked with Osama bin Laden, cites the landmark 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" as key to understanding contemporary global conflict. Only a few Western military analysts recognized the deadly nature of 4GW

If diverse factors are driving the evolution of conflict, then solutions must lie primarily within the realms of economics, diplomacy, and law-enforcement. Military force will play a smaller role, performing specific tasks to solve problems that are intractable through other means. The West is searching for a coherent grand strategy to ensure that military (destructive) actions harmonize with their overall objectives and do not undermine the public support needed to prosecute a fourth generation war to its successful conclusion. In grand strategy, the carrot is as important as the stick, and alliances are critical factors which could favor the US in 4GW against al-Qa'ida and those who support similar ideologies. The election of John Kerry could heal the US-EU alliance, but by then it could be too late to matter.

Technology is important, and may provide options, but the fact is that lack of suitable technology cannot explain America’s poor track record in fourth generation warfare. Any discussion of 4GW, since it involves conflicts of culture and religion, is likely to generate a high degree of emotion.

6200 words below --
Our Lives are War: Understanding Iraq/Saudi War Strategies - Insurgency as 4GW,
by Jacques Dessalines and Misha Butchevitz

-- Comprehension of The Grand Strategies of the Key Players -- and the Forces They Represent –
is nowhere to be found...
-- There are many secrets... and plans that only a select few on each of the many sides have privy to.
-- Awareness is a battlefield…

Government and insurgents take advantage of many tactics for influencing all phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the grand or the priority strategies of either side -- amid this confusion of goals -- is no easy task. The third and final phase of the struggle against the ruling class will see the development of sophisticated guerrilla insurgencies employing Fourth generation Warfare (4GW) on the battlefield, the streets and the media: To build or disrupt alliances and to destroy the cohesion of the West and create doubt.

The measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies and weapon systems. A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition.

.....Between advance and retreat. Hidden dragon. Do not act. -- I Ching

Both sides in the 4thWW will employ harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. Such a strategy reduces the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu (500 B.C.) strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics... to win without fighting.

John Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- (OODA) pattern (also called decision-loop) to operate inside his opponent's decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To sustain high operational tempos he codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army.

There are 3 fundamental points to 4GW:

1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs.
2. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware, however, a hypothetical US strike force (with a hardware component) can be compared to the ancient and news ways of thinking about conflict and maneuver warfare
3. First attack your enemy’s strategy then his alliances and cohesion.

Summary of a US 3-4 GW Evolutionary Strike Force:

A. A military and intelligence personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[And- for insurgents - to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy -- especially among the leaders of US strike forces]

B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas (mobility, speed and trained in deception and adaptability).
[Insurgents and other anti-American forces will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare ]

C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around: U.S. Marine Corps, Army 82nd Airborne Division, Special Forces, Rangers, Delta Force, SEALs and other unconventional forces, carrier and land-based tactical air, and Intra-theater lift of heavy armor & mechanized infantry. These would be enhanced through: Robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation; and increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations.

The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won. Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions as the ruling class. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US -- though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast!

Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare

The strategy devised by Sun Tzu fit the circumstances perfectly. It rested on two major and complementary elements, one internal and one external. Harmony on the inside is The Way (Tao) of war. All else flows from this basic idea, and without it, there is little reason to press forward into the stress of military operations. Externally, Sun's goal was to create confusion in the opposing side and then exploit it. The focus was not on winning through superior tactics or individual fighting technique (although these are important), the enemy commanders must become confused and if possible, driven insane. The tool for accomplishing this was quickness, which helps create ambiguity and also increases the effectiveness of deception, security, and intelligence.

Foreknowledge enables an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others even when the opponent is stronger or wealthier. Foreknowledge must be obtained from reliable people, people who know the conditions of the enemy. Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem conducted before and during combat operations can unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. If one fails to spot mismatches between what one believes to be going on and what really is, (i.e., between Orientation and the real world), one has become "mentally isolated." If adversaries can keep us in this state -- operating inside our OODA loops -- then as setback after inexplicable frustration befall us, we will become disoriented, confused, indecisive, fearful, etc. A competent enemy will create, locate, and exploit vulnerabilities leading, in the case of maneuver warfare, to envelopments, ambushes, high prisoner counts: phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change. Ill-treatment of POWs cannot be tolerated: A battlefield commander wants them to surrender, and needs to make it as easy as possible.

The Utility of Military Force

For Sun Tzu the best way to defeat an enemy is by "attacking his strategy." Attack early, while the enemy's plans are being laid or employ unusual methods to "seize victory without even battling." Should this prove impossible, Sun Tzu then recommends disrupting his alliances. Some say that this means to attack early (pre-emptive strikes), before the enemy can solidify his alliances. Others suggest it means isolating potential enemies from sources of support, or intimidating them through strong alliances of your own.

The use of armed force by the US government must be carefully thought out so that it does not cause more problems than it solves. For this Boyd expands on Sun Tzu's first two courses of action through his concept of "grand strategy," which serves to:

1. Support national goals and pump up one's own resolve, drain away the adversary's resolve, and attract the uncommitted to one's cause
2. End the conflict on favorable terms in the shortest possible time and with the least possible loss of life
3. Ensure that the conflict and peace terms do not provide the seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict – don’t kill too many of the enemy or mistreat prisoners

Insurgents will try to block each of these imperialist actions.

U.S. leaders will commit enormous forces to protect such things as access to crude oil, and given the dependence of the U.S. economy on imported resources, practically any part of the world could become a "vital national interest" in the future (Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia).

Military Force vis-a-vis Other Options and Considerations

The Balkans, Chechnya, East Timor, Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq have shown the limited capacity of the major powers to deploy forces relevant to keeping the peace and rebuilding states shattered by civil war. Civil affairs capabilities have proven to be almost non existent. Keeping the peace requires soldiers to act like policemen, a job for which they are ill prepared and ill equipped. Many Third World countries resent the U.S. ready resort to military power.

Since the Bush invasion of Iraq, large majorities around the world have grown to fear the threat of an Imperial-Crusader US foreign policy and the US proclaimed right to pre-emptive strikes, lies and bullying that it uses to get its way with the people of the Middle East, US allies and the UN. The U.S. is rushing to court unpopularity across the world, contrary to expectations that the Bush national security establishment would conduct itself with sophistication. U.S. foreign policy under President Bush suggests a lack of coherence and a hegemonic arrogance. The Bush administration has set a record for alienating so many nations in such a short period. And then there was Iraq...

Forgotten are the lesson of the Tao Te Ching, that any use of "power," even (especially) if it is successful, breeds resentment and may plant the seeds of future conflict. Boyd, Chester and most liberals miss the point of Bush's actions. Having grasped the seriousness of Boyd's predictions about 4GW, the US has been forced to accelerate its program of global domination. Though some mistakes were made -- as in all conflicts -- Bush seeks to draw out potential large nation enemies so that the US can destroy their conventional forces and reduce their support to insurgents. Then the US will only face 4GW and strategic threats of a diminished nature. And the US will control even more oil than now (with the UK, currently about half of world output).

What Makes a Military Force "Effective"? -- Sun Tzu's and Boyd's Perspective

Sun Tzu focused on the problem of how to get groups of people to work together harmoniously under conditions of hardship, danger, and the inevitable confusion of conflict (and it applies to all forms of conflict, including business, politics, and sport). Before envisioning conflict with another state, the ruler and his immediate advisors must survey and compare many factors to guide their plans:

1. Which leadership has the Way? The "Way" (Tao) means harmony among people, so that the people and the leadership are united in purpose to overcome fear of danger. The Way, in this sense, includes unity of purpose between the ruler and the population and other factors, such as the ability to clearly perceive the true situation (which includes the ability to make these comparisons
2. Is the terrain favorable? Is the weather likely to be favorable? Which army can better exploit the advantages of climate and terrain?
3. Which side's generals are the more capable? The political leadership must make objective comparisons of such factors as humaneness, intelligence, trustworthiness, courage, and sternness.
4. Which army's doctrine and discipline is superior? Here the leadership must consider organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and provisions. Whose troops are the stronger, including morally and intellectually?
5. Whose military discipline is more effective? In which army are regulations and instructions better carried out?
6. Whose officers and soldiers are better trained? Whose system of rewards and punishments is clearer?

Sun Tzu believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if wise military practices were applied, war could be waged with certain success.

Later he restates some of these practices with a more tactical (i.e., who will win the next engagement) flavor:
1. Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious.
2. Those who know when to use many or few troops are victorious.
3. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
4. Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious.
5. Those whose generals are able and not constrained by their governments are victorious.

Leaders should improve weaknesses wherever they exist, and the final calculation rests heavily on the experience, intelligence, and intuitive understanding of the commander and the ruler. Success in conflict depends on one's ability to perform these calculations and, in particular, not to deceive oneself.

Boyd's scheme is:

1. Mutual trust; unity: Similar to The Way in Sun Tzu's list of factors.
2. Intuitive competence, at all levels from private to general. In addition to proficiency with weapons at the individual level, "intuitive competence" also applies at the command levels, where it refers to the "feel" that great commanders have for the progress of the battle, and in particular to their seemingly uncanny abilities to detect and exploit openings while they still present opportunities. This comes from years of practice at ever increasing levels of complexity. The Germans called it fingerspitzengefhl, literally "finger tip feeling" and it implies such a high level of competence that complex decisions can be made without hesitation, similar to the Zen notion of action without a "sticking mind."
3. Mission orientation. The Germans called this auftragstaktik. The basic idea is that commanders and subordinates enter into a type of contract where the subordinate agrees to fulfill the commander's intent, while the commander agrees to give the subordinate wide latitude on how this is done.
4. Focus and direction. Related to the concept of "commander's intent." It often refers to a specific unit and its mission. All other units must make their activities support the fulfillment of this unit's mission. Depending on the progress of the operation, the commander may shift this role to another unit and another mission.

Boyd's insight was that organizations that operated along these lines would naturally generate higher OODA loop speeds and more irregular ways to employ them. Boyd concluded that such units could:

1. Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as a basis to sever the adversary's moral ties and disorient him.

2. Select the initiative (or response) that is least expected (not necessarily the one that has the highest predicted effectiveness, since the enemy can perform these calculations, also).

3. Establish the focus of the main effort (together with other efforts) and pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives.

4. Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).

5. Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary's vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for later mop-up.

6. Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic and chaos in order to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse.

We find echoes in Sun Tzu:

1. Take them by confusion. 2. Throw them into disarray. 3. Cause division among them. 4. Victory is gained by surprise. 5. Take away the heart of their general.

Cheng and Ch'i: Forcing or Deceiving

The interplay of Cheng (Pinning -- Orthodox) and Ch'i (Distracting -- unorthodox) strategies is a tool of available to those who operate inside their opponents' OODA loops. It applies to the force (people-ideas-hardware) rather than to any particular component alone. Making armies able to take on opponents without being defeated is a matter of unorthodox (ch'i) and orthodox (cheng) methods ... The unorthodox and the orthodox give rise to each other like a beginning-less circle -- who could exhaust them? The utility (resiliency, cohesion and cleverness training) of a force can be assessed without predicting how effective it will be. This seeming contradiction hinges on the idea that the actual performance of the force in the field depends on the enemy's actions, which cannot be predicted.

True war-winning effectiveness comes from a force's ability to play the cheng / ch'i game, that is, to set up the opponent, then quickly shift to something he does not anticipate, and then to exploit to the fullest the resulting confusion. A key element of strategy is to "drive the opponent crazy" before actually committing military forces. Isolation in all forms -- particularly diplomatic and economic -- is an effective tool for accomplishing this. Morally-mentally-physically isolate our adversaries from their allies and outside support as well as isolate them from one another in order to magnify their internal friction, produce paralysis, bring about their collapse and/or bring about a change in their political / economic / social philosophy so that they can no longer inhibit our vitality and growth. – Boyd

Drawn out campaigns tend to strain both alliances and domestic support, and what is seen as gratuitous destruction alienates support in the US, among allied countries, and within those groups in the target society that would support the U.S. The insurgents will seek to exploit the weaknesses in this strategy and make it backfire. They can take advantage of election cycles and mistakes to add to strains in alliances and catch shifting public opinion with symbolic or terror-inducing strikes (assassinations, bombings and kidnappings).

Creating Forces: Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces

In creating forces and assessing them, one needs to ask:

1. Do they offer the requisite variety? Do they present a range of options to the people actually conducting the conflict? Do they facilitate the creation of cheng / ch'i situations? Do they create options that would be least expected by the enemy, not necessarily the one that is predicted to be the most effective?
2. Can commanders rapidly shift the focus if required? When a decision is made, are forces structured and trained so that it can be rapidly carried out? Is this capability being tested and exercised under a variety of circumstances? When selecting between quickness and predicted effectiveness, is there a strong bias towards quickness?
3. Are people and forces being trained to act in harmony? Are organizations formed to foster harmony? Is this quality exercised in a variety of circumstances and are those who prove adept in its employment promoted?
4. What is being done to ensure that people at all levels will take the initiative in harmony with others in the force to achieve objectives? In particular, are all commanders trained to issue mission orders?

Instead of detailed tactics, followers of Sun Tzu evolved a way of thinking about conflict. That guerillas should be using Sun Tzu is not surprising, given his emphasis on deception and formlessness, since guerillas that become predictable are quickly eliminated. As the world moves into the 21st Century, such forms of highly irregular and unpredictable conflict are becoming the only way for many opponents to confront U.S. military forces. 4GW (asymmetric" conflict pushed to its limits) is what the U.S. military will have to face in the future.

In the fourth generation combat will be more dispersed. The battlefield will once again envelop entire societies, as it did in more primitive and ancient cultures. Military objectives will no longer involve annihilating tidy enemy lines, but rather eroding popular support for the war within the enemy's society.

Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions. The distinction between war and peace would be blurred to the vanishing point. Conflict will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' will disappear.

The condition of a military force is that its essential factor is speed, taking advantage of others' failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect, attacking where they are not on guard. Future wars will be fluid with no defined fronts or formations; decentralized armies where troops act on their own with high initiative as opposed to centralized command structures where troops ask permission and wait for orders; war designed to place the enemy in a dilemma, to suck him in to traps of his own creation, taking advantage of his stupidities and weaknesses and avoiding his strengths; war where soldiers act on judgment not on rules; war without rules; war that seeks to penetrate the enemy rather than push opposing lines backwards and forwards; war waged by a cohesive team that is like a family or tribe with a common culture and common outlook; a willingness to fight close, not just applying firepower from a long standoff, but infiltrating when the opportunity arises.

According to Sun Tzu, The Way of military operations winds through unit cohesion: Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious. Good warriors seek effectiveness in battle from the force of momentum, not from individual people.

Cohesion works because it creates and in turn depends on trust. Harmony is an essential element of any successful organism, and "mutual trust," (translation of the Germaneinheit -- literally, "oneness") is at the top of Boyd's "organizational climate for operational effectiveness.” He concluded that: Harmony in operations is created by the bonds of implicit communications and trust that evolve as a consequence of the similar mental images or impressions each individual creates and commits to memory by repeatedly sharing the same variety of experience in the same ways.

Military hardware and organizations must possess the inherent variety of action to facilitate cheng / ch'i (orthodox/unorthodox) maneuvers. The range of options that a force offers and the rapidity with which it can switch between them is crucial. A clever and motivated enemy can develop counters to any particular capability. One force will win because -- through training, cohesion, and leadership -- it can create options for itself and dilemmas for the enemy, and switch between them more rapidly, more inconspicuously, and with more irregularity than the enemy can cope. When a vulnerability ("gap") has been created or discovered, it can be exploited. Since the enemy is a clever and determined human being, one must assume he will find and close gaps as rapidly as possible, or, even more insidiously, change them into traps, or convert some of them into chengs of his own by attempting to create and exploit gaps in one's own forces. If he can do this more rapidly than friendly forces can cope, he can create Boyd-type effects: panic, confusion, and chaos, leading to collapse. This suggests that forces with mission cycles measured in days, or in some cases even hours, will find it difficult to function as the ch'i component of maneuver warfare, thus limiting the options for commanders.

Logistics and support requirements play a role in sustaining high operational tempos (ammo, fuel, spare parts, food). These can interfere with the ability to maneuver and create and exploit gaps. Systems that require extensive logistical support also tend to focus commanders' attention inward. During the 19th century it was the rare commander who could envision how to break free of the railroads that were providing his sustenance. Part of the genius of both Grant and Sherman is that they were able to convert this obvious dependency into a cheng, that is, fool Confederate commanders into attacking "lines of supply" while they launched out cross country: Grant towards Jackson and Vicksburg, and Sherman towards the sea.

Complex hardware and systems focus organizations inward, which can accelerate the trend towards confusion and disintegration. Technical complexity per se is generally not the most severe issue, since it generally "just" degrades how often the system is available for combat. Organizational complexity is more debilitating and is the key component in Clausewitz's famous friction. It represents organizational entropy that dissipates energy and converts it into chaos, without having to wait for the enemy to do it. In particular, the OODA loops of complex organizations can degrade quickly in such an environment, making them vulnerable to cheng / ch'i maneuvers by the other side.

The real problem with complex equipment is that it spawns complex organizations to operate, support, and maintain it. In other words, technical complexity tends to generate organizational complexity and thus predictability and slowness. However, the US defense establishment is so vast that within its shadows there exist focused operational systems (even whole divisions) who are learning from Iraq and adapting technology to aid the new tactics they have adopted. This will force insurgents to become more creative, more cunning and more destructive.

Guerrilla Insurgents and New Technology
Advanced technology has been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision systems, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.

To counter enhanced guerrilla technologies "Finders" -- intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets are being deployed. The role of wide-area assets is to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. A limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage -- a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars will enhance U.S. surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor.

Advanced Sensor and Surveillance Technologies

Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors make it possible to examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination. Other technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical "sniffers." Miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. Lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles may soon patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysis devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a "mothership" or a ground station. Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors.

One can listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building's windows. Experiments are under way with radars that have the potential to "see" through walls. Tagging suspected vehicles helps develop information about patterns of activity and assists shooters in engaging elusive targets. An operative on the ground in a city could place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of terrorist activities. The transmitter permits authorities to monitor that vehicle's movement and make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle "in the crosshairs" should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy the vehicle.

Most researchers ignore that technology promotion by the US is primarily to re-assure its people of US superiority, second to prop up the profits of the Congressional-Military-Industrial Complex and by creating so many and diverse technological gadgets and systems some of them turn out to actually be useful. Effectiveness concerns have also overcome institutional momentum in a few notable cases. The Commanche helicopter program was scrapped after costs and concerns that insurgents will posses advanced surface to air missiles rendering the aircraft obsolete.

Summary of the guidelines for a Sun Tzu / Boyd US Strike Force

1. Military force is a key component of furthering national interests, but it is not the only component or in many cases even the primary one. It should always be used sparingly to end conflict quickly with minimum damage.
2. Military operations against conventional forces, for example, to assist an ally under conventional attack, must be conducted as maneuver warfare. That implies a substantial capacity to play the cheng / chi game against any potential opponent.
3. Military operations in 4GW must be carefully measured so that, by their very success, they do not strengthen the hands of opponents. It truly is not necessary to destroy the village in order to save it.

The changing nature of conflict has led the US to focus on littorals (regions within 100 miles of the sea), where most of the world's people, wealth, commerce, instabilities, and U.S. interests are concentrated. The need for intervention and extraction capabilities to protect lives, property, commerce, and other interests demands an emphasis on high-speed lighter forces configured for autonomous operations in hostile regions. The rise of 4 GW results in a need for irregular war-fighting skills/capabilities in close-quarters combat and small-unit operations among state/non-state actors. Characteristic of this are the following:

a. Decreased reliance on firepower/attrition in ground warfare.
b. Decreased reliance on deep-strike/interdiction/strategic bombardment of "infrastructure" in air warfare.
c. Increased reliance on fast-transient littoral penetration operations, info-war operations, Special Forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/ antiterrorist/ antinuclear operations, and increased occurrences of urban/suburban combat.
d. Increased resource constraints resulting in internal competition for resources.

Evolving US Strike Forces and Rapid Deployment Options

The U.S. Marine Corps provides all the conventional ground warfare capability needed to engage the land forces of any Third World country. The three active duty U.S.M.C. divisions provide a range of capabilities, including heavy armor, light armored vehicles, organic artillery, air support and infantry. The Marine Corps, beginning with its 1989 edition of Warfighting, is the farthest along in adopting maneuver warfare concepts. Using them, the Marines liberated Kuwait in two days and probably could have done it sooner. Once the rout began, there was nothing to stop a Patton-esque penetration -- properly supported from the air (as Patton's was) and logistically (as Patton's was not) -- from continuing straight on to Baghdad. The big hook around the left flank was at best cheng, perhaps unnecessary, and in any case, failed to accomplish its stated objective, since the bulk of the capable Iraqi forces escaped over the Euphrates.

Fire Support and Weapons Requirements

Before World War II, aerial bombardment was regarded as an instrument of mass terror; its targets were cities and the people and infrastructure within them. Then the doctrine of daylight precision bombardment was developed where the objective was to destroy key elements of an enemy's war-supporting industrial base so as to render continued military operations impossible. The Gulf War was the first time that precision guided munitions (PGMs) were used on a large scale. This trend accelerated in Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force (Bosnia and Kosovo). Targets included buildings in urban areas, small groups of soldiers within villages, and individual vehicles within convoys. The same sorts of targets have been prominent in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. There, U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead and coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laser homing guidance. (soon the Predator will refuel on station)

Similar capabilities have been demonstrated in Iraq (2003-2004). However, the shock-and-awe initial attacks were not particularly effective and the US has failed to kill a single Iraqi leader with bombs as of June 2004. Weapons or technology without solid intelligence to guide them are dangerous and of marginal tactical or strategic value.

Locating and Attacking Terrorists and Related Targets

Improvements are being developed so that U.S. air forces can identify and attack small groups of people with appropriate levels of confidence that innocent civilians will not be placed at undue risk. Opportunities exist for more effective concepts of execution (CONEXs) for engaging such targets. Terrorists will try to operate in areas and ways that make them difficult to find, identify, and isolate. They may be in wilderness areas that feature mountains, caves, forest, or jungle canopy. They may be living in rural areas, using anonymous-looking dwellings or small encampments, or they may choose urban environments (again occupying unexceptional buildings). Within these environments, terrorists may be stationary or moving, with movement being by vehicle or on foot. In all cases, the terrorists may be in the company of noncombatant (family members or unrelated strangers). New concepts for engaging such demanding targets set will seek to incorporate innovations among "finders, controllers, and shooters."

U.S. forces can apply firepower precisely when and where it is needed. The AC- 130 Specter gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions. It combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. The crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. In addition, airpower in the form of tactical airlift and fire support has proven attractive in these situations because it can bring forces and firepower to bear on the enemy without having to move heavy equipment, such as trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery, over land. Airpower obviates the need to rely upon often primitive ground-transportation infrastructures. It also increases the possibility of gaining tactical surprise by limiting the enemy's ability to observe preparations for an attack.

One can also envisage situations in which U.S. involvement in counterterrorist operations is desired but one or both sides would like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. The Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind "fingerprints" associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes. Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged.

To cause larger enemy formations to stop moving and to engage land forces ashore, a US strike force needs an effective close air support and air interdiction capability. This would facilitate maneuver warfare in littoral areas outside the battleship range, and it could also provide fire support and interdiction in conjunction with unconventional forces operating much deeper -- perhaps in a thrust / feint towards the capital or ruling juntas residences, weapons of mass destruction storage / launch facilities, etc. In order to support high operational tempos and interfere with the enemy's, an aircraft must be developed capable of operating from carriers, as well as far forward from austere bases (and generating high sortie rates). Such considerations suggest a short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft with system redundancy, a low vulnerable area, low visible signatures, and high loiter capability. Particular attention should be paid to allowing it to operate successfully in an environment infested with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS -- shoulder-fired infra-red missiles), of which there are upwards of 500,000 in the world today (accounting for 2/3 of all aircraft destroyed by ground fire in the last 15 years). This implies a low infra-red signature (less than one-tenth that of an F-16, which is itself some 35 times that of an AH-64 Apache helicopter). It should be designed to rain enough chaos from the sky to cause Third World troops to rapidly leave their vehicles and not return for an appreciable time.

The Marines have the AV-8B Harrier, but it is expensive, complex, and vulnerable to ground fire. U.S.A.F. studies in the1980s demonstrated the feasibility of developing a simpler and more rugged aircraft.

OspreyCV-22

With a range of 515 miles and capable of transporting 24 troops plus the two man crew (at 275 knots), the V22 is set to play an important role in transporting Special Forces. The vertical takeoff plane can carry a 10,000-pound payload 50 nautical miles at 3,000 feet. During the previous OPEVAL (operations evaluation tests), 24 combat loaded Marines were flown in the MV-22. Ingress and egress were demonstrated without difficulty. The Air Force requires the CV-22 to provide a long-range VTOL insertion and extraction capability and to supplement the Special Operations Forces (SOF) MC-130 aircraft in precision engagement. The V-22 design, incorporating advanced mature technology and b survivability and crashworthiness. A tiltrotor combines the speed, range and fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities of helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft represents a technological breakthrough in aviation that meets long standing military needs. The US has the capability to quickly move more than 10,000 troops into any nation’s capital or key cities and back them up with sustained firepower.

FOOTTNOTES

Insurgency PArt II. Part XII. to XV. -The series - Beyond Iraq

2004-07-06T22:22:00.000-07:00

Section XIII. Force Structure Options
Summary of the guidelines for a Sun Tzu / Boyd force:
1. Military force is a key component of furthering national interests, but it is not the only component or in many cases even the primary one. It should always be used sparingly.
2. Military forces, when they are used, should obey Sun Tzu's dictum: end the conflict in the quickest possible time with the least possible damage to either side.
3. Military operations against conventional forces, for example, to assist an ally under conventional attack, must be conducted as maneuver warfare. That implies a substantial capacity to play the cheng / chi game against any potential opponent.
4. Military operations in 4GW must be carefully measured so that, by their very success, they do not strengthen the hands of opponents. It truly is not necessary to destroy the village in order to save it. (XIII.1.)

The changing nature of Maneuver Warfare requirements suggest:
1. Increased focus on littorals (regions within a hundred miles of the sea), where most of the world's people, wealth, commerce, instabilities, and U.S. interests are concentrated.
2. Decreased need for large standing land and air forces, and an enhanced role for reserve forces.
3. Decreased need for heavy naval forces configured for global war at sea and heavy bombing forces, with a concurrent shift to maintaining control of littoral regions in support of interventions.

4. The need for intervention and extraction capabilities to protect lives, property, commerce, and other interests, with an emphasis on high-speed lighter forces configured for autonomous operations in hostile regions.
5. The rise of fourth-generation warfare, resulting in an increased need for irregular war-fighting skills/capabilities in close-quarters combat and small-unit operations among state/non-state actors. Characteristic of this are the following:

a. Decreased reliance on firepower/attrition in ground warfare.
b. Decreased reliance on deep-strike/interdiction/strategic bombardment of "infrastructure" in air warfare.
c. Increased reliance on fast-transient littoral penetration operations, info-war operations, Special Forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/ antiterrorist/ antinuclear operations, and increased occurrences of urban/suburban combat.
d. Increased resource constraints resulting in internal competition for resources. (XIII.3)
See full article at: Section XIII. Force Structure Options
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060829.html
http://www.tblog.com/templates/index.php?bid=guerrillawar&static=213145&search=guerrillawar

Section XIV. Evolving US Strike Forces and Rapid Deployment Options
The U.S. Marine Corps provides all the conventional ground warfare capability needed to engage the land forces of any Third World country. The three active duty U.S.M.C. divisions provide a range of capabilities, including heavy armor, light armored vehicles, organic artillery, air support and infantry. The Marine Corps, beginning with its 1989 edition of Warfighting, is the farthest along in adopting maneuver warfare concepts. Using them, the Marines liberated Kuwait in two days and probably could have done it as early as the end of September 1990. Once the rout began, there was nothing to stop a Patton-esque penetration -- properly supported from the air (as Patton's was) and logistically (as Patton's was not) -- from continuing straight on to Baghdad. The big hook around the left flank was at best cheng, perhaps unnecessary, and in any case, failed to accomplish its stated objective, since the bulk of the capable Iraqi forces escaped over the Euphrates. (XIV.1.)

The US can simplify its defense establishment by eliminating active Army armor and mechanized infantry divisions, and their supporting units, higher headquarters, commands, the Department of the Army, etc. A certain amount of additional heavy capability can be maintained in the Guard and Reserve, and exercised frequently with the legacy U.S.M.C. conventional components. Transferring these missions to the Guard and Reserve could actually increase their effectiveness in the rare cases when additional heavy combat capability is needed. Active Army -- unconventional forces, including Ranger, Special Forces, and Airborne units, will be retained, which have the unique capability among Army units of actually being able to reach the fight while it is still going on. In addition to being major players in 4GW, they can participate in cheng / chi combinations against both the conventional and unconventional forces of Third World armies. The idea would be to combine them with the Marine Corps into a new Strike Force. It is not that these unconventional forces will be the chi to the Marines' cheng. Enemies would react to that pattern and exploit it. It is that combining these two elements provides a wider range of options for commanders. This force should provide the requisite variety for carrying out cheng / chi operations against any threat it is likely to face on the ground in the next 15 years. (XIV.3.)
Strategic and Mobility Forces
The Air Force's mission would become purely strategic. Strategic delivery systems, including submarines and unconventional methods, would belong to this force, as would any eventual strategic defensive systems. Combat missions in space would also belong to this new force. Tactical aircraft from the Air Force and the Navy would be transferred to the Strike Force. Intra-theater, or tactical transport by whatever means, including C-130, helicopter, or ground, would belong to the Strike Force, which would have to determine the balance between transport by air and by other means in the vicinity of operations on land. Inter-theater transport aircraft, such as the C-5 and C-17, would be transferred to the Navy/Mobility Force, whose mission would become to move and support the Strike Force anywhere in the world. (XIV.5)
See: Section XIV. Evolving US Strike Forces and Rapid Deployment Options
http://www.soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=21156
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/061556.html

Section XV. Fire Support and Weapons Requirements (Part I of II)
Before World War II, aerial bombardment was regarded as an instrument of mass terror; its targets were cities and the people and infrastructure within them. Then the doctrine of daylight precision bombardment was developed where the objective was to destroy key elements of an enemy's war-supporting industrial base so as to render continued military operations impossible. The Gulf War was the first time that precision guided munitions (PGMs) were used on a large scale. This trend accelerated in Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force (Bosnia and Kosovo). Targets included buildings in urban areas, small groups of soldiers within villages, and individual vehicles within convoys. The same sorts of targets have been prominent in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. There, U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. (XV.2.)The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead and coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laser homing guidance.

Similar capabilities have been demonstrated in Iraq (2003-2004). However, the shock-and-awe initial attacks were not particularly effective and the US has failed to kill a single Iraqi leader with bombs as of June 2004. Weapons or technology without solid intelligence to guide them are dangerous and of marginal tactical or strategic value. (XV.3.)
LOCATING & ATTACKING TERRORISTS & RELATED TARGETS
Improvements are being developed so that U.S. air forces can identify and attack small groups of people with appropriate levels of confidence that innocent civilians will not be placed at undue risk. Opportunities exist to define new and more effective concepts of execution (CONEXs) for engaging such targets. Terrorists will try to operate in areas and ways that make them difficult to find, identify, and isolate. They may be in wilderness areas that feature mountains, caves, forest, or jungle canopy. They may be living in rural areas, using anonymous-looking dwellings or small encampments, or they may choose urban environments (again occupying unexceptional buildings). Within these environments, terrorists may be stationary or moving, with movement being by vehicle or on foot. In all cases, the terrorists may be in the company of noncombatant (family members or unrelated strangers). New concepts for engaging such a demanding target set will seek to incorporate innovations among "finders, controllers, and shooters." (XV.4.)
Fire Support for the New US Strike Forces
In order to make the land forces more effective, particularly when engaged against conventional opponents, it is necessary to ensure adequate fire support. In keeping with an increased focus on the littorals, one way to provide this is to recommission battleships and modernize their main armament and fire control systems. The battleship provides an invincible platform for delivering effective fire support in the littorals, 16-inch rounds being difficult to counter. The psychological effect of these behemoths, which unlike aircraft carriers can safely steam close enough to shore to be seen, heard, and felt by the inhabitants, is a capability worth keeping. Since they get everybody's attention, they personify cheng. Paint giant American flags on the side.

U.S. forces can apply firepower precisely when and where it is needed. The AC- 130 gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions today, since it combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. The crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. In addition, airpower in the form of tactical airlift and fire support has proven attractive in these situations because it can bring forces and firepower to bear on the enemy without having to move heavy equipment, such as trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery, over land. Airpower obviates the need to rely upon often primitive ground-transportation infrastructures. It also increases the possibility of gaining tactical surprise by limiting the enemy's ability to observe preparations for an attack. (XV.5.)

In the Iraqi battles around Falluja, Najaf, Karbala and Sadr City (April - May 2004) the US used AC-130s with powerful and deadly results - the accuracy is not known, but many people were killed.

One can also envisage situations in which U.S. involvement in counterterrorist operations is desired but one or both sides would like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. The Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind "fingerprints" associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes. Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged. (XV.7.)

To cause larger enemy formations to stop moving and to engage land forces ashore, a US strike force needs an effective close air support and air interdiction capability. This would facilitate maneuver warfare in littoral areas outside the battleship range, and it could also provide fire support and interdiction in conjunction with unconventional forces operating much deeper -- perhaps in a thrust / feint towards the capital or ruling juntas residences, weapons of mass destruction storage / launch facilities, etc. In order to support high operational tempos and interfere with the enemy's, an aircraft must be developed capable of operating from carriers, as well as far forward from austere bases (and generating high sortie rates). Such considerations suggest a short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft with system redundancy, a low vulnerable area, low visible signatures, and high loiter capability. Particular attention should be paid to allowing it to operate successfully in an environment infested with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS -- shoulder-fired infra-red missiles), of which there are upwards of 500,000 in the world today (accounting for 2/3 of all aircraft destroyed by ground fire in the last 15 years). This implies a low infra-red signature (less than one-tenth that of an F-16, which is itself some 35 times that of an AH-64 Apache helicopter). It should be designed to rain enough chaos from the sky to cause Third World troops to rapidly leave their vehicles and not return for an appreciable time. (XV.8.)

The Marines have the AV-8B Harrier, but it is expensive, complex, and vulnerable to ground fire. U.S.A.F. studies in the1980s demonstrated the feasibility of developing a simpler and more rugged aircraft. Armed helicopters would largely be retired, since they were developed because the Army was not allowed to have fixed-wing combat aircraft. They are slow, vulnerable to ground threats, and require logistics out of proportion to their effectiveness, as was demonstrated by Task Force Hawk in Albania and in Iraq engagements. On March 23, 60 miles south of Baghdad the US sent dozens of Apaches into a heavily fortified area defended by elite Republican Guards. Many of the Apache helicopters were damaged.

Since the new US strike force will depend on maneuver warfare, there is a need to ensure that enemies cannot use their own air forces to significantly inhibit the ability of U.S. forces to maneuver. This implies at least local air superiority and a robust organic air defense capability. American fighter pilots, flying continually improved versions of current air-to-air platforms -- the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 -- are more than capable of engaging any conceivable enemy air forces and keeping them away from on-shore troops. They can operate in conjunction with cruise missile and unconventional attacks against enemy air bases. The force should retain a small number, perhaps 6, modern aircraft carriers (CVNs) to provide protection from enemy air forces until bases can be established ashore and for operating the more vulnerable intelligence, electronic warfare, and command-and-control platforms. It also should keep a robust research and development program in this area, including MANPADS and other highly mobile, logistically simple means of air defense and improvements to our air-to-air fighters. (XV.9.)

OspreyCV-22
With a range of 515 miles and capable of transporting 24 troops plus the two man crew (at 275 knots), the V22 is set to play an important role in transporting Special Forces. The vertical takeoff plane can carry a 10,000-pound payload 50 nautical miles at 3,000 feet. During the previous OPEVAL (operations evaluation tests), 24 combat loaded Marines were flown in the MV-22. Ingress and egress were demonstrated without difficulty. The Air Force requires the CV-22 to provide a long-range VTOL insertion and extraction capability and to supplement the Special Operations Forces (SOF) MC-130 aircraft in precision engagement." The V-22 is also being developed to perform Marine Corps (USMC), Navy(USN), and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) combat missions. The V-22 design, incorporating advanced but mature technology, takes advantage of proven technology in composite materials, digital fly-by-wire flight controls, and advanced survivability and crashworthiness. A tiltrotor combines the speed, range and fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities of helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft represents a major technological breakthrough in aviation that meets long standing military needs.
AV-8B Harrier (The Marines' Jump-Jet)
The AV-8B V/STOL strike aircraft was designed to replace the AV-8A and the A-4M light attack aircraft. Combining tactical mobility, responsiveness, reduced operating cost and basing flexibility, both afloat and ashore, V/STOL aircraft are particularly well-suited to special combat and expeditionary requirements. The AV-8BII+ features the APG-65 Radar common to the F/A-18, as well as all previous systems and features common to the AV-8BII. B. In Operation Desert Storm (1991) the Harriers were highlighted by expeditionary air operations and they were the first Marine Corps tactical strike platform to arrive in theater. Three squadrons, totaling 60 aircraft, and one six-aircraft detachment operated ashore from an expeditionary airfield, while one squadron of 20 aircraft operated from a sea platform. During the ground war, AV-8Bs were based as close as 40 from the Kuwait border, making them the most forward deployed tactical strike aircraft. The AV-8B flew 3,380 sorties for a total of 4,083 flight hours while maintaining a mission capable rate in excess of 90%. Average turnaround time during the ground war surge rate flight operations was 23 minutes. (

Despite assertions by the Marine Corps that its crash-plagued AV-8B Harrier attack jet is safe, House Armed Services Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-El Cajon) said he would appoint Rep. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (R-Santa Clarita) to lead a task force to assess persistent safety problems. The Harrier has long been the military's most dangerous plane. Forty-five Marines have died in 148 noncombat accidents in the 32-year history of the single-seat jet. More than one-third of the fleet has been destroyed in crashes.

Increased accident tallies reflects a broader trend: the rate of Class A, accidents for all military aircraft jumped by about one-third in 2002 and 2003, to about two per 100,000 flight hours. A Class A accident is one that results in death or permanent injury or causes damage of more than $1 million. In the Air Force alone, accidents in the last decade killed more than 300 aviators, destroyed more than 250 aircraft and cost $11 billion. Human factors - mistakes by pilots, mechanics and aircrew - cause the vast majority of accidents. Such errors contributed to 83% of the Navy's serious accidents, while equipment or material failure contributed to 36%.

In contrast, the safety chiefs agreed, the aging of the military fleets does not pose a significant safety concern. Christopher Bolkcom, a military aviation analyst with the Congressional Research Service, testified that, "leadership is the single most important factor in increasing safety." He noted that the number of staff with expertise and responsibility for aviation safety in the office of the Secretary of Defense had been cut in recent years from eight to none. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld challenged the services last year to reduce by half in the next two years the number and rate of accidents.

Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) asked Helland why the Marines' major accident rate was twice that of other services. Helland responded that the Marine Corps flies predominantly combat aircraft, not transports. Naval Safety Center records show the AV-8B's accident rate has vacillated but has not declined for any extended period since its inception in the mid-1980s. Its Class A accident rate in 2003 was 11.05 per 100,000 hours - more than five times the average rate for all military aircraft. The AV-8B losses in 2003 totaled $154 million.

The causes of the five 2003 crashes remain under investigation. Helland said one involved "some sort of an anomaly in the aircraft"; in another, the engine may have been damaged by a foreign object. A third Harrier, he said, ran off the tarmac in Afghanistan in a strong crosswind. Harriers flew 1,686 missions in Afghanistan, 58% of them at night, and 2,186 missions in Iraq. None were shot down. One crashed in Afghanistan and one in the Persian Gulf. The AV-8B is scheduled to fly for another decade until its successor, the Marines' version of the Joint Strike Fighter, becomes available. The AV-8B production line was closed last year. (XV.11.)
See complete article at: Section XV. Fire Support and Weapons Requirements (Part I of II)
http://www.soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=21153
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/061554.html

Section XVI. Weapons From RPGs to Mini and Neutron Nukes
(Part II of Fire Support and Weapons Requirements)
Below is god on 4GW - http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/4gw_continued.htm
below is good quotes by G. Sunborough on mercenary death squads in Iraq and S America -- Carlyle and UK --http://beirut.indymedia.org/ar/2004/06/1454.shtml
also gary S. -- http://beirut.indymedia.org/ar//2004/05/1255.shtml

PArt VII. to XII. - The Series - Beyond Iraq

2004-07-06T22:21:00.000-07:00

Section VII.
What Makes a Military Force "Effective"? -- Sun Tzu's and Boyd's Perspective
Sun Tzu focused on the problem of how to get groups of people to work together harmoniously under conditions of hardship, danger, and the inevitable confusion of conflict (and it applies to all forms of conflict, including business, politics, and sport). Before envisioning conflict with another state, the ruler and his immediate advisors must survey and compare many factors to guide their plans:

1. Which leadership has the Way? The "Way" (Tao) means harmony among people, so that the people and the leadership are united in purpose to overcome fear of danger. The Way, in this sense, includes unity of purpose between the ruler and the population and other factors, such as the ability to clearly perceive the true situation (which includes the ability to make these comparisons
2. Is the terrain favorable? Is the weather likely to be favorable? Which army can better exploit the advantages of climate and terrain?
3. Which side's generals are the more capable? The political leadership must make objective comparisons of such factors as humaneness, intelligence, trustworthiness, courage, and sternness.
4. Which army's doctrine and discipline is superior? Here the leadership must consider organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and provisions. Whose troops are the stronger, including morally and intellectually?
5. Whose military discipline is more effective? In which army are regulations and instructions better carried out?
6. Whose officers and soldiers are better trained? Whose system of rewards and punishments is clearer? (VII.2.)

Sun Tzu believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if wise military practices were applied, war could be waged with certain success. (VII.3.)

Later he restates some of these practices with a more tactical (i.e., who will win the next engagement) flavor:
1. Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious.
2. Those who know when to use many or few troops are victorious.
3. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
4. Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious.
5. Those whose generals are able and not constrained by their governments are victorious.

Leaders should improve weaknesses wherever they exist, and the final calculation rests heavily on the experience, intelligence, and intuitive understanding of the commander and the ruler. Success in conflict depends on one's ability to perform these calculations and, in particular, not to deceive oneself. (VII.4.)

Boyd's scheme is:
1. Mutual trust; unity: Similar to The Way in Sun Tzu's list of factors.
2. Intuitive competence, at all levels from private to general. In addition to proficiency with weapons at the individual level, "intuitive competence" also applies at the command levels, where it refers to the "feel" that great commanders have for the progress of the battle, and in particular to their seemingly uncanny abilities to detect and exploit openings while they still present opportunities. This comes from years of practice at ever increasing levels of complexity. The Germans called it fingerspitzengefhl, literally "finger tip feeling" and it implies such a high level of competence that complex decisions can be made without hesitation, similar to the Zen notion of action without a "sticking mind."
3. Mission orientation. The Germans called this auftragstaktik. The basic idea is that commanders and subordinates enter into a type of contract where the subordinate agrees to fulfill the commander's intent, while the commander agrees to give the subordinate wide latitude on how this is done.
4. Focus and direction. Related to the concept of "commander's intent." It often refers to a specific unit and its mission. All other units must make their activities support the fulfillment of this unit's mission. Depending on the progress of the operation, the commander may shift this role to another unit and another mission. (VII.6.)

Boyd's insight was that organizations that operated along these lines would naturally generate higher OODA loop speeds and more irregular ways to employ them. Boyd concluded that such units could:
1. Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as a basis to sever the adversary's moral ties and disorient him.
2. Select the initiative (or response) that is least expected [note: not necessarily the one that has the highest predicted effectiveness, since the enemy can perform these calculations, also].
3. Establish the focus of the main effort (together with other efforts) and pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives.
4. Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
5. Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary's vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for later mop-up.
6. Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic and chaos in order to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse. (VII.7.)

We find echoes in Sun Tzu: 1. Take them by confusion. 2. Throw them into disarray. 3. Cause division among them. 4. Victory is gained by surprise. 5. Take away the heart of their general. (VII.8.)

Cheng and Ch'i: Forcing or Deceiving
The interplay of Cheng (Pinning -- Orthodox) and Ch'i (Distracting -- unorthodox) strategies is a tool of available to those who operate inside their opponents' OODA loops. It applies to the force (people-ideas-hardware) rather than to any particular component alone. Making armies able to take on opponents without being defeated is a matter of unorthodox (ch'i) and orthodox (cheng) methods ... The unorthodox and the orthodox give rise to each other like a beginning-less circle -- who could exhaust them? (VII.9.) The utility (resiliency, cohesion and cleverness training) of a force can be assessed without predicting how effective it will be. This seeming contradiction hinges on the idea that the actual performance of the force in the field depends on the enemy's actions, which cannot be predicted.

True war-winning effectiveness comes from the force's ability to play the cheng / ch'i game, that is, to set up the opponent, then quickly shift to something he does not anticipate, and then to exploit to the fullest the resulting confusion. A key element of strategy is to "drive the opponent crazy" before actually committing military forces. Isolation in all forms -- particularly diplomatic and economic -- is an effective tool for accomplishing this. (VII.10.) Morally-mentally-physically isolate our adversaries from their allies and outside support as well as isolate them from one another in order to magnify their internal friction, produce paralysis, bring about their collapse and/or bring about a change in their political / economic / social philosophy so that they can no longer inhibit our vitality and growth. – Boyd (VII.11.)

As noted previously, the goal of "morally-mentally-physically isolating our adversaries from their allies and outside support" is one of the primary objectives of grand strategy. For the purpose of protecting vital national interests, effective military forces would harmonize with those of allies, help enforce diplomatic and economic efforts to isolate adversaries, and end any recourse to armed conflict. In keeping with Boyd's concept of grand strategy, this would attract the uncommitted to one's side and make it easy for the "conquered" population to resume normal diplomatic and trade relationships after the conflict has ended.

But drawn out campaigns tend to strain both alliances and domestic support, and what is seen as gratuitous destruction alienates support in the US, among allied countries, and within those groups in the target society that would support the U.S. The insurgents will seek to exploit the weaknesses in this strategy and make it backfire. They can take advantage of election cycles and mistakes to add to strains in alliances and catch shifting public opinion with symbolic or terror-inducing strikes (assassinations, bombings and kidnappings). (VII.13.)
See: Section VII. What Makes a Military Force "Effective"? - Sun Tzu's and Boyd's Perspective
http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=Soldierforum&type=journal&zorpiasid=fe7fd06c088bed188556a25b6c0ac96f
http://insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=31058&entryId=19428

Section VIII. Creating Forces: Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces
At the beginning of "Patterns of Conflict," Boyd suggests four elements that would enable a force to function effectively in maneuver conflict and 4GW. Two of these are external and two internal:

It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish an adversary's capacity for independent action.
The simpler organisms -- those that make up man as well as man working together with other men in a higher level context -- must cooperate or, better yet, harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organic synthesis. Military forces that possess these qualities gain competitive advantage: they operate with quick / inconspicuous / irregular OODA loops, they can play the cheng / ch'i game, and they can shape the course of the conflict, responding as necessary to moves by their thinking human opponent. (VIII.1)

In creating forces and assessing them, one needs to ask:
1. Do they offer the requisite variety? Do they present a range of options to the people actually conducting the conflict? Do they facilitate the creation of cheng / ch'i situations? Do they create options that would be least expected by the enemy, not necessarily the one that is predicted to be the most effective?
2. Can commanders rapidly shift the focus if required? When a decision is made, are forces structured and trained so that it can be rapidly carried out? Is this capability being tested and exercised under a variety of circumstances? When selecting between quickness and predicted effectiveness, is there a strong bias towards quickness?
3. Are people and forces being trained to act in harmony? Are organizations formed to foster harmony? Is this quality exercised in a variety of circumstances and are those who prove adept in its employment promoted?
4. What is being done to ensure that people at all levels will take the initiative in harmony with others in the force to achieve objectives? In particular, are all commanders trained to issue mission orders? (VIII.2.)

Although effectiveness on the battlefield depends on people, ideas, and hardware (in that order), when creating forces there can be advantages to starting with ideas. There are instances where superbly trained and led troops have been defeated because of flawed doctrine (WWI, WWI-Eastern front). But more important, different ideas, strategies, and doctrines make different demands on people. They answer the question, "training to do what?" for example. Although people will predominate once in combat, the ideas element of Boyd's trinity is important in creating forces.

Instead of detailed tactics, followers of Sun Tzu evolved a way of thinking about conflict. That guerillas should be using Sun Tzu is not surprising, given his emphasis on deception and formlessness, since guerillas that become predictable are quickly eliminated. As the world moves into the 21st Century, such forms of highly irregular and unpredictable conflict are becoming the only way for many opponents to confront U.S. military forces. 4GW (asymmetric" conflict pushed to its limits) is what the U.S. military will have to face in the future. 4GW is nothing especially new and may represent the oldest form of organized conflict between groups of humans. Applied to large-scale "conventional" conflict, where both sides have large forces and roughly equal levels of technology, the result is known as "maneuver warfare" or "third generation warfare." (VIII.4.)
See full article at: SectionVIII. Creating Forces: Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060395.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18999

Section IX. Enhanced Third Generation Warfare: The Warfare of Rapid Maneuver
The general rule for the military is that it is better to keep a nation intact than to destroy it ... Therefore those who win every battle are not really skillful -- those who render others' armies helpless without fighting are the best of all. – Sun Tzu (IX.1.)

An early example of maneuver warfare was the Civil War campaign in the south by US General Sherman. From the time he left Chattanooga on May 1, 1864, and entered Savannah (7 months later), Sherman initiated a total of one major battle against a prepared Confederate position -- Kennesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864 -- which he lost. The entire Atlanta campaign was one cheng / ch'i operation after another. Certainly Sherman was an adequate tactician, capable of fighting battles should they be forced upon him, but that was not his strategy. Sherman so befuddled the Confederate leadership that they replaced Joe Johnston (who had a good idea of what Sherman was up to) with John Bell Hood (who hadn't a clue). Hood proceeded to launch four bloody battles and lose them all, thereby handing Atlanta (on Sept. 3), the upcoming 1864 election, and most probably the Civil War to Lincoln and the Union. (IX.2.)

Maneuver warfare follows Sun Tzu's admonition that:
The condition of a military force is that its essential factor is speed, taking advantage of others' failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect, attacking where they are not on guard. (IX.3.)
The essence of maneuver warfare is:
Warfare directed towards destroying enemy cohesion as opposed to seizing real estate; at taking the enemy force out of play decisively instead of wearing him down through slow attrition; high tempo war; fluid war that has no defined fronts or formations; decentralized armies where troops act on their own with high initiative as opposed to centralized command structures where troops ask permission and wait for orders; war designed to place the enemy in a dilemma, to suck him in to traps of his own creation, taking advantage of his stupidities and weaknesses and avoiding his strengths; war where soldiers act on judgment not on rules; war without rules; war that seeks to penetrate the enemy rather than push opposing lines backwards and forwards; war waged by a cohesive team that is like a family or tribe with a common culture and common outlook; a willingness to fight close, not just applying firepower from a long standoff, but infiltrating when the opportunity arises, as did 1st. Marine Division in Desert Storm. In maneuver warfare, we attempt not to destroy the entire enemy force but to render most of it irrelevant. (IX.4.)

Although people issues are not glamorous like new ships and fighters, and do not provide the opportunities for political engineering and simple pork-barreling inherent in large weapons programs, they are the heart and soul of a military force. (IX.5.)People and cultural factors demand the majority emphasis for study and planning. Sun Tzu would not recognize the U.S. Defense Department as a military force -- with its 300,000 people working in acquisition compared to 42,000 in combat arms battalions. Personnel are shuffled constantly so that cohesion (the single largest component of force effectiveness) is impossible.

The current Army personnel system (created in the late 1940s) cannot deploy rapidly enough to deal with flare-ups like Kosovo. When forces do reach the field, they lack the cohesion that would come from years of training together and the trust this engenders. As both Sun Tzu and Boyd insisted, these virtues are the foundation of success for any military force. (IX.6.)
See: Section IX. Enhanced Third Generation Warfare: The Warfare of Rapid Maneuver
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060399.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18998

Section X. Cohesion; Training and Leadership
According to Sun Tzu, The Way of military operations winds through unit cohesion:
Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
Good warriors seek effectiveness in battle from the force of momentum, not from individual people. (X.1.))

Cohesion works because it creates and in turn depends on trust. Harmony is an essential element of any successful organism, and "mutual trust," (translation of the Germaneinheit -- literally, "oneness") is at the top of Boyd's "organizational climate for operational effectiveness.” He concluded that: Harmony in operations is created by the bonds of implicit communications and trust that evolve as a consequence of the similar mental images or impressions each individual creates and commits to memory by repeatedly sharing the same variety of experience in the same ways. (X.2.)

The first item in a defense review is to stop doing those things that erode cohesion and mutual trust. (X.3.) A brief analysis of Vandergriff's recommendations demonstrates that not only would they greatly increase the effectiveness of U.S. military forces, they would save money. Officers are more expensive than enlisted, so reducing the percentage of officers improves the force by devolving increased responsibility (X.4.) Training needs to be robust, even at the occasional expense of procurement. One of Boyd's four principles for operational effectiveness (p. 27) was "intuitive competence," which can only come from increasingly rigorous training of individuals and units at all levels under a variety of conditions as closely related to real conflict as possible. Unit training, particularly free play exercises, not only improves proficiency, but it creates cohesion and mutual trust among its participants. Exercises can also be a laboratory for evolving the ideas that will win in the theater of operations. (X.6.)
Leadership and the Officer Corps
As one reduces the percentages of officers, eliminates intermediate headquarters, and uses performance in the field as the primary criterion for promotion, one should naturally improve leadership. Leadership in the military carries a heavy load. Boyd defined it as: The art of inspiring people to enthusiastically take action toward the achievement of uncommon goals. (X.7.) Performance -- in exercises and in actual operations -- should be the criteria for promotion. Service members who aspire to the higher ranks need a broad education. Credential-ism counts for little in high-performing civilian organizations, and there is no reason it should continue to exert such strong influence in the military.

Remember that for insurgents the criteria for leadership is primarily a willingness or drive to become a martyr.

Boyd and Sun Tzu put considerable emphasis on the importance of leadership, and Congress and U.S. national command authorities will do likewise, especially in the area of commissioning officers. In the British Army, from which the U.S. system largely derives, officers held the King's (now Queen's) Commission. This allowed them to act in the name of the monarch, in particular, to issue orders that held the force of law. Disobeying such an order was tantamount to treason and could result in execution. In the U.S. military, commissions begin with "The President of the United States ..." but other than that, little has changed. Commanders, who must be commissioned officers, can still issue life-and-death orders and can, when necessary, invoke the Uniform Code of Military Justice to ensure they are obeyed. (X.9.) Commissions are unnecessary and unnecessarily elitist.
See complete article at: Section X. Cohesion, Training and Leadership
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=20512
http://zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=soldierforum&type=journal&start=0

Section XI. Equipment and Organizations for Maneuver Warfare
It is possible to execute maneuver warfare and 4GW with the equipment the U.S. has today (and planned for the future). As the 16th Century samurai philosopher Miyamoto Musashi insisted, a warrior using proper strategy and armed only with a fencepost can take on a fully outfitted samurai and defeat him as Musashi in fact did. Three hundred years later, blitzkrieg warfare achieved its greatest success, against France and England in May 1940, with German tanks that were generally inferior to their allied counterparts in quality and in numbers. The question is whether the US can produce a force attuned to the challenges of the post-Soviet world. (XI.1.)

Military hardware and organizations must possess the inherent variety of action to facilitate cheng / ch'i maneuvers. The range of options that a force offers and the rapidity with which it can switch between them is crucial. A clever and motivated enemy can develop counters to any particular capability. One force will win because -- through training, cohesion, and leadership -- it can create options for itself and dilemmas for the enemy, and switch between them more rapidly, more inconspicuously, and with more irregularity than the enemy can cope.

Maneuver warfare requires that forces must be able to sustain a high operational tempo so that when a vulnerability ("gap") has been created or discovered, it can be exploited. Since the enemy is a clever and determined human being, one must assume he will find and close gaps as rapidly as possible, or, even more insidiously, change them into traps, or convert some of them into chengs of his own by attempting to create and exploit gaps in one's own forces. If he can do this more rapidly than friendly forces can cope, he can create Boyd-type effects: panic, confusion, and chaos, leading to collapse. This suggests that forces with mission cycles measured in days, or in some cases even hours, will find it difficult to function as the ch'i component of maneuver warfare, thus limiting the options for commanders. (XI.2.)

Logistics and support requirements play a role in sustaining high operational tempos (ammo, fuel, spare parts). These can interfere with the ability to maneuver and create and exploit gaps. Systems that require extensive logistical support also tend to focus commanders' attention inward. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, for example, it was the rare commander who could envision how to break free of the railroads that were providing his sustenance. Part of the genius of both Grant and Sherman is that they were able to convert this obvious dependency into a cheng, that is, fool Confederate commanders into attacking "lines of supply" while they launched out cross country: Grant towards Jackson and Vicksburg, and Sherman towards the sea. (XI.3.)

Complex hardware and systems focus organizations inward, which can accelerate the trend towards confusion, disintegration, and collapse. However, technical complexity per se is generally not the most severe issue, since it generally "just" degrades how often the system is available for combat. Organizational complexity is much more debilitating and is the key component in Clausewitz's famous friction. It represents organizational entropy that dissipates energy and converts it into chaos, without having to wait for the enemy to do it. In particular, the OODA loops of complex organizations can degrade quickly in such an environment, making them vulnerable to cheng / ch'i maneuvers by the other side.

The real problem with very complex equipment is that it spawns complex organizations to operate, support, and maintain it. In other words, technical complexity tends to generate organizational complexity and thus predictability and slowness. (XI.5.)
See complete article at: Section XI. Equipment and Organizations for Maneuver Warfare
http://zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=soldierforum&type=journal&start=0
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=20469
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=19075

Section XII.
Technology and Effectiveness in the 4GW World of Conflict and Deceptions
The victory of a military force is determined by the opponent.
The ability to gain victory by changing and adapting to the opponent is called genius

To illustrate the limitations of technology, look at the hurdles aviation technology has to overcome in order to prove effective in shaping and supporting operations on land:
1. The technology must physically work reliably enough to be effective. It must locate, identify, and destroy enemy forces, sometimes in close contact with our own forces, whether they be in desert, jungles, or cities.
2. It must overcome efforts by the enemy to counter it directly. System(s) must be able to achieve their acceptable level of effectiveness despite efforts by potential adversaries to defeat it -- through hardening, decoys, signature reduction, or other methods that we may not discover until we actually engage in combat.
3. Enemies must not be able to indirectly counter it by attacking the deploying platform. Conversely, its effects on the deploying platform should be minimal, that is, it should not increase its signature, decrease its performance, or require it to operate in such as way as to make it more vulnerable. Early Maverick air-to-surface missiles, for example, required the attacking aircraft to maintain line of sight to the target until the missile could obtain a lock-on. This also includes attacks on wherever the deploying platform is based.
4. It must prove tactically robust. It must withstand efforts by the enemy to render it irrelevant or to degrade it by, for example, engaging in more frequent but shorter attacks that have ended before the new technology arrives. (XII.1.)

To place technology in its place in a Sun Tzu / Boyd assessment, stay with the concept of a military force -- people, ideas, hardware, in that order. Technology can make a difference if it is integrated into this scheme. Given a well-trained, cohesive, motivated force using maneuver warfare / 4GW tactics, technology appropriately tested and evolved can provide them with better tools to do the job. In "Conceptual Spiral," Boyd concluded that the OODA loop could be applied to technology. The process of developing and using technology is iterative, and the process of iterating must move through the people and doctrine elements. As Boyd's "Patterns of Conflict" demonstrates, there are many examples of the side with the superior organizational climate and doctrine prevailing over the side with the superior weaponry. (XII.3.)

Complexity (technical, organizational, operational) causes commanders and subordinates to be captured by their own internal dynamics or interaction -- hence they cannot adapt to rapidly changing external (or even internal) circumstances. The effects of this internal focus were noted above: confusion, disruption, disintegration -- the very effects one should be trying to create in the enemy.

Guerrilla Insurgents and New Technology
Advanced technology has been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision systems, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.

To counter enhanced guerrilla technologies "Finders"--intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets of two broad types are being deployed: those that provide wide-area coverage and those with a narrow field of view but higher resolution. The role of wide-area assets is to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. Each of these types of assets has its strengths and limitations. A limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage -- a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars could enhance U.S. wide-area surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor. (XII.5.)

Advanced Sensor and Surveillance Technologies
Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors make it possible to remotely examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination. Other technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical "sniffers." Miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. Lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles may soon patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysis devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a "mothership" or a ground station. Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors.

One can listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building's windows. Experiments are under way with radars that have the potential to "see" through walls. Tagging suspected vehicles helps develop information about patterns of activity and assists shooters in engaging elusive targets. An operative on the ground in a city could covertly place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of conducting terrorist activities. The transmitter permits authorities to monitor that vehicle's movement. Signals from the transmitter make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle "in the crosshairs" should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy the vehicle. (XII.6.)

Most researchers ignore that technology promotion by the US is primarily to re-assure its people of US superiority, second to prop up the profits of the Congressional-Military-Industrial Complex and by creating so many and diverse technological gadgets and systems some of them turn out to actually be useful. Effectiveness concerns have also overcome institutional momentum in a few notable cases. The Commanche helicopter program was scrapped after costs and concerns that insurgents will posses advanced surface to air missiles rendering the aircraft obsolete. (XII.7.)
See full article: Section XII.Technology and Effectiveness in the 4GW World of Conflict
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=19076
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/060827.html

Parts I-VI Series- Beyond Iraq (Final)

2004-07-06T22:14:00.000-07:00

4GW - INSURGENCY and SURVIVAL
Making the Morally-Insane Functionally-Crazy
& The Downtrodden Invincible
Key Words: Fourth Generation Warfare - Insurgents - 4GW - Sun Tzu - John Boyd - Imperialism - War - Clash of Civilizations - Maneuver Warfare - Improvised Weapons - Guerrilla Warfare - US National Security Threats - Intelligence - Espionage - Sabotage - Assassination - Energy Vulnerability - Fifth Generation Warfare - Blackmail - Disrupting Alliances - al Qaeda - Iraqi Resistance - High-Tech Sensors and Surveillance - Neutron Bombs; Terrorism - Terror tactics - Counterinsurgency (COIN) - Special Operations; Military Commands; CIA; Suicide bombings, Car Bombs - Conspiracy Theories - Osprey V 22 - AC-130 Gunships - Osama bin Laden - George W. Bush - Rumsfeld - Fourth World War - Islam - Moslems - Crusades - Jihad - Shahid – Martyrs - Permanent war
Dear citizens interested in turning the tide of USA-led fascism, I am a military strategist. I write to you because a great war is breaking out that will make or break this planet. Call it the 4th World War (4WW) - the War of Global Imperialism or the spread of fourth generation warfare (5th generation if the Imperialists don't win soon).
I have worked in British intelligence services and for American based security firms which helped direct the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. I work for the Iraqi resistance. I am a strategist and not much of a philosopher by training, but I can tell you of my experiences. I cannot tell you which political, social or religious systems work the best -- because what is the best or even what is good for the short or the longterm has been degraded and mystified in this existence that we call the modern world. People cannot talk about the definitions of important things or about why communications/understanding are so difficult.
I can tell you what I have seen. These are stories from behind the curtain of the rich and powerful. Wherever US-UK money goes it breeds the most vile corruption. From the sex-slavery of Dyncorp in Bosnia to the same group and many other security contractors committing torture, murder and atrocities in Iraq; from the jokes about the Colombian and Peruvian airlines/airforce drug smuggling to the hilarious naivete of US activists and eco-tourists. There are 100 stories of the tragedies tolerated or promoted by the USA government and its elite classes around the world. To know the details of these evil errors (evil -- but are they errors or intentional? Ah...) is to understand why for billions of people in the world -- and millions of insurgents everywhere - there is no turning back toward (false) ideas of peace or cooperation with the West or its ruling class imperialists.

There will be war,
a fourth generation war, a war that the planet and the rich cannot win.

A Good Defense Anticipates Enemy Offense
Rifleman democracy. 2004 ------------------------------------------------------------ politics as a possible link: –
There is a theory of "rifleman democracy".
Machiavelli set out this theory: A man without a gun is in no way comparable to a man with a gun. He also proposed a democratic republic as a practical form of government exemplified by the city-state (agglomerations less than 10 million people) and Machiavelli felt this was a very possible (positive ?) development. He believed these democratic republics would be established because of the development of more accurate fire-arms, namely, rifles. One rifle is carried by one man. So, basically, one rifle = one vote. That was the format of "rifleman democracy" which enabled Napoleon to transform Europe out of feudalism. Napoleon lost as an individual, but Europe was transformed forever.
Now we have a much more complicated situation when viewing democracy as an expression of, or as determined by, realities of warfare. The U.S. did not even get involved in trying to disarm Iraqis from their AK-47's. RPG's, however, that's another matter. Anti-aircraft weapons, etc., are far more important than rifles. What it comes down to is that even individual snipers require a support system (extending to helicopters and control of the air-space) in order to function in their DEFENSE OR ATTACK roles.
Traditional individual fire-arms have, for good reason, been known as "equalizers". The days when an armored knight was equal, say, to 30 yeoman --- that period of history ended with the development of the modern rifle. Of course, it has been more complicated than one man, one rifle, one vote, for some time now. Napoleon's successes depended upon his ability to recruit, inspire and utilize riflemen --- but he was also known for his unequaled use of cannon fire in connection with infantry battles. Everything changed with the development of the machine gun about a century ago. Machine guns were operated by teams, rather than individuals, and machine guns gobbled up ammo so fast that considerable supporting infrastructure is required. Thus, the theory of "superior fire power" that was developed out of World War I and the millions of men sacrificed in futile efforts to attack and take fortified machine gun positions on static front-lines. Then came World War II --- air power and control of the air space are everything.
Warfare and revolution have been transformed by high-tech. Outcomes can no longer be forecast by counting heads. The whole is more than the sum of the parts. So, to be successful, revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box (or Box-cutter!), teamwork and specialties. It's a complex calculation anymore. Falluja and Najaf/Karbala (in Iraq) support and yet also call into question this Rifleman analysis. Rifles do seem important - though the RPGs and anti-aircraft weapons (and mortars) may be more important. We are part way into a permanent war -- which is to say a long and complex war -- The Fourth World War. Groups opposed to the current power structure will have to master 4th and 5th generation mobile-chaos smart-targeting warfare. This kind of war relies on Secret revolutionary/battle/sabotage cells, international media savvy, and connecting synergistically with each member and each group’s specialties: hackers, bombers, espionage, media, event-timing and logistics. The strength of Islamic fundamentalists lies in their cultural cohesiveness (teamwork) and their ability to combine cleverness, a feel for media-propaganda and news/action timing to create a powerful force to block the military power of the invader crusader (U.S.A.). The case of the FARC guerrillas in Colombia is another example of this interplay - riflemen and teamwork in a culture of resistance! = political-territorial-military-financial power.
Al Qaeda takes the long view that if Islam survives they win. Fundamentalist have cohesion and they have a weapon that embodies the most powerful elements of 4GW warfare: People. Ideas and Hardware. The weapon is suicide bombers and suicide car bombers. The West has no defense against such weapons except to declare martial law and watch the global economy crumble in their hands. A sign of impending demise of the Empire is that the people at the top tend to believe their own propaganda. Hitler, for example, was told as early as 1939 about the U.S. (Boeing Aircraft) tooling up to be capable of making more bombers in a month than existed in all countries combined in 1939. Basically, Hitler was told that attacking Poland and starting World War II was bound to fail in the long run. Hitler fired the messenger and brought in someone who would tell him what he wanted to hear. That is the arrogance part of it. The other part of imperial break-down has to do with corruption.

Each Section in this study:
Taking Iraqi Strategies Beyond: Insurgent Rebellions and Imperialist Strategies of War; has a summary of key points and then links to the original article and other resources....
Visit or comment at: www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy
www.communitydefense.blogspot.com-- -- www.insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com

Understanding Iraq/Saudi War- Insurgency as 4GW, by Jacques Dessalines

The Wars We Live: Beyond Iraq Strategies - Insurgency and 4GW

True Comprehension of The Grand Strategies of the Key Players -- and the Forces They Represent -- is nowhere to be found... There are many secrets... and plans that only a select few on each of the many sides have privy to.

Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms
The ruling class employs three phases of escalation to control power and its uses:
Fake liberal democracy; sophisticated riot control and subversion of opposition groups; faked national crises leading to martial law and civil war.

This final phase in the struggle against the ruling class will spread to most countries in a few years. At times all three phases overlap and so the government and the insurgents take advantage of tactics for influencing all three phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the grand or the priority strategies of either side -- amid this confusion of goals -- is no easy task.

This paper considers the third phase of struggle against the ruling class:
Guerrilla insurgencies employing Fourth generation Warfare (4GW) on the battlefield, the streets and the media: To build or disrupt alliances and to destroy the cohesion of the West and create doubt. (I.1)

The measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies and weapon systems. A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. (I.2.)
See full article and introduction with a comment on the Massive US base
at Diego Garcia: Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058642.html
Rifleman Democracy (plus INTRODUCING IMPERIALIST STRATEGIES OF CONTROL & AGGRESSION; long w/footnotes plus ); http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/05/good-defense-anticipates-enemy-offense.html

Section II.
U.S. National Defense Review: Adaptation to Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

.....Between advance and retreat. Hidden dragon. Do not act.
--I Ching

Consider the problem of conflict in a wide scope and the essential, but limited, role of military force in resolving conflict. What makes a force effective? -- The answers are largely independent of the particular age in which one dwells and the specific weapons one uses. In China, Sun Tzu (c. 500 B.C.) emphasized harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. Such a strategy reduced the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics... to win without fighting. (II.1.)
John Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- (OODA) pattern to operate inside his opponent's decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To sustain high operational tempos he codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army. (II.2.)

The US military has completed recommendations on how to change personnel management systems to foster Boyd's organizational climate. Boyd's formula of -- people--ideas --hardware, in that order, holds as well for warring states on the plains of ancient China as for guerilla warfare or national missile defense today. Though force restructuring is underway at the Pentagon, much of it would not meet with the approval (at least on a cost efficiency basis) of 4GW experts. (II.3.)

There are 3 fundamental points in Chester W. Richards' review of Boyd and Sun Tzu:
1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs.
2. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware, however, a hypothetical force including a hardware component can be compared to planned U.S. forces as expounded by Sun Tzu and John Boyd
3. Richards' outlines such a military force, one that is more effective and requires fewer resources than what the US has today. (II.4))

Richards suggests deactivating from the U.S. Army Corps, that part of its forces which are unlikely to reach a theater of conflict while any modern war is still going on. The Marine Corps and those units of the Army generally called -- unconventional-- would remain. Properly supported, this provides a mobile striking force that could descend on any part of the globe and strike at the heart of an enemy nation.

Summary of the US 3-4 GW Evolutionary Strike Force:
A. Personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[ And- for insurgents - to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy -- especially among the leaders of US strike forces ]

B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas.
[ Insurgents and other anti-American forces will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare (II.5.) ]

C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around:
U.S. Marine Corps, Army 82nd Airborne Division, Special Forces, Rangers, Delta Force, SEALs and other unconventional forces, carrier and land-based tactical air, and Intra-theater lift of heavy armor & mechanized infantry. These would be enhanced through: Robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation; and increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations. (II.6.)

The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won.

Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions as the ruling class. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US -- though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast! (II.7.)
See complete article at: Section II. National Defense Review --
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/section-ii-us-national-defense-review.html
With Photo Gallery at: Section II. National Defense Review
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000380294&zorpiasid=6c3126873f1df1f1af3dfc56134f5cde

Section III.
Boyd, Sun Tzu and Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
The Tao Te Ching (c. 500 B.C.), states that, "Weapons are the tools of fear. A decent man will avoid them, except in the direst necessity." Some argue that we have now swung to the opposite extreme... or the direst emergency.

The strategy devised by Sun Tzu fit the circumstances perfectly. It rested on two major and complementary elements, one internal and one external. Harmony on the inside is The Way (Tao) of war. All else flows from this basic idea, and without it, there is little reason to press forward into the stress of military operations. Externally, Sun's goal was to create confusion in the opposing side and then exploit it. The focus was not on winning through superior tactics or individual fighting technique (although these are important), but, as Griffith notes, -- the enemy commanders must become confused and if possible, driven insane. His primary tool for accomplishing this was quickness, which helps create ambiguity and also increases the effectiveness of a panoply of tools, such as deception, security, and intelligence.

The final chapter of The Art of War deals with use of spies. Foreknowledge enables an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplishment. Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out by calculation. It must be obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the enemy. (III.2.)

John Boyd arrived at similar conclusions. In "Blitzkrieg: Keys to Success," the third point is:
Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized before and during combat operations to unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. Boyd's OODA Loop Sketch shows that he regarded intelligence in the broadest sense no less highly than Sun Tzu. He emphasizes the importance of open systems, and the only opening into the OODA loop is through Observation. If one fails to spot mismatches between what one believes to be going on and what really is, (i.e., between Orientation and the real world), one has become "mentally isolated." If adversaries can keep us in this state -- operating inside our OODA loops -- then as setback after inexplicable frustration befall us, we will become disoriented, confused, indecisive, fearful, etc. (III.3.) A competent enemy will create, locate, and exploit vulnerabilities leading, in the case of maneuver warfare, to envelopments, ambushes, high prisoner counts or, as Boyd put it, "phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change." This explains why ill-treatment of POWs cannot be tolerated: A battlefield commander wants them to surrender, and needs to make it as easy as possible. (III.4.)

Although Sun Tzu is known for his admonition "To win without fighting is best," the subject of this sentence and of The Art of War is: To win. Whether used to fight or for some other purpose, Sun Tzu placed a high premium on the utility of military force. (III.5.)
See: Section III. Boyd, Sun Tzu and Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18601

Section IV. Threats to U.S. National Security
The most likely cause for introducing US military forces would be a large-scale attack against a country that the U.S. considers a "vital national interest" (Israel, Taiwan. Saudi Arabia). U.S. forces could face anything from a conventional attack to what is called "fourth generation warfare" (4GW). This term describes any way of dealing with U.S. military forces other than confronting them on the battlefield. It includes all forms of terrorism, guerilla warfare, intifada-type urban unrest -- sometimes financed by relationships with criminal or narcotics networks -- and others that will evolve. (IV.1)

Grant Hammond of the Air War College notes (IV.2.), 4GW is not just guerilla warfare under another name: Perceiving war as a contest marked by the use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragically simplistic, and fundamentally flawed view ... a future war among industrialized states, even if effective and efficient, could be virtually invisible. In 4GW distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-22 aircraft by poisoning the squadron's mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even attacking schools and PXs back at the base. 4GW, while highly "asymmetric," is not the same as "asymmetric warfare," since maneuver warfare is also "asymmetric" and calls for creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses, rather than engaging and trying to reduce his formations and fortified positions directly. Since 2001, more than 50 major active conflicts are brewing, any one of which could be the spark for commitment of US troops. Survival of the US does not have to be the issue; survival of the current political leadership will suffice. (IV.3.)
See full article at: Section IV. Threats to U.S. National Security
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058691.html
http://insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournal?moduleId=31058

Section V. Sun Tzu and Boyd on the Utility of Military Force
For Sun Tzu the best way to defeat an enemy is by "attacking his strategy." Attack early, while the enemy's plans are being laid or employ unusual methods to "seize victory without even battling." Should this prove impossible, Sun Tzu then recommends disrupting his alliances. Some say that this means to attack early, before the enemy can solidify his alliances. Others suggest it means isolating potential enemies from sources of support, or intimidating them through strong alliances of your own. (V.1.)

The use of armed force by the US government must be carefully thought out so that it does not cause more problems than it solves. (V.2.) For this Boyd expands on Sun Tzu's first two courses of action through his concept of "grand strategy," which serves to:
1. Support national goals
2. Pump up one's own resolve, drain away the adversary's resolve, and attract the uncommitted to one's cause
3. End the conflict on favorable terms
4. Ensure that the conflict and peace terms do not provide the seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict
For insurgents, more and bloodier is usually a desired accomplishment (V.3.)

The goal of war, once unleashed, is to achieve victory:
1. In the shortest possible time
2. At the least possible cost in lives and effort to one's own side
3. With the infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties

Today, one finds many justifications for U.S. military force, all of which can be included within three broad categories: 1. Defend homeland from attack; 2. Enforce "Pax Americana" ; 3. Protect vital U.S. interests abroad. (V.4.)

Enforcing worldwide peace is a large job. Many of the 40 major armed conflicts active in the world involve longstanding ethnic or tribal disputes. It is not clear how entry of U.S. armed forces would resolve them. This suggests a policy of selective intervention, which is usually phrased as "protecting U.S. vital interests." As with the Pax Americana, most Americans agree with the idea that the US should employ its armed forces to protect vital interests. U.S. leaders will commit enormous forces to protect such things as access to crude oil, and given the dependence of the U.S. economy on imported resources, practically any part of the world could become a "vital national interest" in the future (Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia). (V.5.)
See: Section V. Sun Tzu and Boyd on the Utility of Military Force
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/059016.html
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18817

Section VI. Military Force vis-a-vis Other Options and Considerations
The Balkans, Chechnya, East Timor, Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq have shown the limited capacity of the major powers to deploy forces relevant to keeping the peace and rebuilding states shattered by civil war. Civil affairs capabilities have proven to be almost non existent. Keeping the peace requires soldiers to act like policemen, a job for which they are ill prepared and ill equipped. Many Third World countries resent the U.S. ready resort to military power. (VI.1.)

Since the Bush invasion of Iraq, large majorities around the world have grown to fear the threat of an Imperial-Crusader US foreign policy and the US proclaimed right to pre-emptive strikes, lies and bullying that it uses to get its way with the people of the Middle East, US allies and the UN. The U.S. is rushing to court unpopularity across the world, contrary to expectations that the Bush national security establishment would conduct itself with sophistication. There is little sign of the maturity, balance and sobriety expected of the -- reluctant warrior -- Colin Powell ... The U.S. policy in the first months of President George Bush was suggestive of a lack of coherence and a hegemonic arrogance. The Bush administration set a record for alienating so many nations in such a short period. And then there was Iraq... (VI.2.)
Forgotten are the lesson of the Tao Te Ching, that any use of "power," even (especially) if it is successful, breeds resentment and may plant the seeds of future conflict. (VI.3.) Boyd, Chester and most liberals miss the point of Bush's actions. Having grasped the seriousness of Boyd's predictions about 4GW, the US has been forced to accelerate its program of global domination. Though some mistakes were made -- as in all conflicts -- Bush seeks to draw out potential large nation enemies so that the US can destroy their conventional forces and reduce their support to insurgents. Then the US will only face 4GW and strategic threats of a diminished nature. (VI.4.)

Boyd and Sun Tzu insisted that to be effective, the military option must be integrated within the entire collection of tools available. The US is assembling a national military plan that will provide effective forces when called for, but which does not require accurate predictions of the future. Sun Tzu and John Boyd provide a resolution to this dilemma by stepping up one level and asking, "Regardless of the specifics of how they will be used, what makes military forces effective in general?" If the US creates an evolutionary military force, and equips and trains them for maneuver conflict and 4GW, then operating in conjunction with allies and using the other tools for advancing vital interests, it can field an effective and affordable military force.
Peacekeeping: In the initial stages of a peacekeeping operation, military forces may be needed to engage hostile military forces before true peacekeeping can begin. This is a standard use of force and presents no conceptual problems, since the primary mission of the military is to defeat opposing armed forces by death and destruction if necessary. This is what they study, equip, and train for. People are promoted (or should be) for their proficiency as war fighters and leaders. In true peacekeeping, the mission is protection, not destruction. It is more akin to policing than to soldiering, and uses of force must be controlled. One of the largest threats to effective peacekeeping is the orientation that the underlying problems can be solved by force. This mindset can be reinforced if it seems that armed military groups cannot be quickly eliminated or, as in Somalia, that they keep reappearing after a successful initial stage. Such a situation could indicate that the armed groups enjoy wider support among the population than originally thought -- that U.S. forces are engaging in fourth generation warfare without knowing it -- and so the venue is not ready for "peacekeeping" at all. (VI.5.)
See: Section VI. Military Force vis-a-vis Other Options and Considerations
http://soldierrebelion.squarespace.com/display/ShowJournalEntry?moduleId=29099&entryId=19094
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18818

Section XII. Force Structure Options: The Series Beyond Iraqi Strategies

2004-06-24T14:21:00.000-07:00

Section XII. Force Structure Options

If hardware is tertiary, why not just stick with what the U.S. military already has? The problem with this alternative is that it requires spending at Cold War levels on Cold War equipment, but without a Cold War threat. It also turns leaders’ attention away from creating effective forces and towards lobbying for hardware programs. The issue is whether the US could carry out a maneuver warfare strategy by using fewer resources, do it better, and in the process avoid some of the problems caused by continuing an enormously large defense establishment.

In war or in business, implementing lean-production forces any organization to eliminate waste and reduce costs while simultaneously improving quality, efficiency and time to market. Enterprises that successfully employ lean production routinely take market share from those who do not, and, because of their lower costs, generally post far better bottom lines. Improving mutual trust is a key element in implementing lean production, and that coincidentally, the people who invented lean manufacturing were careful students of Sun Tzu. To see the power of Sun Tzu’s strategy applied to business, one need only note that between 1980 and 1990, General Motors’ share of the U.S. market declined from 52 percent to less than 30 percent, largely driven down by the inroads of Toyota, Nissan, and Honda.

To summarize the guidelines for constructing a Sun Tzu / Boyd force following the discussion above:

1. Military force is a key component of furthering national interests, but it is not the only component or in many cases even the primary one. It should always be used sparingly.

2. Military forces, when they are used, should obey Sun Tzu’s dictum: end the conflict in the quickest possible time with the least possible damage to either side.

3. Military operations against conventional forces, for example, to assist an ally under conventional attack, must be conducted as maneuver warfare. That implies a substantial capacity to play the cheng / chi game against any potential opponent.

4. Military operations in 4GW must be carefully measured so that, by their very success, they do not strengthen the hands of opponents. It truly is not necessary to destroy the village in order to save it.

Maneuver warfare provides a framework for implementing such a force and history suggests that there are some characteristics of a force that can reinforce its capabilities for maneuver warfare in the post-Cold War era. The following table is from a recent book on maneuver warfare by experts on the subject from all four armed services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (reflecting their personal views, not official policy):

1. Increased focus on littorals (regions within a hundred miles of the sea), where most of the world's people, wealth, commerce, instabilities, and U.S. interests are concentrated.

2. Decreased need for large standing land and air forces, and an enhanced role for reserve forces.

3. Decreased need for heavy naval forces configured for global war at sea and heavy bombing forces, with a concurrent shift to maintaining control of littoral regions in support of interventions.

4. The need for intervention and extraction capabilities to protect lives, property, commerce, and other interests, with an emphasis on high-speed lighter forces configured for autonomous operations in hostile regions.

5. The rise of fourth-generation warfare, resulting in an increased need for irregular war-fighting skills/capabilities in close-quarters combat and small-unit operations among state/non-state actors. Characteristic of this are the following:

a. Decreased reliance on firepower/attrition in ground warfare.

b. Decreased reliance on deep-strike/interdiction/strategic bombardment of "infrastructure" in air warfare.

c. Increased reliance on fast-transient littoral penetration operations, info-war operations, Special Forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/ antiterrorist/ antinuclear operations, and increased occurrences of urban/suburban combat.

d. Increased resource constraints resulting in internal competition for resources.

With this in mind, let’s construct an alternative defense capability. Neither Boyd nor Sun Tzu ever built such a force, so the recommendations are merely speculations by Chester and his group of researchers.. The other caveat is that if Chester’s recommendations are successful, the force represented below will satisfy the requirements of maneuver warfare, but that is not to suggest that it is the only force that will do so, or even the best that could ultimately be attained by continuing to experiment and select.

Unveiling the Wars We Live: Insurgency and Fourth Generation Warfare

2004-06-20T16:33:00.000-07:00

Unveiling the Wars We Live: Insurgency and Fourth Generation Warfare

Key Words:

Insurgents; 4GW; Sun Tzu; John Boyd; Imperialism; War; Clash of Civilizations; Maneuver Warfare; Improvised Weapons; Guerrilla Warfare; US National Security Threats; Intelligence, Espionage; Sabotage; Assassination; Energy Vulnerability; Fifth Generation Warfare; Blackmail; Disrupting Alliances; Al Qaeda; Iraqi Resistance; High-Tech Sensors and Surveillance

Each Section in this study: Taking Iraqi Strategies Beyond: Insurgent Rebellions and Imperialist Strategies of War; has a summary of key points and then links to the original article and other resources.

…
True Comprehension of The Grand Strategies of the Key Players – and the Forces They Represent – is nowhere to be found... There are many secrets... and plans that only a select few on each of the many sides have privy to. – Echoes of the Archetype

Dear citizens interested in turning the tide of USA-led Fascism, I am a military strategist. I write to you because a great war is breaking out that will make or break this planet. Call it the 4th World War - the War of Global Imperialism or the spread of fourth generation warfare ( 5th generation if the Imperialists don't win soon).

I have worked in British intelligence services and for the American-based private security firms which helped to direct the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. For 10 months I have worked for a faction of the Iraqi resistance. I am a strategist and not much of a philosopher by training, but I can tell you of my experiences. I cannot tell you which political, social or religious systems work the best -- because what is the best or even what is good for the short or the longterm has been degraded and mystified in this existence that we call the modern world. People cannot talk about the definitions of important things or about why communications/understanding are so difficult.

I can tell you what I have seen. These are stories from behind the curtain of the rich and powerful. Wherever US-UK money goes it breeds the most vile corruption. From the sex-slavery of Dyncorp in Bosnia to the same group and many other security contractors committing torture, murder and atrocities in Iraq; from the jokes about the Colombian and Peruvian airlines/airforce drug smuggling to the hilarious naivete of US activists and eco-tourists. There are 100 stories of the tragedies tolerated or promoted by the USA government and its elite classes around the world. If one knew the details of these evil errors ( evil – but are they errors or intentional? Ah...) then one could understand why for billions of people in the world – and millions of insurgents everywhere - there is no turning back toward (false) ideas of peace or cooperation with the West or its ruling class imperialists.

There will be war, a fourth generation war, a war that the planet and the rich cannot win.

Please visit and comment on - or pass on to those who know something
about the world scene the following web sites :
www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy;
communitydefense.blogspot.com;
insurgency-4gw.squarespace.com

Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms

The ruling class employs three phases of escalation to control power and its uses: fake liberal democracy; sophisticated riot control and subversion of opposition groups; faked national crises leading to martial law and civil war. This final phase in the struggle against the ruling class will spread to most countries in a few years. At times all three phases overlap and so the government and the insurgents take advantage of tactics for influencing all three phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the grand or the priority strategies of either side -- amid this confusion of goals -- is no easy task. This paper considers the third phase of struggle against the ruling class:

Guerrilla insurgencies employing Fourth generations Warfare (4GW) on the battlefield, the streets, the media and in building or disrupting alliances.

The measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies and weapon systems. A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition

Suggestions on new sub-topics, better organization, resources, links and cross referencing techniques are appreciated. We are also interested in obtaining a chronology of attacks in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the US, Europe, Afghanistan and other relevant places with a description of the attack, casualties by nationality and any statements made by the authorities, insurgents or Al Qaeda, etc…. We hope to chart these events alongside the price of oil, the stock market quotes, Bush’s popularity and other factors in search of correlation or patterns.

See full article and introduction with a comment on the Massive US base at Diego Garcia:
1. Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms

http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/058642.html

See also
2. Rifleman Democracy (plus INTRODUCING IMPERIALIST STRATEGIES OF CONTROL & AGGRESSION; long w/footnotes plus)
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/05/good-defense-anticipates-enemy-offense.html

Section II. U.S. National Defense Review: Adaptation to Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

Consider the problem of conflict in a wide scope and the essential, but limited, role of military force in resolving conflict. What makes a force effective? -- The answers are largely independent of the particular age in which one dwells and the specific weapons one uses. In China, Sun Tzu (c. 500 B.C.) emphasized harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. Such a strategy reduced the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics… to win without fighting.

John Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- pattern to operate inside his opponent’s decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To sustain high operational tempos he codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army.

The US military has completed recommendations on how to change personnel management systems to foster Boyd’s organizational climate. Boyd’s formula of – people—ideas --hardware, in that order, holds as well for warring states on the plains of ancient China as for guerilla warfare or national missile defense today. Though force restructuring is underway (1), much of it would not meet with the approval (at least on a cost efficiency basis) of 4GW experts.

There are four fundamental points in Chester W. Richards’ review of Boyd and Sun Tzu:
1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs.
2. The strategic framework expounded by Sun Tzu and John Boyd provides a coherent and historically validated method for comparing one force with another.
3. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware, however, a hypothetical force including a hardware component can be compared to planned U.S. forces.
4. Richards’ paper posits such a force that is more effective and requires fewer resources than what the US has today. (2)

He suggests deactivating from the U.S. Army that part of it which is unlikely to reach a theater of conflict while any modern war is still going on. The Marine Corps and those units of the Army generally called – unconventional-- would remain. Properly supported, this provides a mobile striking force that could descend on any part of the globe and strike at the heart of an enemy nation.

Summary of an Evolutionary Force

A. Personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[ And to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy – especially among the leaders of US strike forces ]

B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas.
[ Insurgents and other anti-American forces will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare (3.) ]

C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around:
U.S. Marine Corps, Army 82nd Airborne Division, Special Forces, Rangers, Delta Force, SEALs and other unconventional forces, carrier and land-based tactical air, and Intra-theater lift of heavy armor & mechanized infantry. These would be enhanced through: Robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation; and increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations. (4.)

The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won.

Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions as the ruling class. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US – though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast!

See complete article at:
Section II. National Defense Review –
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/section-ii-us-national-defense-review.html
Or with Photo Gallery at:
Section II. National Defense Review – as per num 6 above
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000380294&zorpiasid=6c3126873f1df1f1af3dfc56134f5cde

Section III. Boyd, Sun Tzu and Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare

The Tao Te Ching (c. 500 B.C.), states that, “Weapons are the tools of fear. A decent man will avoid them, except in the direst necessity.” Some argue that we have now swung to the opposite extreme... or the direst emergency.

The strategy devised by Sun Tzu fit the circumstances perfectly. It rested on two major and complementary elements, one internal and one external. Harmony on the inside is The Way (Tao) of war. All else flows from this basic idea, and without it, there is little reason to press forward into the stress of military operations. Externally, Sun’s goal was to create confusion in the opposing side and then exploit it. The focus was not on winning through superior tactics or individual fighting technique (although these are important), but, as Griffith notes, -- the enemy commanders must become confused and if possible, driven insane. His primary tool for accomplishing this was quickness, which helps create ambiguity and also increases the effectiveness of a panoply of tools, such as deception, security, and intelligence.

The final chapter of The Art of War deals with use of spies. Foreknowledge enables an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplishment. Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out by calculation. It must be obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the enemy.

John Boyd arrived at similar conclusions. He appears to accord intelligence a lower status than Sun Tzu. He has no briefing with “intelligence” in the title, nor is the word in the title of his briefing slides. When it does appear, it is in a list with other items. In “Blitzkrieg: Keys to Success,” the third point is:

Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized before and during combat operations to unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.

Boyd’s OODA Loop Sketch, however, shows that he regarded intelligence in the broadest sense no less highly than Sun Tzu. He emphasizes the importance of open systems, and the only opening into the OODA loop is through Observation. If one fails by to spot mismatches between what one believes to be going on and what really is, (i.e., between Orientation and the real world), one has become “mentally isolated.” If adversaries can keep us in this state – operating inside our OODA loops – then as setback after inexplicable frustration befall us, we will become disoriented, confused, indecisive, fearful, etc. A competent enemy will create, locate, and exploit vulnerabilities leading, in the case of maneuver warfare, to envelopments, ambushes, high prisoner counts or, as Boyd put it, “phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change.” This explains why ill-treatment of POWs cannot be tolerated: A battlefield commander wants them to surrender, and needs to make it as easy as possible. (7.)

Although Sun Tzu is known for his admonition “To win without fighting is best,” the subject of this sentence and of The Art of War is: To win. Whether used to fight or for some other purpose, Sun Tzu placed a high premium on the utility of military force. (8.)

See full article at:
Section III. Boyd, Sun Tzu and Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
http://insurgency.joeuser.com/index.asp?AID=18601

Section II. U.S. National Defense Review: Adaptation to Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

2004-06-17T20:31:00.000-07:00

1086 wds
Section II. U.S. National Defense Review: Adaptation to Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

Consider the problem of conflict in a wide scope and the essential, but limited, role of military force in resolving conflict. What makes a force effective? -- The answers are largely independent of the particular age in which one dwells and the specific weapons one uses. This study examines the evolving US military strategy for 3rd and 4th Generation Warfare.

Sun Tzu (c. 500 B.C.) emphasized harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. If done well, such a strategy eliminated, or at worst greatly reduced, the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics. The ideal result is -- to win without fighting.

John Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- pattern to operate inside his opponent’s decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To allow forces to sustain such high operational tempos, Boyd codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army.

The US military has completed recommendations on how to change personnel management systems to foster Boyd’s organizational climate. Boyd’s formula of – people—ideas --hardware, in that order, holds as well for warring states on the plains of ancient China as for guerilla warfare or national missile defense today.

There are four fundamental points:
1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs.

2. The strategic framework expounded by Sun Tzu and John Boyd provides a coherent and historically validated method for comparing one force with another.

3. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware. One can, however, construct hypothetical forces including a hardware component and, using their framework, compare them to current and planned U.S. forces.

4. To illustrate this process, this paper posits one such force that would be more effective and require fewer resources than what the US has today.

This synthesis relies on the style of fighting Boyd espoused, which he derived from Sun Tzu and from commanders, including Americans such as Grant and Patton, who employed this style with success down through history. One can use the precepts of what is called -- maneuver warfare -- to help choose between alternative force structures, but not, as it turns out, between individual weapons.

A study by Chester W. Richards suggests deactivating from the U.S. Army that part of it which is unlikely to reach a theater of conflict while any modern war is still going on. The Marine Corps and those units of the Army generally called – unconventional-- would remain. Properly supported, this provides a mobile striking force that could rapidly descend on any part of the globe, should that prove desirable, and strike directly at the heart of an enemy nation. It could have won the Gulf War several months sooner than the ponderous formations eventually deployed. For all but the briefest operations we assume that the US will fight in conjunction with allies. (2.)

Summary of an Evolutionary Force

A. Personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[ And to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy – especially among the leaders of US strike forces ]

B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas.

[ Insurgents and other anti-American forces will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare (3.) ]

C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around:

Current active U.S. Marine Corps divisions
U.S. Army 82nd Airborne Division
Special Forces
Rangers, Delta Force, etc. expanded as necessary
SEALs and other U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force unconventional forces
Carrier and land-based tactical air
New aircraft for direct support and shaping of land combat
Heavy armor & mechanized infantry capability in elite Reserve / Guard units
Intra-theater lift
Seaborne fire support (battleship as interim)

D. U.S. Mobility Force composed of:

6 aircraft carrier (CVN) task forces
Inter-theater air and sealift
Attack submarines (SSNs) (in addition to those in the CVN task forces)
Strategic forces (aircraft, bombers, missile and space assets)

E. Robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation to support the above areas.

F. Greatly increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations.(4.)

* COMMENT: One problem with these proposals is that a smaller elite force might decide to coup – because they are better and smarter than the rest of us – though a time may come when the Military Industrial Complex sees the need for a coup coming and the need to have a small force that it can more easily control

The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won.

U.S. defense spending is like giving food to an obese, but hungry and insistent, relative. It quiets him down for a few minutes, but you know it isn’t the solution to his problem. (5.) To begin to answer the question of -- What could be done to improve the Defense Department (DoD) and its forces -- one must first ask, -- What makes one force more effective than another -- Which immediately leads to the question of -- Effective at what? Differences in the answers one gives to this question will make large differences in the types of forces one buys and operates. If one envisions U.S. military forces as global enforcers, for example, taking the primary responsibility for suppressing opposition to U.S. interests, one arrives at a quite different military than one charged primarily with territorial defense of the US. (6.)

Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US – though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast!

Restructuring and expansion of US Special Operations forces continues, but infighting among the branches of the armed forces has kept effectiveness from improving faster.

US Special Operations forces are CIA Paramilitaries without Geneva Convention Protection

2004-06-15T13:47:00.000-07:00

US Special Operations Forces Expand in Size and Extend Their Missions to Become CIA Paramilitary Forces

Enemies are aligned against the US in an unconventional fashion called "fourth-generation warfare"… characterized by the adversary’s adroit use of methods that differ greatly from the usual mode of US military doctrine and operations. They undermine US strengths and exploit our weaknesses as the single global superpower and portray the US as a global villain picking on the little guy. If the US military doesn't "out-guerrilla the guerrilla," they lose the global war on terrorism.

The Pentagon's elite Special Forces soldiers now fight in the shadowy world of "actionable intelligence," covertly collecting information against terrorists and acting on that information with clandestine raids and attacks. The Washington Times (Feb. 19, 04) revealed that Army "Green Berets" have assumed the role of "spies" in addition to their traditional combat roles. The intelligence networks that the Special Forces personnel have nurtured, and cultivated, support their own unit-unique initiatives and mission requirements. Collection skills have improved with time and experience. National-level intelligence agencies have shoehorned themselves into Special Forces intelligence operations that were initially designed for collection of tactical human intelligence. These ops gained strategic and global intelligence direction as they yielded bonanzas. In Afghanistan since 2001, Tajikistan, Uzbeckistan and Iraq (especially in Kurdistan) before and during the 2003 invasion US Special Operations forces have been both scouts and forward diplomats in war zones and in negotiations with tribal warlords all over these regions. he special ops and its command in conjunction with the Joint Forces Command is transforming the now-larger special forces into CIA Paramilitary units with sufficient air support and fire power they can strike swiftly and act with battalion-sized strength.

The CIA relied upon the Special Forces as key players in the Vietnam, Phoenix program. The soldiers were often dispatched into the "denied-areas" in the war zone to perform their dangerous missions. Phoenix was basically the shortest distance between two points during the Vietnam War – those points being (1) the decision to liquidate an adversary, normally a well placed Viet Cong official, or his minions, and (2) the end-game of the operation: the capture, disappearance, or publicized assassination of the target.

The Department Of Defense is not going to be restricted, as in past decades, when it comes to aggressive intelligence collection efforts against U.S. adversaries. In keeping with the veracity of the threat, Don Rumsfeld has created the Pentagon's, first-ever, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. In the post-9/11 world, the intelligence community recognizes strength in the Special Forces that their own operatives lack. Establishing indigenous human intelligence operations in a rapidly developing or already fluid combat environment has not been a strong area for the ivy-league operatives.

The Army is stepping up intelligence training for Special Forces soldiers at SOCOM Headquarters in Florida, and at Ft. Lewis, Wash., the home of the 1st Special Forces Group. The Tacoma location is being run like a "Mini-Farm," referring to the highly classified CIA training facility at Camp Peary, Va. ( known to the CIA as "The Farm"). Rumsfeld has given SOCOM new powers to plan and execute, "kill-or-capture-missions" against terrorists. To accomplish this goal, the SOCOM troops must have mission-unique intelligence information that is absolutely current -- a CIA paramilitary force. The CIA largely engages in activities that are intended to, and do evade international law – and many times US laws are skirted too. CIA personnel are unrestricted by the laws of war that particularly deal with uniforms, equipment and identities. They exploit this freedom to create "cover" identities for their missions.

If special forces soldiers are operating undercover with CIA paramilitary units, they risk losing their Geneva Convention protection

Insurgency and Fourth Generation Warfare: Unveiling the Wars We Live

2004-06-10T18:47:00.000-07:00

Insurgency and Fourth Generation Warfare: Unveiling the Wars We Live

Insurgents; 4GW; Sun Tzu; John Boyd; Imperialism; War; Clash of Civilizations

Iraq Strategies and Beyond; Insurgent Rebellions and Imperialist Strategies of War

http://india.indymedia.org/en/2004/06/209461.shtml

Dear citizens and --- interested in turning the tide of UsA-led Fascism, I am a military strategist. I write to you because a great war is breaking out that will make or break this planet. Call it the Fourth World War - the War of Global Imperialism or the spread of fourth generation warfare ( soon to be 5th generation if the Imperialists don't win soon) -

I have worked in British intelligence services and for the American-based private security firms which helped to direct the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. For 10 months I have worked for a faction of the Iraqi resistance. I am a strategist and not much of a philosopher by training, but I can tell you of my experiences. I cannot tell you which political, social or religious systems work the best -- because what is the best or even what is good for the short or the longterm has been degraded and mystified in this existence that we call the modern world. People cannot talk about the definitions of things or about why communications/understanding are so difficult.

I can tell you what I have seen. These are stories from behind the curtain of the rich and powerful. Wherever US-UK money goes it breeds the most vile corruption. From the sex-slavery of Dyncorp in Bosnia to the same group and many other security contractors committing torture, murder and atrocities in Iraq; from the jokes about the Colombian and Peruvian airlines/airforce drug smuggling to the hilariousness of naive and stupid US activists and eco-tourists. There are hundreds more major stories and tragedies tolerated or promoted by the USA government and its elite class. If one knew the details of these evil errors ( evil – but are they errors or intentional? Ah...) then one could understand why for billions of people in the world – and millions of insurgents everywhere - there is no turning back toward (false) ideas of peace or cooperation with the West or its ruling class imperialists.

There will be war, a fourth generation war, a war that the planet and the rich cannot win.

Please visit and comment on - or pass on to those who know something about the world scene the following web sites : www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy; communitydefense.blogspot.com

INTRODUCTION:

There are three stages of escalation that the ruling class employs to control everything that it needs to control:

I. They promote a shallow, unrepresentative, liberal democracy when the people demand involvement in the affairs of governance. The ruling class assures that dynasties, family-gangs or business oligarchies dominate control, sometimes with alternating figureheads. Assassinations or coups are used as needed. This type of government is really just a PR or an opinion collecting organization.

II. Control tactics for combating protesters and rioting are well developed, tested and written about: Stryker transports, water cannons, chemical weapons, robo-cops, electronic weapons and infiltration, intimidation and assassinations are coordinated to suit the situation; Seattle, Genoa, Cancun, Miami-ALCA, Cairo. Large-scale detentions are eventually used: such as the 2.5 million people in the US prison system, the 9000 terror-suspect detainees in the US (held without charges), and the many thousands of enemy combatants held at Guantanamo and the other torture centers in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel. Additionally the Iraqi-Model of holding 40-60,000 people for months or years without charges will be expanded despite the prisoner abuse scandals. Under this type of regime, disappearances, wrongful arrest and extreme forms of torture (including of your children/wife in front of you) will become (are) common-place.

III. This paper examines the third and final phase of control employed by the government to avoid real democracy or challenges to corporate wealth: faked national crises leading to martial law and civil war. This final phase in the struggle against the ruling class will spread to most countries in a few years. At times all three phases overlap and so the government and the insurgents take advantage of tactics for influencing all three phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the grnad or priority strategies amid this confusion of goals is no easy task.

In order for citizens to function as independent and responsible actors, they need to know what the government is up to. As with commercial investments and development, the military is planning far ahead and their planning actually helps to create what will happen through the responses of their enemies and the urge to use new technologies and new operational tactics.

U.S. National Defense Review: Adaptation to Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

Sun Tzu and John Boyd considered the problem of conflict in a wide scope. They explored the essential, but limited, role of military force in resolving conflict, and they examined in some detail the issue of -- What makes a force effective? -- The answers they derived are largely independent of the particular age in which one dwells and the specific weapons one uses. (1.)

Sun Tzu (c. 500 B.C.) emphasized harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. If done well, such a strategy eliminated, or at worst greatly reduced, the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics. The ideal result is -- to win without fighting.

Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- pattern to operate inside his opponent’s decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To allow forces to sustain such high operational tempos, Boyd codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army.

The US military has completed recommendations on how to change personnel management systems to foster Boyd’s organizational climate. Boyd’s formula of – people—ideas --hardware, in that order, holds as well for warring states on the plains of ancient China as for guerilla warfare or national missile defense today.

There are four fundamental points:
1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs.

2. The strategic framework expounded by Sun Tzu and John Boyd provides a coherent and historically validated method for comparing one force with another.

3. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware. One can, however, construct hypothetical forces including a hardware component and, using their framework, compare them to current and planned U.S. forces.

4. To illustrate this process, this paper posits one such force and claims that it would be more effective and require fewer resources than what the US has today.

This synthesis relies heavily on the style of fighting Boyd espoused, which he derived from Sun Tzu and from commanders, including Americans such as Grant and Patton, who employed this style with success down through history. One can use the precepts of what is called -- maneuver warfare -- to help choose between alternative force structures, but not, as it turns out, between individual weapons.

This paper suggests deactivating from the U.S. Army that part of it which is unlikely to reach a theater of conflict while any modern war is still going on. The Marine Corps and those units of the Army generally called – unconventional-- would remain. Properly supported, this provides a mobile striking force that could rapidly descend on any part of the globe, should that prove desirable, and strike directly at the heart of an enemy nation. It could have won the Gulf War several months sooner than the ponderous formations eventually deployed. This study assumes, as did Boyd and Sun Tzu, that for all but the briefest operations, the US will fight in conjunction with allies.

[ Notation: One problem with these proposals is that a smaller elite force might decide to coup – because they are better and smarter than the rest of us – though a time may come when the Military Industrial Complex sees the need for a coup coming and the need to have a small force that it can more easily control ]

Summary of an Evolutionary Force

A. Personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[ And to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy – especially among the leaders of US strike forces ]

B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas.
[ Insurgents and other will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare (2.) ]

C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around:

Current active U.S. Marine Corps divisions
U.S. Army 82nd Airborne Division
Special Forces
Rangers, Delta Force, etc. expanded as necessary
SEALs and other U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force unconventional forces
Carrier and land-based tactical air
New aircraft for direct support and shaping of land combat
Heavy armor & mechanized infantry capability in elite Reserve / Guard units
Intra-theater lift
Seaborne fire support (battleship as interim)

D. U.S. Mobility Force composed of:

6 aircraft carrier (CVN) task forces
Inter-theater air and sealift
Attack submarines (SSNs) (in addition to those in the CVN task forces)
Strategic forces (aircraft, bombers, missile and space assets)

E. Robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation to support the above areas.

F. Greatly increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations. (3. See CIA Paramilitary forces include all US Special Operations forces; www.blogspotcom )

The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won.

Increasing U.S. defense spending is like giving more food to an obese, but very hungry and insistent, relative. It may quiet him down for a few minutes, but somehow you know it isn’t the solution to his problem. [ on page # ??, we address the fallacies surrounding this perspective. (4. – Generalized strategies like Boyd's or Chester's are introductory and foundational – Much of the "debate" over 4th generation and new US strategies are intentionally or otherwise misleading – The real world - where the US charts a course of domination -- is ever more complex than analysts describe – are they (and the Bush neo-cons) ignorant, partially blinded or hyper-Machiavellian? ) ] To begin to answer the question of -- What could be done to improve the Defense Department (DoD) and its forces -- one must first ask, -- What makes one force more effective than another -- Which immediately leads to the question of -- Effective at what? Differences in the answers one gives to this question will make large differences in the types of forces one buys and operates. If one envisions U.S. military forces as global enforcers, for example, taking the primary responsibility for suppressing opposition to U.S. interests, one arrives at a quite different military than one charged primarily with territorial defense of the United States. (5. Actually a moot point as the US designed the world economy long ago to require the US to dominate and secure its resources.)

Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Queda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US – though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast!

Sun Tzu 101
The time in which Sun Tzu lived, like those that spawned other great strategic works, was a laboratory for the creation, testing, and evolution of military ideas. During the aptly named -- Warring States-- period, China broke into some eight major states and a dozen or so principalities, each of which was attempting to subdue the others by armed conflict. Invasion by one or more neighbors posed a constant threat, so that war truly was, in the famous opening words of the book, the -- path of survival and destruction.

The strategy devised by Sun Tzu fit the circumstances perfectly. It rested on two major and complementary elements, one internal and one external. Harmony on the inside is The Way (Tao) of war. All else flows from this basic idea, and without it, there is little reason to press forward into the stress of military operations. Externally, Sun’s goal was to create confusion in the opposing side and then exploit it. The focus was not on winning through superior tactics or individual fighting technique (although these are important), but, as Griffith notes, -- the enemy commanders must become confused and if possible, driven insane. His primary tool for accomplishing this was quickness, which helps create ambiguity and also increases the effectiveness of a panoply of tools, such as deception, security, and intelligence, that will be addressed in the following sections.

This strategy differs fundamentally from the core of Western military doctrine, which follows the strategy of Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz’s goal was to bring the opposing army to -- decisive battle, and then win it. Sun Tzu wanted to achieve victory in war, but preferably by causing the enemy army to disintegrate before the battle:

Therefore, those who win every battle are not really skillful -- those who render other’s armies helpless without fighting are the best of all.

Although this may not always be possible, it sets a completely different focus on how one approaches the conduct of conflict. As Boyd noted, Clausewitz, even if his strategy is successful, invariably leads to bloody battles of attrition.

[ Notation: But large-scale battles are slower, safer, patriotism-building and more amenable to the political cycles. ]

Sun Tzu and Intelligence
The final chapter of The Art of War deals with use of spies. Foreknowledge enables an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplishment. Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out by calculation. It must be obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the enemy.

The section on spies is the culmination of the entire work. Sun Tzu makes this clear in the final passage:

-- So only a brilliant ruler or a wise general who can use the highly intelligent for espionage is sure of great success. This is essential for military operations, and the armies depend on this for their actions.

Sun Tzu’s commanders are not passive – consumers-- of intelligence. A general in the Sun Tzu tradition takes as much personal interest in employing spies as he does in issuing orders to his subordinate commanders. He is as active in intelligence as he is in operations:

Of all those in the army close to the commander, none is as intimate as the secret agent; of all rewards, none more liberal than those given to secret agents. To be parsimonious with positions, compensations, or hundreds of pounds of gold, and thereby blind to the enemy’s status, is to be extraordinarily inhumane: such a man can never be considered his people’s commander, can never be his lord’s aide, and can never be the ruler of victory.

A commander whose primary contact with intelligence is the daily coordinated, scripted, and rehearsed -- intelligence briefing-- could never be successful in the Sun Tzu school.

John Boyd
Sun Tzu is widely studied today in Japan, where one of its most influential strategy texts, Miyamoto Musashi’s Book of Five Rings (1645 A.D.) is a direct adaptation of the ideas of The Art of War to the military situation of the time. Boyd represents the most recent major member of this school. Of all the strategists he considered, and the list includes such luminaries as Clausewitz, Jomini, Bonaparte, Saxe, and most of the other classroom standards, Sun Tzu was the only one that Boyd did not critique in his major work, A Discourse on Winning and Losing.

Boyd was the first to derive a mathematically coherent theory of air combat, -- energy maneuverability, -- which for two competing fighters shows precisely which will have the advantage in any flight state (combination of airspeed, altitude, and direction). – Maneuverability-- is the ability to change flight states -- to climb, for example, turn, or accelerate or any combination thereof.

Boyd acknowledged a fundamental shortcoming in his theory and his correction proved to be more powerful than this original idea (and far more applicable to other forms of conflict, such as business). Basically, there were times when the less maneuverable aircraft won. It is true that for this to happen, both aircraft had to be roughly comparable -- that is, the original theory still held in most cases -- but there were instances, such as the F-86 vs. the MiG-15 and the YF-16 vs. the YF-17, where energy maneuverability alone did not adequately explain the results. These anomalies led Boyd to the idea of -- fast transients, -- that is, the ability to transition between maneuver states. He called this ability, -- agility. To give an example: At a given airspeed and altitude, the more maneuverable fighter could make a tighter turn, while the more agile could more quickly change from a (perhaps not quite so tight) turn in one direction to a (perhaps not quite so tight) turn in another:

The ability to shift from one maneuver to another more rapidly than an adversary enables one to win in air-to-air combat. Boyd made a critical observation, that the pilots of the more maneuverable but less agile fighters often became frustrated while trying to pin down their more agile adversaries, and this sometimes caused them to make mistakes. The pilots of the more agile aircraft could spot and exploit these mistakes to win a victory. Boyd was a student of military history and this rang a bell. This idea of discombobulating the enemy first and then -- and only then -- engaging in close combat was fundamental to earlier strategists, like Sun Tzu.

Boyd made his best-known contribution to modern strategy, expanding the concept of – agility -- from a largely physical property of aircraft to a largely mental property of competitive organisms in general. He concluded that it is as if the more agile competitor is able to observe, orient, decide, and act more quickly than the other. If he can consistently go through this loop -- more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity,-- which Boyd equated to -- operating inside the opponent’s OODA loops, -- he will disorient and confuse his opponent precisely as Sun Tzu had mandated. This leap from air-to-air combat to the now famous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop and its link to the strategic purpose of Sun Tzu is perhaps the most brilliant insight of strategy in the last 100 years.

Over the course of 10 years, Boyd evolved an 8-hour briefing, -- Patterns of Conflict,-- that led viewers to this conclusion. Beginning with Sun Tzu, continuing through the Battles of Marathon and Leuctra (Epaminondas’ classic victory over the then-invincible Spartans in 371 B.C.), visiting Alexander’s conquests, then winding its way finally to the blitzkrieg (particularly against France in 1940) and modern guerilla warfare, Boyd showed that his pattern held, time after time. More agile armies had defeated their larger and technologically advanced opponents with remarkable frequency, and this pattern continues to the present day, most obviously in the Arab-Israeli Wars from 1947 to 1973 and the Vietnam War.

Boyd and Intelligence

Boyd appears to accord intelligence a lower status than did Sun Tzu. He has no briefing with “intelligence” in the title, nor is the word in the title of even one of his briefing slides. When it does appear, it is generally in a list with many other items. For example, in “Blitzkrieg: Keys to Success,” the third point is:

Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized before and during combat operations to unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.

Boyd’s OODA Loop Sketch, however, shows that he regarded intelligence in the broadest sense no less highly than Sun Tzu. Boyd constantly emphasizes the importance of open systems, and the only opening into the OODA loop is through Observation. If one fails by whatever means to spot mismatches between what one believes to be going on and what really is, (i.e., between Orientation and the real world), one has become “mentally isolated.” If an adversary can keep us in this state – perhaps by operating inside our OODA loops – then as setback after inexplicable frustration befall us, we will become disoriented, confused, indecisive, fearful, etc., and a competent enemy will be able to create, locate, and exploit vulnerabilities leading, in the case of maneuver warfare, to frequent envelopments, ambushes, high prisoner counts or, as Boyd put it, “any other phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change.” This explains, by the way, why ill-treatment of POWs cannot be tolerated: A battlefield commander should want them to surrender, and needs to make it as easy as possible. (6. Interested readers can download Boyd’s major briefings at Defense and the National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net.)

Role of Military Force

Although Sun Tzu is known for his admonition that “To win without fighting is best,” the subject of this sentence and of The Art of War is “To win.” Whether used to fight or for some other purpose, Sun Tzu placed a high premium on the utility of military force. The opening of The Art of War simply states that:

Military action is important to the nation – it is the ground of death and life, the path of survival and destruction, so it is imperative to examine it.

The Tao Te Ching (c. 500 B.C.), states that, “Weapons are the tools of fear. A decent man will avoid them, except in the direst necessity.”

Some may argue that we have now swung to the opposite extreme.

Threats to U.S. National Security

There are thousands of nuclear warheads in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and some of these are mounted on delivery systems capable of propelling them onto U.S. soil. However, the U.S. strategic position relative to the states of the Former Soviet Union is much better than it was to the real Soviet Union, and since it is not clear that an “exchange” of nuclear weapons constitutes war, the goal of which is survival on the nation’s own terms, this paper will not address changes to U.S. strategic posture.

The only other direct military threat to the US proper could come from the emerging nuclear states, including China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and potentially Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. There are also circumstances that, although not directly threatening US territory, could call forth a military response. Most likely would be a large-scale attack against a country that the U.S. considers a “vital national interest.” Sun Tzu and Boyd urge caution in these situations, since there are potentially an unlimited number of these and in most cases military force is only one tool at our disposal.

U.S. forces may also become engaged to protect areas considered inviolable by politically influential blocs (Israel and Taiwan) and as population demographics change, others may be added. U.S. forces could face anything from a large-scale conventional attack –- a replay of Desert Storm –- to what is called “fourth generation warfare” (4GW). This term describes any way of dealing with U.S. military forces other than confronting them on the battlefield. It includes all forms of terrorism, guerilla warfare, intifada-type urban unrest -- sometimes financed by relationships with criminal or narcotics networks – and others that will evolve. (7. 4th, 5th and versions mixed with maneuver warfare)

As Dr. Grant Hammond of the Air War College notes (8. see bottom notes), 4GW is not just guerilla warfare under another name:

Perceiving war as a contest marked by the use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragically simplistic, and fundamentally flawed view … a future war among industrialized states, even if effective and efficient, could be virtually invisible.

The threat of conventional war -- or even that the leadership of some “rogue” state will commit suicide by attempting to lob their one working nuclear device in our direction – is insignificant compared to the certainty of 4GW.

As General Charles Krulak, a former commandant of the Marine Corps, has noted,
“We need to watch for the ‘Stepchild of Chechnya’ and the ‘Son of Desert Storm.’ ” [The Bush Invasion of Iraq]

In true 4GW, distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-22 by poisoning the squadron’s mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even attacking schools and PXs back at the base. Fourth generation warfare, while highly “asymmetric,” is not the same as “asymmetric warfare,” since maneuver warfare is also “asymmetric” and calls for creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses, rather than engaging and trying to reduce his formations and fortified positions directly.

This is not meant to be a complete list of the possibilities for using U.S. military forces, but should illustrate that since the resort to armed conflict is still the ultimate arbitrator of disputes, the US will have no shortage of opportunity to participate. As of Jan. 1, 2001, the Center for Defense Information lists nearly 40 “major active conflicts” around the world, any one of which could be the spark for commitment of U.S. military forces. Survival of the United States does not have to be the issue; survival of the current political leadership will suffice.

Sun Tzu and Boyd on the Utility of Military Force

Sun Tzu recommends two options as superior to battle for using military force to triumph in war. The best way to defeat an enemy is by “attacking his strategy.” This could mean to attack early, while the enemy’s plans are being laid. Others find a deeper meaning, to employ unusual methods to “seize victory without even battling,” which seems more in harmony with the maxim that “to win without fighting is best.”

Should this prove impossible, Sun Tzu then recommends disrupting his alliances. Some say that this means to attack early, before the enemy can solidify his alliances. Others suggest it means isolating potential enemies from sources of support, or intimidating them through strong alliances of your own. Boyd takes a similar approach. He begins “Patterns of Conflict” with an observation on human nature, that we strive to:

Survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for independent action.

The competition for limited resources to satisfy these desires may force one to:
Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it impossible for him to survive at all.

Boyd leaves open the possibility of resolving the competition for resources without forcing these alternatives on one’s adversaries, or making them adversaries at all. Even if diminishing, denying, or eliminating an adversary should become necessary, he does not mandate war and certainly not armed conflict as the only method. However, he leaves the possibility open, as well as the possibility that resort to arms is what the adversary will choose.
He insists that the use of armed force must be carefully thought out so that it does not cause more problems than it solves. For this, he expands on Sun Tzu’s first two courses of actions through his concept of “grand strategy,” which serves to:

1. Support national goals
2. Pump up one’s own resolve, drain away the adversary’s resolve, and attract the uncommitted to one’s cause
3. End the conflict on favorable terms
4. Ensure that the conflict and peace terms do not provide the seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict

He then summarizes his argument to this point in a hierarchy, starting with the primary national goal (“Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment”), and working down through various levels of strategy to tactics. Careful examination of this hierarchy shows that the phrases “military force,” “armed conflict,” or even “war” are not mentioned at all. The resort to such methods is just one tool for accomplishing Boyd’s grand scheme, and the strategy and tactics of “Patterns of Conflict” do provide a guide for using them – when necessary – in harmony with the grand strategy outlined above.

Neither Boyd nor Sun Tzu saw war as the solution to all of humanity’s problems, or even that armed conflict was the best way to prosecute war once it had become necessary. Both would agree that the goal of war, once it is unleashed, is more than just to achieve victory, but to accomplish it:

1. In the shortest possible time
2. At the least possible cost in lives and effort to one’s own side
3. With the infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties

Contemporary Justifications for Military Forces

Today, one finds many justifications for U.S. military force, all of which can be included within three broad categories:

1. Defend the homeland from attack
2. Enforce a “Pax Americana”
3. Protect vital U.S. interests abroad

Americans agree on the legitimacy of defending U.S. territory, although there is an argument over defense against what – does the US need a national missile defense, for example – and against whom (just foreign militaries, or should narcotics traffickers, or illegal aliens be included)? The debate becomes heated when other uses of military force enter the equation.

“Pax Americana,” refers to the idea that as the sole remaining superpower, it is in the long-term U.S. interest to intervene militarily to ensure peace and stability anywhere around the world, that it is better to stamp out brushfires than fight major conflagrations. A RAND study concluded that “We learned [in the last decade] that American economic and military strength is as important as ever and that much of the world still depends upon us to be engaged – and to lead.”

Americans agree with the goal of creating a safer, more peaceful world. The issue is whether such an objective should guide the sizing and organization of U.S. military forces. On the surface, this seems to have support from Sun Tzu, since he noted that, “the superior militarist strikes while the schemes are still being laid.” However this observation is really advice on how to conduct operations once the decision to do so has been made. It does not address the larger question of the role of military operations in national policy. The Tao Te Ching, however, takes the problem on directly:

If a nation is centered in the Tao
if it nourishes its own people
and doesn’t meddle in the affairs of others
it will be a light to all the nations of the world.

It is probably redundant to note that this advice was widely ignored during the ensuing Chinese Warring States period. And the U.S. government’s ignoring of it in Vietnam produced entirely predictable effects, which are a hallmark of fourth generation warfare: The French and the Americans resorted to force because of the supremacy of the Communists in the political arena. They learned (or should have learned) that force by itself was inappropriate, because the application of force made the political appeal of the insurgency all the greater. The harder they tried to win the war, the more disruption they caused, and the more remote victory became.

The other problem with enforcing worldwide peace is that it is a large job. Many of the 40 major armed conflicts active in the world involve longstanding ethnic or tribal disputes. It is not clear how entry of U.S. armed forces would resolve them. This suggests a policy of selective intervention, which is usually phrased as “protecting U.S. vital interests.” As with the Pax Americana, most Americans agree with the idea that the US should employ its armed forces to protect vital interests. U.S. leaders will commit enormous forces to protect such things as access to crude oil, and given the dependence of the U.S. economy on imported resources, practically any part of the world could become a “vital national interest” in the future.

To make “protection of vital interests” useful for creating forces, however, the US would have to determine in advance what its specific vital interests are. There are at least two problems one runs into when attempting to put this idea into practice. First, “vital interests” change and often faster than weapons or forces can. Who, as late as 1994, would have thought that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo would have represented “vital American interests”? Because development cycles for major weapons often exceed one human generation, the US will protect its vital interests with the forces it has, or even select these interests based in part on what the forces can do.
(9. Actually, the US seems to be speeding up and diversifying its forces and strategic development.)

The other problem inherent in the vital interests approach to force creation is the range and sheer number of potential areas and scenarios that could involve “vital interests.” Today, the range extends from incidents, such as rescue of U.S. citizens, to assisting allies (especially those with sizable voting diasporas in the US) in everything from terrorism and guerilla warfare to repelling a conventional attack to a “major theater war” against some as yet undetermined, but large and capable, conventional opponent. It follows that potential theaters of operations could range from desert to jungle to teeming Third World metropolis.

Using “protection of vital national interests” as the rationale for sizing U.S. military forces quickly and logically transforms into the Pax Americana. The only ways out would be for U.S. leaders to convince themselves that they can indeed predict the future, or to announce in advance that the US is writing off the “non-vital” areas of the world. One of the purposes of this paper will be to offer an alternative that does not suffer from these defects.

Military vis-à-vis Other Options

What should be the role of the military in protecting U.S. interests, in conjunction with other tools for advancing national goals? Some argue that the end of the Cold War made the world more unpredictable, and so the United States must now increase reliance on the military to protect its national interests. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger has called for an increase in the defense budget, noting that, “Events in the Middle East should underscore that we are living in unpredictable and even dangerous times. A strong military is a bulwark against threats to U.S. vital interests and to our homeland.” Columnist Charles Krauthammer tells the rest of the world to bend to the U.S. will, or else. Daniel Goure of the Lexington Institute, suggests that the US relies too heavily on the military aspects of securing national interests:

The Balkans, Chechnya, East Timor, Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq have shown the limited capacity of the major powers to deploy forces relevant to keeping the peace and rebuilding states shattered by civil war.
Civil affairs capabilities have proven to be almost non existent. Keeping the peace requires soldiers to act like policemen, a job for which they are ill prepared and ill equipped. Yet, an effort to create an international police force for Bosnia and Kosovo has stalled. The scarcity of engineering units has also restricted efforts to rebuild civil infrastructure.

It should not be too surprising that many Third World countries resent the U.S. ready resort to military power:

see rest of srticle at:
www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy

A Good Defense Anticipates Enemy Offense

2004-05-26T11:42:00.000-07:00

Rifleman democracy.2004 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
politics as possible link

There is a theory of "rifleman democracy".
Machiavelli set out this theory, saying that a man without a gun is in no way comparable to a man with a gun. Aside from Machiavelli's better known ideas, as expressed in THE PRINCE, he also proposed that a practical possibility could be seen in the democratic republic as a form of government (seen as exemplified by the small city-state – not anything of more than 10 million people) and this was a very possible (positive ?) development. Machiavelli believed these democratic republics would be established because of the development of more accurate fire-arms, namely, rifles. One rifle is carried by one man. So, basically, one rifle = one vote. That was the format of "rifleman democracy" which enabled Napoleon to transform Europe out of feudalism. (Napoleon lost as an individual, but Europe was transformed forever.)

Now, however, we have a much more complicated situation when viewing democracy as an expression of, or as determined by, realities of warfare. The U.S. did not even get involved in trying to disarm Iraqis from their AK-47's. RPG's, however, that's another matter. Anti-aircraft weapons, etc., are far more important than rifles. What it comes down to is that even individual snipers require a support system (extending to helicopters and control of the air-space) in order to function in their DEFENSE OR ATTACK roles.

Traditional individual fire-arms have, for good reason, been known as "equalizers". The days when an armored knight was equal, say, to 30 yeoman --- that period of history ended with the development of the modern rifle. Of course, it has been more complicated than one man, one rifle, one vote, for some time now. Napoleon's successes depended upon his ability to recruit, inspire and utilize riflemen --- but he was also known for his unequaled use of cannon fire in connection with infantry battles. Everything changed with the development of the machine gun about a century ago. Machine guns were operated by teams, rather than individuals, and machine guns gobbled up ammo so fast that considerable supporting infrastructure is required. Thus, the theory of "superior fire power" that was developed out of World War I and the millions of men sacrificed in futile efforts to attack and take fortified machine gun positions on static front-lines. Then came World War II --- air power and control of the air space are everything.

Warfare and revolution have been transformed by high-tech, like everything else in the world. Outcomes can no longer be forecast by counting heads. The whole is more than the sum of the parts. So, to be successful, revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box, teamwork and specialties. It's a complex calculation anymore.

A sign of impending demise of the Empire is that the people at the top tend to believe their own propaganda. Hitler, for example, was told as early as 1939 about the U.S. (Boeing Aircraft) tooling up to be capable of making more bombers in a month than existed in all countries combined in 1939. Basically, Hitler was told that attacking Poland and starting World War II was bound to fail in the long run. Hitler fired the messenger and brought in someone who would tell him what he wanted to hear. That is the arrogance part of it. The other part of imperial break-down has to do with corruption.

[NOTE:
( From a reader comment) Falluja and Najaf/Karbala in Iraq support and also call into question this Rifleman analysis. Rifles do seem important - though the RPGs and anti-aircraft weapons (and mortars) may be more important. As the author says: " successful, revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box (4th and 5th generation mobile-chaos smart-targeting warfare), teamwork (cells, international assistance and connecting synergistically the specialty revolutionary cells and special operations) and specialties (hackers, bombers, espionage, media, event-timing and logistics)," and the cultural cohesiveness (teamwork) seems to combine with cleverness, a feel for media-propaganda and news/action timing to create a powerful force to block the military power of the invader (U.S.)

The case of the FARC guerrillas in Colombia is another example of this interplay - riflemen and teamwork in a culture of resistance! = political-territorial-military-financial power.]
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_3.htm#REF29h4

Photos
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=%22Chechnya+Photographs%22&spell=1
see also: http://zorpia.com/cgi/album.cgi?00033836

INTRODUCING IMPERIALIST STRATEGIES OF CONTROL
& AGGRESSION

From Spirit of Liberty

There are three stages of escalation that the ruling class employs to control everything that it needs to control.

I. They promote a shallow, unrepresentative, liberal democracy when the people demand involvement in their affairs. The ruling class assures that dynasties, family-gangs or business oligarchies dominate control, sometimes with alternating figureheads. Assassinations or coups are used as needed. This type of government is really just a PR or an opinion collecting organization.

II. Control tactics for combating protesters and rioting are well developed, tested and written about everywhere: Stryker transports, water cannons, chemical weapons, robo-cops, electronic weapons and infiltration, intimidation and assassinations are coordinated to suit the situation. Large-scale detentions are eventually used: such as the 2 million in the US prison system, the 9000 terror-suspect detainees in the US (held without charges), and the many thousands of enemy combatants held at Guantanamo and the other torture centers in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel. Additionally the Iraqi-Model of holding 40-60,000 people for months or years without charges will be expanded despite the prisoner abuse scandals. Under this type of regime, disappearances, wrongful arrest and extreme forms of torture (including of your children/wife in front of you) will become (are) common-place.

III. This paper examines the third and final phase of control employed by the government to avoid real democracy or challenges to corporate wealth: martial law and civil war. This final phase in the struggle against the ruling class will spread to most countries in a few years. At times all three phases overlap and so the government and the insurgents take advantage of tactics for influencing all three phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the clear or priority strategies amid this confusion of goals is not an easy task.

In order for citizens to function as independent and responsible actors, they need to know what the government is up to. As with commercial investments and development, the military is planning far ahead and their planning actually helps to create what will happen through the responses of their enemies and the urge to use new technologies and new operational tactics.

.....This paper seeks to inform and to learn from the input that we receive from you –

1.2 Glossary of Terms:

AFSOF -- Air Force Special Operation Forces
CAS -- Close Air Support
CIA -- Central Intelligence Agency (http://members.aol.com/bblum6/American_holocaust.htm)
C3I -- Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
C4I --Command, Control, Communication, Computation & Intelligence
COMINT -- Communication Intelligence
DIA -- Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD -- US Department of Defense
FLIR -- Forward Looking Infra-Red
HIC -- High Intensity Conflict
HUMIT -- Human Intelligence
LIC -- Low Intensity Conflict
NSA -- National Security Agency
OOTW -- Operations Other Than War
PGM -- Precision Guided Munitions
SAM -- Surface-to-Air Missiles
SAR -- Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT -- Signal Intelligence
USSOCOM -- Special Operations Command
UAV -- Unmanned Airborne Vehicle

The government has to create enemies if there are none large enough to justify their wasteful spending and control activities. This is the building block that goes unmentioned in almost all media and even among many fringe groups: the government makes mistakes on purpose, they create chaotic situations (Iraq, Colombia, Pakistan, Israel) so that they can stir up trouble and start patriotic wars to entrance and humble their people - as well as their current and future victims of aggression.

As we enter the final phase of the Imperialist Game Plan, the government is preparing on every front for widespread and sustained guerrilla wars against the people of the US (and their Constitution) and also against people everywhere in the world who refuse to submit to imperial decree.

Here are some of their plans:

U.S. Military Commands:

See Global Photo at:
http://www.cdi.org/issues/usforces/commands.html

The U.S. is the only state which divides the entire globe into military commands with a general or admiral in command of each region and designated forces. This practice began during World War II when global warfare forced the U.S. armed services to change from small, separate branches into an integrated armed force that deployed vast land, sea, and air forces around the globe. This practice of assigning U.S. military forces responsibility for specific regions worldwide is known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP).

Recent changes in US Military Command are: the merger of U.S. Strategic and U.S. Space Commands. This means that from Oct. 1, there will be 9 Unified Commands (composed of units from two or more military services):

Geographical Responsibilities:

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) (Bases/HQ in Colorado Springs and Washington DC)
Pacific Command (USPACOM) (Hawaii?)
Central Command (USCENTCOM)
European Command (USEUCOM)
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) (Miami, Florida, & Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico)

Functional Responsibilities:

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (same as USSOUTHCOM)
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)

NORTHCOM AND SOUTHCOM/USSOCOM are the primary tools for the Western Hemisphere.

The following examples show how the Imperialist war planners think:

Measures of Guerrilla Strength

The main measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies (states and guerrilla movements) and weapon systems.
Guerrilla as a Strategic Threat

The existential threat presented by guerrilla warfare derives from the guerrilla movement's goal of capturing a given territory and a given population controlled at the time by the regime, and sometimes also of destroying the existing regime. Guerrilla activities corrode social and political cohesion, and call into question the internal security of the state and its individual citizens. Even when a strategic threat is identified, the regime continues to counter it largely with military means, without recognizing the need to act against all the guerrilla's sources of power.

…………….Technology and Guerrilla Warfare

While the guerrilla's weapons remain the bomb and the rifle, more recently, advanced technology has also been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision system, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.

.................. Attributes of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare

A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Generally, governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. This is also the goal of the guerrilla movement. The characterization of the counter-guerrilla struggle should be carried out in parallel with the delineation of the guerrilla movement's weaknesses. (Guerrillas do the same.)

The goals of a war against guerrillas are the preservation of the regime, of the population's normal course of life, and the removal of the strategic threat which the guerrilla movement constitutes." Military activity against the guerrilla movement includes policing activities, border patrols and guard duty, covert operations, counter-terror, and intelligence. It also involves political, economic, social, or diplomatic activities. Guerrilla warfare develops in parallel with the guerrilla movement in the areas of strategy, tactics, diplomacy, media, and so on, including cooperation with neighboring and friendly states. Those fighting against guerrilla movements understand the importance of the media in the battle for public opinion, but for the most part have yet to deal properly with this issue. Counter-guerrilla forces have adapted new weapon systems, but they do not direct sufficient technological efforts to research and development (R&D).

Guerrilla groups become more professional over the course of a conflict until they sometimes are on a higher quality level than the regular army units fighting them. For example, the Hizballah forces in Lebanon display a high level of field skills and expertise in operating mortars, rockets, ground-to-air missiles and intelligence gathering devices. A modern distinction of the asymmetries between regular and irregular warfare was formulated by Gotowicki. ( )

…………… Counter-Guerrilla Task Force

Air power, in most cases, cannot win a counter-guerrilla war alone. However, unification of all functions of offensive operations (intelligence, planning, and execution) under the command of the air force, can bring about a revolution in the long term outcomes of campaigns against guerrilla forces. A model for the integration of advanced technology and quality manpower is the Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force, a specialized task force for well-defined goals and missions. Its headquarters - an air force unit - would enjoy responsibility and authority for training the units, the development of operational and tactical doctrines, command in combat, and the operational evaluation of operations weapon systems. The US Air Force has built a Special Operation Forces unit (AFSOF). This unit is organized and employed in small formations, capable of both independent and supporting operations, with the purpose of enabling tailored responses. Plans are also inderconsideration to assign an Airforce General to lead USSPOCM or to lead a major counter terrortask force within USSPOCM or US Joint Forces Command (ASJFCOM).

……………Structure of Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force

1. Intelligence Element : Collection Planning teams; UAVs unit; Ground observers; Target production; Analysis team; counter-intelligence
2. Command and Planning: C3 systems; C2 Teams; Professional experts
3. Operational Unit: Assault helicopters; Attack aircraft; Airborne commando; Electronic warfare

............Conduct of Operations

A Possible Cycle of Activities for a Single Operation

*** NOTE:
[ The following description of a large special forces operation is about to be launched into Colombia from Peru and Ecuador - to kill or capture guerrilla leaders. Or the US may wait until it decides to assassinate Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.

The intelligence element belonging to the task force will search and locate a guerrilla force moving far from the front-line. Forces are scrambled to engage the guerrilla force and one force is flown to the designated area in order to engage the guerrilla. A special force of the airborne unit, deployed by assault helicopters nearby the guerrilla unit, uses laser designation systems to mark it for attack by air. Simultaneously, attack aircraft loaded with precision anti-personnel munitions takes off towards the guerrillas for the completion of the mission. Assault helicopters manned with an airborne elite unit are deployed in ambushes on the expected retreat routes of the guerrillas, in order to capture the survivors.
Throughout the entire procedure of scramble and engagement, contact is maintained with the guerrilla force by means of data collection (UAVs or sensors attached to guerrillas, spies or equipment) and would designate targets by laser designators and other means for aircraft and helicopters. The goal of the first wave attack is to destroy a part of the force and to 'freeze' the rest of it in place. At this point, after the guerrilla force has lost its maneuverability and mobility, since movement would expose it to additional volleys, attack aircraft and attack helicopters continue to destroy the guerrilla force. Finally, the elite unit would close in and finish off the battle. The few guerrillas who succeeded in escaping would probably run into the ambushes and be hit by them.

*** NOTE:

[ How would guerrilla counter this strategy and these types of operations?
How could they turn it into a trap ... or a defeat? ]

............... Intelligence

Counter-guerrilla Air Warfare planning and execution is intelligence- intensive. Operations planners use all-source intelligence from both organic and external intelligence sources. Harkabi, as a representative of the military viewpoint, emphasized the importance of tactical intelligence: "Development of tactical intelligence is important for counter-guerrilla warfare. Exploiting blind power against a 'stealthy' enemy as guerrilla is useless and dangerous."43 Air power requires 'real time intelligence,' since the swiftness of its operations demands knowledge on the enemy at the time of the execution of operations. Specific efforts are invested to satisfy this requirement."

NOTE:
[ In Afghanistan these techniques of landing Rangers or other Special Forces near airforce targets worked extremely well. With the forward US forces identifying targets with laser devices, the accuracy of the JDAMS and other smart and not-so-smart bombs was precise and devastating against the Taliban bunkers. ]

A proper focus of intelligence on irregular forces should establish a database on various groups' identification and intentions, local political alignments and alliances, guerrilla goals and objectives. It should also monitor disaffected and radicalized individuals, and assess the influence and intentions of local religious leaders.

Air force intelligence gathering with special equipment and employing methods peculiar to aircraft is vital to counter-insurgency. By means of aerial reconnaissance, changes in insurgent deployment may be detected. The air force supplies air photos, expensive and rare systems and operations such as reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, SIGINT system, and new information warfare systems. The intelligence component gathers, collates, analyzes and processes tactical short-range, near-real-time information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of actual and potential guerrilla enemies by using visual, imagery and electronic reconnaissance. At the same time it must identify the threats which might interfere with operations.

Accurate information on targets is the Achilles' heel of counter-guerrilla air warfare. Tracking human moving targets is more difficult than locating armor and fixed targets. Therefore, air power must shape unique requirements for sensors' research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement. Experts on Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) have criticized the US military intelligence tendency to emphasize the technological side of intelligence, while LIC operations require effective political/human intelligence, which can be gathered and analyzed by well-educated people with operational experience....

After the following insert learn what the government has done to enhance both its intelligence gathering and its special operations capability... ---
Optional insert: Inside a US General:

Genral Peter Pace: Upfront Personal
http://www.european-security.com/index.php?id=3686
http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-06-18pace.html

"Leadership is still leadership, but the tools that you have available to exercise that leadership have changed. Leadership principles have remained constant from Roman times through World Wars I and II to today
"Now we have the opportunity to get our message out much faster
and to many more people." -General Peter Pace

In the past, a commander would pass information to his top officers, who would then pass information down the chain of command. Today, Pace said, a lot of the military planning is done at the leadership level using video teleconferences. Instead of just a handful of officers getting the word straight from the commander, hundreds of people can now absorb the information at the same time.
"That kind of impact is huge and it can be 'huge positive' or it can be 'huge negative,' depending upon what's being said and the individual leadership style," Pace said. "If you are a caring, thoughtful leader, in addition to your immediate subordinates, the other 500 guys watching know that. If you're less than that, they know.
"Body language on a video teleconference says a lot of things," he noted. "The exact same things that have always been important (still are), but they're magnified multiple times because of the ability to hit a large audience."
Video teleconferences give commanders a "powerful ability to quickly get the word out globally, good, bad or indifferent," he said. "But leaders are still going to be judged by their professional competence, and by the way they do or don't take care of those in their charge."
The advent of the Internet and e-mail has also broadened the scope of service members' knowledge of global events.
"It is possible now for a member of a rifle platoon to get on the Internet and see what the national policies are, what the regional policies are, or the regional events that are going on and how that impacts their missions," Pace said.
"When I was in Vietnam," he recalled, "my mail took about three weeks in one direction. By the time I got it, whatever the problem was or wasn't, was already finished. Now, e-mail goes back and forth all the time."
Rather than doing business in a news-free "bubble," he said, troops today are aware not only of their immediate environment, but that of the world if they want. "The vast majority of the force is plugged in 24/7 and can, if they want, educate themselves on a vast amount of information that otherwise would not be available. It certainly was not available to me 30 years ago."
"It amazes me," Pace said, "when my son or daughter says, 'You said this.' And I ask, 'How do you know that?' and they say 'I got on the Internet and punched up your name, pushed enter and the last three articles that quoted you came up.'
Gen. Pace and his son, Lt. Pete Pace, attended an Oct. 15, 2001, welcoming ceremony at Fort Myer, Va., in honor of the new vice chairman. The general is the first Marine to hold the vice chairmanship, the second-highest uniformed position in the Defense Department. DoD

U. S. Special Forces soldiers, with CIA guidance and assets, return to the intelligence business
After a hiatus of 30 years, the Pentagon's elite Special Forces soldiers will fight in the shadowy world of "actionable intelligence," covertly collecting information against terrorists and acting on that information with clandestine raids and attacks. The Washington Times (Feb. 19, 04) revealed that Army "Green Berets" will assume the role of "spies" in addition to their traditional combat roles. The intelligence networks that the Special Forces personnel have nurtured, and cultivated, have been in support of their own unit-unique initiatives and mission requirements. Collection skills have improved with time and experience. National-level intelligence agencies have shoehorned themselves into Special Forces intelligence operations that were initially designed for collection of tactical human intelligence. These ops gained strategic and global intelligence direction as they yielded bonanzas.
In the post-9/11 world, the intelligence community recognizes strength in the Special Forces that their own operatives lack. Establishing indigenous human intelligence operations in a rapidly developing or already fluid combat environment has not been a strong area for the ivy-league operatives. At least, not since the termination of the legendary Phoenix program in Vietnam in the mid-1970s. The Phoenix Phung Hoang (or Operation Phoenix) was a stroke of manifest brilliance by a former Saigon CIA station chief (and later CIA Director) William Colby. **** [ Actually a brutal war crimes campaign that killed or imprisoned thousands of innocent Vietnamese ;
see: http://www.members.authorsguild.net/valentine/work3.htm ]

The CIA relied upon the Special Forces as key players in the Phoenix program. The soldiers were often dispatched into the "denied-areas" in the war zone to perform their dangerous missions. Phoenix was basically the shortest distance between two points during the Vietnam War – those points being (1) the decision to liquidate an adversary, normally a well placed Viet Cong official, or his minions, and (2) the end-game of the operation: the capture, disappearance, or publicized assassination of the target.
Why are Special Forces soldiers once again preparing to begin conducting their own intelligence collection, which will likely be fully sanctioned and supported by the CIA?

Because they can.

What is clear is that the Department Of Defense is not going to be constrained and restricted, as in past decades, when it comes to aggressive intelligence collection efforts against our country's adversaries. In keeping with the veracity of the threat, Don Rumsfeld has also created the Pentagon's, first-ever, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

The Army is stepping up intelligence training for Special Forces soldiers at SOCOM Headquarters in Florida, and at Ft. Lewis, Wash., the home of the 1st Special Forces Group. A source says that the Tacoma location is being run like a "Mini-Farm," referring to the highly classified CIA training facility at Camp Peary, Va. ( known to the CIA as "The Farm"). The Special Operations HQ for SOUTHCOM (Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico) is also expanding its numbers and its mission scope. Many of SOUTCOM's special ops forces are in and out of the jungle in Colombia, Ecudaor and Peru on a regular rotating basis.

Rumsfeld has given SOCOM new powers to plan and execute, "kill-or-capture-missions" against terrorists. To accomplish this goal, the SOCOM troops must have mission-unique intelligence information that is absolutely current -- a CIA paramilitary force. CIA activities must be acquiescent to U.S. law. At the same time, the CIA largely engages in activities that are intended to, and do evade international law. Special Forces soldiers are bound by both sets of legal standards. While Special Forces soldiers have been "sheep-dipped" in the past, and lived by CIA standards, the Pentagon does not want its soldiers violating laws that pertain to soldier conduct. CIA personnel on the other hand are unrestricted by the laws of war that particularly deal with uniforms, equipment and identities. They exploit this freedom to create "cover" identities for their missions.

If Special Forces soldiers are captured they have protection under the Geneva Convention that governs the treatment of POWs, but if the soldiers are operating undercover with CIA paramilitary units, they risk losing that protection. Enemies are aligned against the US in an unconventional fashion that is now termed, "fourth-generation warfare"… characterized by our adversary’s adroit use of methods that differ greatly from our usual mode of military doctrine and operations. They undermine our strengths and exploit our weaknesses as the single global superpower and seek to portray the US as a global villain picking on the little guy. If the US military doesn't "out-guerrilla the guerrilla," they lose the global war on terrorism.

… So it's imperative this new SF-CIA partnership continue. …

Super Technolgy to the Rescue!

Even the most competent of governments will find it nearly impossible to identify, locate, monitor, and, if appropriate, detain all of the terrorists, potential terrorists, and their supporters within its jurisdiction.

Fortunate for the ruling classes around the world, the US is developing and deploying increasingly sophisticated and accurate sensing device - everywhere and in almost every spectrum of energy.

Weapons

U.S. forces may be able to provide fire support to friendly units approaching or engaged in combat with terrorist groups. U.S. air forces are especially well suited to this task because of their ability to apply firepower precisely when and where it is needed. The AC- 130 gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions today, since it combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. In fact, the crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may, at times, have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. In addition, airpower in the form of tactical airlift and fire support has proven attractive in these situations because it can bring forces and firepower to bear on the enemy without having to move heavy equipment, such as trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery, over land. Airpower obviates the need to rely upon often primitive ground-transportation infrastructures. It also increases the possibility of gaining tactical surprise by limiting the enemy’s ability to observe preparations for an attack.

** Note

[ In the Iraqi battles around Falluja and Najaf (April - May 2004) the US used AC-130s with powerful and deadly results - the accuracy is not known, but many people were killed. ]

As a result, one can envisage a number of situations in which U.S. involvement in combined counterterrorist operations would be desirable but one or both sides would like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. In such circumstances the Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind “fingerprints” associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes.

Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can, in many circumstances, greatly increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged.

DISRUPT THE ACTIVITIES OF TERRORISTS

If insurgents are permitted to determine the pace of their operations—that is, if they and not the government have the initiative —it is extremely difficult to suppress them because by choosing the time and place to strike, the insurgents can minimize the chances of tactical failure. Conversely, if government forces can keep the insurgents off-balance, many of the insurgents’ efforts will be diverted from planning and conducting offensive operations to trying simply to survive and avoid capture. People and groups under pressure for extended periods operate less effectively: they make more mistakes and they may find it more difficult to cooperate and to maintain organizational coherence. Counterinsurgency forces can exploit these openings.

Examples are:

• Disrupt communications and databases. No large organization can operate effectively without reliable communications and record keeping. Aggressive efforts to exploit and interfere with the communication links used by terrorist groups and to corrupt or mine computer files and other records can compel the enemy to adopt less-efficient modes of operation.

• Interdict the movement of critical materiel and personnel. Efforts to monitor and interdict the movement of ships, vehicles, aircraft, commercial air passengers, and people on foot through particular areas can be useful in a number of ways. Such efforts yield successes in preventing terrorist groups from acquiring or positioning weapons, explosives, or materiel needed for their operations. Second, continuous monitoring of traffic on a long-term basis provides analysts with a picture of what constitutes normal activity, making it easier to detect anomalies. Awareness of U.S. and allied interdiction efforts compels terrorist groups to adopt ways of doing business that are costly and less efficient than they would like, reducing their overall effectiveness.

SENSORS, DRONES (UAV) & What Trillions ($) Will Buy!

New generations of sensors will improve the ability of U.S. forces to detect and monitor the activities of small groups of enemy combatants. The Air Force is developing a new synthetic aperture radar (SAR) that operates simultaneously in the ultra high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF) bands and can detect stationary targets under foliage or camouflage. These sensors will not provide the resolution required for identifying (or perhaps even detecting) individuals, but they can be used to detect facilities and equipment (including weapons) that might be associated with terrorist groups and activities.
Improving assessment capabilities is also important. Most of the images and other data collected by U.S. intelligence sensors are never looked at or are given only a cursory examination. To better exploit the burgeoning “take” of these sensors, efforts are under way to develop new automated assessment tools that will include computer algorithms designed to detect specific activities by people or vehicles and to detect anomalous events or activities against an established baseline.

Technical surveillance systems, such as electro-optical sensors on UAVs, may be useful for this purpose. The problem of emphasizing force-protection measures is that such concerns can begin to compete with the overall mission of neutralizing terrorist groups. To reduce this competition, the DoD will need to develop and field affordable systems appropriate for monitoring activities around friendly bases. Fairly simple, low-cost systems could be adequate to this task. Small, low-speed UAVs with a time-on-station of a few hours have proven to be quite suitable for base-protection missions and are much less expensive than a Predator UAV. Unattended ground sensors (UGSs) may be useful for these tasks as well. They tend to have a smaller field of regard than sensors on airborne platforms, but they are relatively inexpensive and are on station 24 hours a day. Scanning lasers can be used to detect rifle scopes and other optics pointed at a base, and infrared backtracking systems can identify the source of sniper fire.

Prior to World War II, aerial bombardment was regarded as an instrument of mass terror; its targets were cities and the people and infrastructure within them. Theorists and practitioners in the US Army Air Corps were developing the doctrine of daylight precision bombardment. The objective was to destroy key elements of an enemy’s war-supporting industrial base so as to render continued military operations impossible. The Gulf War, however, was the first time that precisionguided munitions (PGMs) were used on a large scale. The availability of large numbers of PGM-capable fighter-bombers, combined with the fact that coalition air forces were able to achieve air supremacy over Iraq within the first few days of the war, meant that far more precision was possible and expected from U.S. air operations. Individual buildings or, in many cases, specific portions of buildings were chosen for attack.

This trend accelerated in Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force—the efforts to end Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. Targets included buildings in urban areas, small groups of soldiers within villages, and individual vehicles within convoys. The same sorts of targets have been prominent in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. There, U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead. These features, coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laserhoming guidance.
U.S. strategy recognizes that not all adversaries will be deterred by traditional means—by the threat to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation for enemy attacks.

TOWARD NEW CONCEPTS FOR LOCATING AND ATTACKING TERRORISTS AND RELATED TARGETS

Improvements are called for in the capabilities of U.S. air forces to identify, and attack small groups of people with appropriate levels of confidence that the right target is being attacked and that innocent civilians will not be placed at undue risk. Opportunities exist to define new and more effective concepts of execution (CONEXs) for engaging such targets.
Terrorists will try to operate in areas and ways that make them difficult to find, identify, and isolate. Depending on the country in which they are operating, they may be in wilderness areas that feature mountains, caves, forest, or jungle canopy. They may be living in rural areas, using anonymous-looking dwellings or small encampments. They may choose urban environments, again occupying unexceptional buildings. Within these environments, terrorists may be either stationary or moving, with movement being by vehicle or on foot. In all cases, the terrorists may be in the company of noncombatants—either family members or unrelated strangers. Any new concept for engaging such a demanding target set should seek to incorporate innovations among “finders, controllers, and shooters.”

WIDE-AREA SURVEILLANCE

“Finders”—intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets— will be of two broad types: those that provide wide-area coverage and those with a narrow field of view but higher resolution. The role of wide-area assets will be to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. Each of these types of assets has its strengths and limitations. A severe limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage—a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars, which have been under development for several years, could significantly enhance U.S. wide-area surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor.

Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors will make it possible to remotely examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. Because every material has a unique signature, data from such sensors can be processed and used to classify objects automatically and with greater fidelity than is possible with sensors that operate in only a single waveband. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination.

Other promising technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical “sniffers.” Essentially miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. If it were possible to develop sniffers to detect particular types of explosives, then lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles could patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. In addition, certain types of illegal drugs or the chemicals used in their processing might be useful targets for sniffers, given the nexus between drug traffickers and terrorists in some areas (e.g., Colombia). Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysis devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a “mothership” or a ground station.

HIGH-RESOLUTION SENSORS

Sensors employed for wide-area searches help analysts to gain a clearer picture of the nature of the enemy’s organization and operations and to identify places where other human and technical assets can be concentrated in hopes of gaining confirmation of the presence or absence of the enemy and, perhaps, the identity of individual terrorists. Such sensors, be they human sources or technical means, ideally should provide continuous monitoring of suspect areas and persons. They should also be covert; that is, able to function without tipping off targets that they are under surveillance.

These requirements—high resolution, continuous and long-term coverage, and secrecy—suggest that sensors to support targeting should, in general, be small so that they can be easily concealed. Small imaging sensors, in turn, must be placed close to their targets, given the need for high resolution and restrictions on focal length.2 And sensors that need to “stare” at their targets for prolonged periods should generally not be on airborne platforms but rather placed on buildings or other fixed structures, or in trees.

Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors. Such tools are especially important in counterterrorist operations because the signatures associated with most terrorist groups are generally very small and the “noise” surrounding them is often considerable. U.S. and Pakistani officials are attempting to apprehend perhaps several hundred individuals in the city of Karachi, which has a population in excess of five million. Under such circumstances, a surveillance and identification system that boasted an error rate of only 1:1000 could still give off many false alarms for each correct identification.

Conventional cameras cannot see inside buildings if the occupants are cautious and if it is not possible to plant devices inside. One means of gaining information about activities inside a building is to listen to what is being said there. Occasionally, it may be possible to plant listening devices (“bugs”) in buildings or vehicles being used by terrorists. More often, antiterrorist forces will have to rely on remote means of monitoring. It has been demonstrated that one can sometimes listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building’s windows.
Experiments are also under way with radars that have the potential to “see” through walls. The resolution of such radars is, of course, modest, but it is possible to determine whether particular rooms in a structure are occupied or not—information that can be valuable when planning an attack. Another emerging technology that can be useful in identifying terrorists is facial-recognition software. If cameras can be placed in areas where terrorists might pass by, the images they collect could be rapidly screened against a database of facial images and perhaps other physical characteristics of known terrorists. Computer algorithms capable of comparing collected images against a large database and discriminating among key features of those images will be essential if this approach is to be effective. Even with these systems, additional efforts would be required to verify the identity of potential targets, given the large number of samples collected and likely false-alarm rates.

Tagging suspected vehicles could help in developing information about patterns of activity and assisting shooters in engaging elusive targets. For example, an operative on the ground in a city could covertly place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of conducting terrorist activities. Once attached, the transmitter could permit authorities to monitor that vehicle’s movements, perhaps pointing them to other groups of terrorists. Signals from the transmitter could also make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle “in the crosshairs” should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy the vehicle.

CONCLUSIONS:

The US is spending a fortune on the war in Iraq while at the same time it is restructuring its entire military force structure to combat fourth generation wars that will be common soon. The dramatic expantion of US Special Operations forces and their tranformation into a quasi-illegal CIA paramilitary army will give the US awesome and flexible deployment options. With a wide array of listening devices and airborne - or spaceborne - sensors the US will be able to attack small targets with devastation. These policies make sense once diplomacy, cooperation, compromise and any hope of a peaceful world are abandoned permanently. But this is a one-way street and the response of the adversaries will be ingenious and unexpected... and so must ours...

Notes:

1. The operations of Philippine forces against Abu Sayef Group (ASG) rebels provide a recent example of this. Over the course of several months, U.S. special forces in-country trained with their Philippine counterparts, focusing on individual soldier skills and small-unit tactics. New equipment, including rifles and ammunition, was also provided. U.S. forces also offered assistance in planning patrol operations. The result was more frequent and more effective patrols that led to the freeing of one American hostage and the elimination of several terrorists. Follow-on training missions are planned. Similar “Successes” have occurred in Nepal and Colombia.
2. Air Force helicopters used for infiltration and exfiltration of special forces can also provide battlefield medical evacuation capabilities. U.S. capabilities for nighttime medical evacuation by helicopter were said to be particularly valuable to Philippine forces engaged in the hunt for members of the ASG in 2002

3. In modern usage, the term (and the strategy) originated with the British campaign against communist insurgents in Malaya after World War II. In the words of Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner to Malaya in the early 1950s, “The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble. The other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us” (Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1991, p. 259).

4. For more on the integration of psychological operations and air operations, see Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941– 1991, RAND, MR-576-AF, 1996, especially pp. 199–202.

5. For more on concepts for countering snipers, see Alan Vick et al., Aerospace
Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts, RAND, MR-1187-AF, 2000, pp. 131–138.

6. U.S. air forces deployed to Operation Desert Storm included more than 250 fixedwing aircraft that were capable of delivering laser-guided bombs. They were supplemented by several squadrons of British Tornadoes and a handful of other PGMcapable allied aircraft.

7. For an overview of emerging sensor technologies and their potential to support operations against dispersed groups of enemy personnel, see Alan Vick et al., Enhancing Airpower’s Contribution Against Light Infantry Targets, RAND, MR-697-AF, 1996, pp. 13–30.

8. For a review of the current state of the art in imaging sensor technologies and their potential for miniaturization, see Alan Vick et al., 2000, pp. 83–107.

9. In some situations, such sensors can be emplaced by agents on the ground. In others, delivery by air might be preferred. The Internetted Unattended Ground Sensor (IUGS) program, initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is developing an air-delivered body with magnetic, seismic, acoustic, chemical, and environmental sensors that can detect human and vehicular movements. See Alan Vick et al., 1996, pp. 26–27.

10. Military Reconnaissance Satellites (IMINT)

When detailed reports of geographical areas, military installations and activities, troop positions, or other picture-based intelligence are required, policy-makers and analysts turn to data provided by IMINT (Image Intelligence) satellites. Operating in low, near-polar orbits at an altitude of between 500 and 3,000 kilometers, and maintaining the same orbit around the Earth, they make about 14 revolutions per day. IMINT satellites use either photo-optic, electro-optic infrared, or radar technology to scan a new swath of ground with each orbit
http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=399&IssueID=49&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&issueID=49

Community Defense: Beyond Government Deception

2004-05-10T17:30:00.000-07:00

a meeting place for enlightened new-militia and for all awakening citizens (even former lefties) – for everyone enraged or bemused by the corrupt dictatorship that the bloated federal bureaucracy has manifest. It’s a discussion group for war gamers on small unit strategies and applied tactical examples. Historical and hypothetical scenarios are examined for application to various contexts. Costs, risks and shortcomings are considered. Its fun to imagine, its good for your chess playing potential and it might just save your life or your family or your country. Thanks!

For information or to contribute links or articles : politicalsoldier@lycos.com

… In the fourth-generation wars that now engulf the planet, improvisation, innovation and
integration of the lessons of the past are the secret to success…

I.1 Introduction to the Game of War

3. Guerrilla Manuals and Related Materials on Guerrilla War and Strategy

3.1. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/index.htm
3.11 A DEFINITION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch01.htm
3.12 PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch02.htm
3.13 HOW THE URBAN GUERRILLA LIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch03.htm
3.14 TECHNICAL PREPARATION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch04.htm
3.15 THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S WEAPONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch05.htm
3.16 THE SHOT; THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S REASON FOR EXISTENCE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch06.htm
3.17 THE FIRING GROUP
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch07.htm
3.18 THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch08.htm
3.19 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch09.htm
3.20 THE INITIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
Page last updated 11 Mar 2004
3.21 SURPRISE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch11.htm
3.22 KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch12.htm
3.23 MOBILITY AND SPEED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch13.htm
3.24 INFORMATION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch14.htm
3.25 DECISIVENESS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch15.htm
3.26 OBJECTIVES OF THE GUERRILLA'S ACTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch16.htm
3.27 ON THE TYPES AND NATURE OF MISSIONS FOR THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch17.htm
3.28 ASSAULTS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch18.htm
3.29 THE BANK ASSAULT AS POPULAR MISSION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch19.htm
3.30 RAIDS AND PENETRATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch20.htm
3.31 OCCUPATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch21.htm
3.32 AMBUSH
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch22.htm
3.33 STREET TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch23.htm
3.34 STRIKES AND WORK INTERRUPTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch24.htm
3.35 DESERTIONS, DIVERSIONS, SEIZURES, EXPROPRIATION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch25.htm
3.36 LIBERATION OF PRISONERS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch26.htm
3.37 EXECUTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch27.htm
3.38 KIDNAPPING
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch28.htm
3.39 SABOTAGE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch29.htm
3.40 TERRORISM
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch30.htm
3.41 ARMED PROPAGANDA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch31.htm
3.42 THE WAR OF NERVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch32.htm
3.43 HOW TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch33.htm
3.44 SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch34.htm
3.45 RESCUE OF THE WOUNDED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch35.htm
3.46 GUERRILLA SECURITY
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch36.htm
3.47 THE SEVEN SINS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch37.htm3.48 POPULAR SUPPORThttp://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch38.htm

3.5 Ireland's OWN: History (IRA & RIRA);
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#gueform
[ put in or link to a summary of this – part of it is similar to contra manual too ! ]

Table of Contents::
Successful Implementations of Guerrilla Warfare : http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#implems
Ground Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare
The IRA
Understanding the Enemy
Guerrilla Commanders
Guerrilla Formations
Guerrilla Units
The Flying Column ; http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#flycol
Defence and Attack Methods
Guerrilla Equipment:
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html
Arms and Explosives
The Barrack Buster
Semtex
Traitors
Theories of Guerrilla Warfare
Psychological Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrillas Should be Volunteers
Importance of Communication
Reaching out to the Masses
Inside Cadres
The Internet
Conclusion

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherisenpeople/

3.6. For interesting Scenarios and information on tactics & strategy see:

http://www.guerrillawar.blogspot.com

3.7. Future Strategy - Putting Together Lessons and A Methodology of InsightsEvery political move – referendum- law – appointment is a military move – since war is in hearts and minds as much as on the field – you have to respond to each political move – keep the enemy off balance
The elite are always way ahead of us street people – we are always reactive – slow – hesitant.
Just like in Colombia where they say that a massacre is always foretold – obvious – if you look at US policies in Iraq or in Latin America you see the wars – the massacres – forming.

………….. Key overall guiding principles:

Three Types of attacks ( See Escalation Theory at: www. )
1. Serious strategic attacks – Takeout key people, enemies , leaders – or major infrastructure ( Power Plant – Key Transformers and substations, Chemical Plant – Oil Facilities – Storage, Gas lines, Bridges, Dams, Aqueducts–Pumping Stations, Railroads, oil and LNG export and import terminals, docks, airport control towers, navigation beacons and aircraft, port facilities, and attacks on a helicopter center or a production facility for choppers, aircraft or other weapons, – and always - government buildings!

2. Tactical strikes – to acquire weapons, money, fame, or takeout limited equipment – a plane – a chopper – a communication facility.

3. Symbolic Strikes – Sword of Bolivar – Statue of Liberty – Governors’ Mansion -

3.8 GW Commando Resistance
This news source occasionally provides analysis and recommendations for resistance groups:

A new low-tech national security strategy

– Venezuela and its emerging allies should adopt commando – citizen resistance strategies to defeat the US and to prepare the people for self and community defense. And Strategic Hamlets should be established on all border areas by the hundreds!

3.9. Scenarios and Battle Examples
3.91 A Typical Urban Guerrilla Attack Plan: TARGET – is a large gun shop or dealer

1. Recon – Security at site, where supplies you want are located – the right gun powders – weapon models etc –
2. Recon the nearest police stations and substations – and queuing areas – coffee shops – hangouts –
3. Observe security and employee shift changes, and traffic changes by shoppers or commuters at or near the place of the primary target (gun shop or armory).
4. Recon the electric distribution system of the area - also supply transformers if near or if they are big or it is the right time of year (summer or winter extremes) Where are key power lines – gas lines – water system components?
5. Escape plan – route – stash places – breakdowns – re supply options.
6. Fall back contingencies – injuries – heat – possible complications.
7.
Battle Plan :
1. Large fires or car bombs are set near a rich part of town away from a targeted gun shop. Attacks on fire department and police stations are made to look like they are large scale attacks in that part of town. Then that attack group falls back to cover – and to keep out enemy forces – say to the north. Meanwhile, the gun shop is hit and power lines/substations are taken out all over – communication towers and – or jamming systems are used. Then the roads or police stations are taken out as the group retreats quickly with the stash. Takeout some of the local police or military helicopters before the raid and prepare to shoot others down at the time of the raid and the retreat – (dusk - ?? ).

Break down part of the shipment quick – smaller trucks – cars – and go in different directions. Set more fires elsewhere ( or time them to go off at the estimated time) and return snipers to attacks on fire department and police. Litter the roadways with nails, caltrops or small car bombs (or smoky fires) for max chaos but minor deaths. – Get away – send those communiqués – and celebrate the precious arms that have been liberated !!

A smaller and continuous harassment would be to rob police randomly at different areas – times – and ways -!! Get mony, cars, radios, weapons, uniforms and some priceless fun…

..................4.1 Reader Comments and Musings

Suggestions from the South Cascade Militia:
In our region many people are fed up with the federal government goons, the waste inherent in all the laws and regulations and the absolute threats to the Constitution – If it even exists… Abolishing this monstrosity that aims to bureaucratize the whole world is the preferred solution - States’ Rights? – how about State sovereignty and secession? You should interview militia people and their potential supporters in the USA and get perspectives from the many disgruntled US military personnel and soldiers around the world. Sponsor open discussions of the Meaning of Life in these times; strategies for defending homelands; and tactics and the psychology of social collapse.

Review and summarize the philosophy and "resistance knowledge" from militia people and related books – Turner Diaries (sans racist stupidity) – McVie – current trends in philosophy – notable contacts – publications – webs – and also SOLDIER FORUMS – so as to channel – unite – give them (soldiers and militia) something new – get them motivated – reformed – improved – focused – revived ! -- or friendly… This game concept is a good way to plug people in and get them thinking clearly and with purpose. Bravo!

5.1 Chapter Three :: TOWARD NEW CONCEPTS FOR LOCATING AND
ATTACKING TERRORISTS AND RELATED TARGETS -- AND Wide Area Surveillance

Send your links and comments to: politicalsoldier@lycos.com

Mao Tse-tung-- PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN
http://www.marx2mao.org/Mao/PSGW38.html

From theSelected Works of Mao Tse-tung; Foreign Languages Press Peking 1967
First Edition 1965; Second Printing 1967, Vol. II, pp. 79-112.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prepared for Internet by David J. Romagnolo, June 1997)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter I :: Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War?

Chapter II :: The Basic Principle of War is to Preserve Oneself & Destroy the Enemy

Chapter IV :: Initiative, Flexibility and Planning in Conducting Offensives
Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within
Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations

Chapter VI :: The Establishment of Base Areas
The Types of Base Areas Guerrilla Zones and Base Zones: Conditions for Establishing Base Areas
The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas
Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle One Another

Chapter IX :: The Relationship of Command

NOTES

[7] Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved that it was possible to establish long-term and, in many places, stable base areas in the plains. This was due to their vastness and big populations, the correctness of the Communist Party's policies, the extensive mobilization of the people and the enemy's shortage of troops. [p.95]
[9] Weichi is an old Chinese game, in which the two players try to encircle each other's pieces on the board. When a player's pieces are encirded, they are counted as "dead" (captured). But if there is a sufficient number of blank spaces among the encircled pieces, then the latter are still "alive" (not captured). [p.102]

[10] In 353 B.C. the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capital of the state of Chao. The king of the state of Chi, an ally of Chao, ordered his generals Tien Chi and Sun Pin to aid Chao with their troops. Knowing that the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao and left their own territory weakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the state of Wei whose troops withdrew to defend their own country. Taking advantage of their exhaustion, the troops of Chi engaged and routed them at Kueiling (northeast of the present Hotse County in Shantung). The siege of Hantan, capital of Chao, was thus lifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei". [p.104]

Thursday, April 22, 2004
THE FIRING GROUP --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to function, the urban guerrillas must be organized into small groups. A team of no more than four or five is called a firing group. A minimum of two firing groups, separated and insulated from other firing groups, directed and coordinated by one or two persons, this is what makes a firing team.

Within the firing group, there must be complete confidence among the members. The best shot, and the one who knows best how to handle the submachine gun, is the person in charge of operations.

The firing group plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and stores weapons, and studies and corrects its own tactics.

When there are tasks planned by the strategic command, these tasks take preference. But there is no such thing as a firing group without its own initiative. For this reason, it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the guerrilla organization, in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the flrlng group. The old-type hierarchy, the style of the traditional revolutionaries, doesn't exist in our organization. This means that, except for the priority of the objectives set by the strategic command, any firing group can decide to raid a bank, to kidnap or execute an agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified with the reaction, or a foreign spy, and can carry out any type of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy, without the need to consult with the general command.

No firing group can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act. Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and begin action can do so, and thus becomes a part of the organization.

This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions, since there is free initiative and the only important point is to greatly increase the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the government and force it onto the defensive.

The firing group is the instrument of organized action. Within it, guerrilla operations and tactics are planned, launched and carried through to success. The general command counts on the firing groups to carry out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country. For its part, the general command helps the firing groups with their difficulties and with carrying out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country.

The organization is an indestructable network of firing groups, and of coordinations among them, that functions simply and practically within a general command that also participates in attacks—an organization that exists for no other purpose than that of pure and simple revolutionary action.

Next: THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch07.htm

Conventional logistics can be expressed with the formula FFEA:

F—food F—fuel E—equipment A—ammunition

Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance problems for an army or a regular armed force, transported in vehicles, with fixed bases and supply lines. Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an army but small armed groups, intentionally fragmented. They have neither vehicles nor rear areas. Their supply lines are precarious and insufficient, and they have no fixed bases except in the rudimentary sense of a weapons factory within a house. While the goal of conventional logistics is to supply the war needs of the "gorillas" who are used to repress rural and urban rebellion, urban guerrilla logistics aim at sustaining operations and tactics which have nothing in common with conventional warfare and are directed against the government and foreign domination of the country.

For the urban guerrilla, who starts from nothing and who has no support at the beginning, logistics are expressed by the formula MMWAE, which is:

M—mechanization M—money W—weapons A—ammunition E—explosives

Revolutionary logistics takes mechanization as one of its bases. Nevertheless, mechanization is inseperable from the driver. The urban guerrilla driver is as important as the urban guerrilla machine gunner. Without either, the machines do not work, and the automobile, as well as the submachine gun becomes a dead thing. An experienced driver is not made in one day, and apprenticeship must begin early. Every good urban guerrilla must be a driver. As to the vehicles, the urban guerrilla must expropriate what he needs. When he already has resources, the urban guerrilla can combine the expropriation of vehicles with his other methods of acquisition.

Money, weapons, ammunition and explosives, and automobiles as well, must be expropriated. The urban guerrilla must rob banks and armories, and seize explosives and ammunition wherever he finds them. None of these operations is carried out for just one purpose. Even when the raid is to obtain money, the weapons that the guards carry must be taken as well.

Expropriation is the first step in organizing our logistics, which itself assumes an armed and permanently mobile character. The second step is to reinforce and expand logistics, resorting to ambushes and traps in which the enemy is surprised and his weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other resources are captured.

Once he has weapons, ammunition and explosives, one of the most serious logistics problems facing the urban guerrilla is a hiding place in which to leave the material, and appropriate means of transporting it and assembling it where it is needed. This has to be accomplished even when the enemy is alerted and has the roads blocked.

The knowledge that the urban guerrilla possesses of the terrain, and the devices he uses or is capable of using, such as scouts specially prepared and recruited for this mission, are the basic elements in solving the eternal logistics problems faced by the guerrillas.

THE INITIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The dynamics of urban guerrilla warfare lie in the guerrilla's violent clash with the military and police forces of the dictatorship. In this conflict, the police have superiority. The urban guerrilla has inferior forces. The paradox is that the urban guerrilla is nevertheless the attacker.

The military and police forces, for their part, respond to the conflict by mobilizing and concentrating greatly superior forces in the pursuit and destruction of the urban guerrilla. The guerrilla can only avoid defeat if he depends on the initial advantages he has and knows how to exploit them to the end, to compensate for his weakness and lack of material.

APPENDIXES

Bibliograghy
1. Title: Commando Raids: 1946-1983, by Bruce Hoffman
Document No: N-2316-USDP Year: 1985 Pages: xiii, 64
http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ordi/getabbydoc.pl?doc=N-2316&hilite=1&qs=guerrilla|warfare

Keywords: Raids (Military science); Terrorism; Commando troops

This Note assesses the effectiveness of a sample of raids executed by small commando and commando-type forces in response to terrorist threats. One hundred raids by irregular forces (guerrilla groups, terrorist organizations, and private individuals) and elite units (organized military units belonging to a country's national armed forces) were examined in terms of: (1) previous training of the personnel involved in the mission; (2) the geographical position from which the raiding parties embarked; (3) the effectiveness of methods of transportation used; (4) the character of the mission (destruction, stand-off assault, rescue, kidnap, or assassination); (5) the size of the raiding party; and (6) the effect of disguise or deception on mission outcome. Seventy-seven percent of the raids accomplished their objective, indicating that obstacles such as geographic distances and well-defended enemy positions can be overcome by the stealth and mobility of small paramilitary and military units.

2. Title: An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments, by Brian Michael Jenkins
Document No: P-4670/1 Year: 1972 Pages: 13

Keywords: Asia; Counterinsurgency; Latin America; Revolutions

The author synthesizes a five-stage strategy by which urban guerrillas take over a city, and suggests government countermeasures. The guerrilla struggle appears to follow a sequence of (1) dramatizing their cause by terrorist bombings and assassinations, (2) expanding and reinforcing their organization; (3) launching an offensive to control the streets and isolate the police, (4) provoking repression to win mass support, and (5) coordinating mass support with guerrilla warfare to wage full-scale urban warfare.

3.
Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad; RAND MR1738-1
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1738/MR1738.pdf

The AC- 130 gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions today, since it combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. In fact, the crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may, at times, have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. … like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. In such circumstances the Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind “fingerprints” associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes.

Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can, in many circumstances, greatly increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged…

U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead. These features, coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laserhoming guidance.

WIDE-AREA SURVEILLANCE

“Finders”—intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets— will be of two broad types: those that provide wide-area coverage and those with a narrow field of view but higher resolution. The role of wide-area assets will be to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. Each of these types of assets has its strengths and limitations. A severe limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage—a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars, which have been under development for several years, could significantly enhance U.S. wide-area surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor.

Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors will make it possible to remotely examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. Because every material has a unique signature, data from such sensors can be processed and used to classify objects automatically and with greater fidelity than is possible with sensors that operate in only a single waveband. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination.1

Other promising technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical “sniffers.” Essentially miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. If it were possible to develop sniffers to detect particular types of explosives, then lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles could patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. In addition, certain types of illegal drugs or the chemicals used in their processing might be useful targets for sniffers, given the nexus between drug traffickers and terrorists in some areas (e.g., Colombia). Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysis devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a “mother ship” or a ground station.
______________
1For an overview of emerging sensor technologies and their potential to support operations
against dispersed groups of enemy personnel, see Alan Vick et al., Enhancing
Airpower’s Contribution Against Light Infantry Targets, RAND, MR-697-AF, 1996, pp.

Sensors employed for wide-area searches help analysts to gain a clearer picture of the nature of the enemy’s organization and operations and to identify places where other human and technical assets can be concentrated in hopes of gaining confirmation of the presence or absence of the enemy and, perhaps, the identity of individual terrorists. Such sensors, be they human sources or technical means, ideally should provide continuous monitoring of suspect areas and persons. They should also be covert; that is, able to function without tipping off targets that they are under
surveillance.

These requirements—high resolution, continuous and long-term coverage, and secrecy—suggest that sensors to support targeting should, in general, be small so that they can be easily concealed. Small imaging sensors, in turn, must be placed close to their targets, given the need for high resolution and restrictions on focal length.2 And sensors that need to “stare” at their targets for prolonged periods should generally not be on airborne platforms but rather placed on buildings or other fixed structures, or in trees.3
______________
2For a review of the current state of the art in imaging sensor technologies and their
potential for miniaturization, see Alan Vick et al., 2000, pp. 83–107.
3In some situations, such sensors can be emplaced by agents on the ground. In others, delivery by air might be preferred. The Internetted Unattended Ground Sensor (IUGS) program, initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is developing an air-delivered body with magnetic, seismic, acoustic, chemical, and environmental sensors that can detect human and vehicular movements. See Alan Vick et al., 1996, pp. 26–27.

Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts more efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors. Such tools are especially important in counterterrorist operations because the signatures associated with most terrorist groups are generally very small and the “noise” surrounding them is often considerable. For example, U.S. and Pakistani officials today are attempting to apprehend perhaps several hundred individuals in the city of Karachi, which has a population in excess of five million. Under such circumstances, a surveillance and identification system that boasted an error rate of only 1:1000 could still give off many false alarms for each correct identification.

Conventional cameras cannot see inside buildings if the occupants are cautious and if it is not possible to plant devices inside. One means of gaining information about activities inside a building is to listen to what is being said there. Occasionally, it may be possible to plant listening devices (“bugs”) in buildings or vehicles being used by terrorists. More often, antiterrorist forces will have to rely on remote means of monitoring. It has been demonstrated that one can sometimes listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building’s windows.

Experiments are also under way with radars that have the potential to “see” through walls. The resolution of such radars is, of course, modest, but it is possible to determine whether particular rooms in a structure are occupied or not—information that can be valuable when planning an attack. Another emerging technology that can be useful in identifying terrorists is facial-recognition software. If cameras can be placed in areas where terrorists might pass by, the images they collect could be rapidly screened against a database of facial images and perhaps other physical characteristics of known terrorists. Computer algorithms capable of comparing collected images against a large database and discriminating among key features of those images will be essential if this approach is to be effective. Even with these systems, additional efforts would be required to verify the identity of potential targets, given the large number of samples collected and likely false-alarm rates.

Tagging suspected vehicles could help in developing information about patterns of activity and assisting shooters in engaging elusive targets. For example, an operative on the ground in a city could covertly place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of conducting terrorist activities. Once attached, the transmitter could permit authorities to monitor that vehicle’s movements, perhaps pointing them to other groups of terrorists. Signals from the transmitter could also make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle “in the crosshairs” should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy it.

One serious shortfall in U.S. special operations capabilities today is the lack of a means for inserting and extracting SOF teams stealthily. SOF helicopters and C-130 cargo planes are equipped for low-level operations, but if they fly within line of sight of radars they can be readily detected and tracked. Because surprise and survivability are such important elements of successful SOF operations, the Air Force should explore concepts for a stealthy medium transport aircraft. To be of use to SOF in a wide range of scenarios, such an aircraft could be somewhat smaller than the C-130, which has a payload of around 40,000 pounds. But it would need to have a mission radius of 1000 miles or so to permit operations deep within the territory of hostile countries. Equally important, this SOF transport should be capable of landing at and taking off from short, unimproved airstrips or

Transport aircraft with these features might also prove to be well suited to serving as a successor to the AC-130 gunship. Developing a more-survivable gunship should be a priority because surface-to-air missiles capable of downing the AC-130 are proliferating and SOF and other light forces often require the type of sustained, precise fire support that the AC-130 provides.
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5The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is committed to procuring some 50 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. These vertical takeoff and landing machines will replace some of AFSOC’s helicopter fleet, offering greater speed and range, but they are not stealthy and cannot substitute for the C-130 in delivering large payloads over ranges greater than a few hundred miles.

1.2 Glossary of Terms:
AFSOF --Air Force Special Operation Forces
CAS --Close Air Support
CIA -- Central Intelligence Agency
C3I --Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
C4I --Command, Control, Communication, Computation and Intelligence
COMINT --Communication Intelligence
DIA -- Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD -- US Department of Defense
FLIR --Forward Looking Infra-Red
HIC --High Intensity Conflict
HUMIT -- Human Intelligence
LIC --Low Intensity Conflict
NSA -- National Security Agency
OOTW --Operations Other Than War
PGM --Precision Guided Munitions
SAM --Surface-to-Air Missiles
SAR --Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT -- Signal Intelligence
SOCOM -- Special Operations Command
UAV --Unmanned Airborne Vehicle

http://www.blackwaterusa.com/
Sounds like mercenaries to me.
http://seattle.indymedia.org/en/2004/04/239527.shtml
just think of usa citizens who have been forced drugged and had health damage and even death and suicide.THAT should make so called americans realize why iraqui people might want to drag your bodies through the streets.your local 'mental health' people (sub humans) are doing the same thing to poor souls in YOUR 'communities' right now!!

Musings and To-Be-Edited

An adolescent boy scout, fighting on the side of the Buddhist rebels, stands in the street during the Da Nang Buddhist Insurrection, 1966.

The Buddhist uprising against Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky's government was assisted by ARVN troops. Ky declared the city to be under communist control despite the presence of a US Marine battalion that was stationed there. 1000 South Vietnamese Marines were sent in to crush the uprising.

Linebacker http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=history.searchbeat.com/vietnamwar/1965bombing.gif&imgrefurl=http://history.searchbeat.com/vietnamwar/vietnam1965.htm&h=160&w=200&sz=12&tbnid=WVUGHgFjAZkJ:&tbnh=79&tbnw=98&start=27&prev=/images%3Fq%3D%2BBombing%2BVietnam%26start%3D20%26hl%3Den%26lr%3D%26ie%3DUTF-8%26oe%3DUTF-8%26sa%3DN
Do a big fire or a flood into a area where the military or the rich live (police) then car bombs at key intersections, bridges, underpasses – or clogged up shopping centers created form an earlier diversion or broken down cars routing traffic into the newly congested area – gas stations too. – second idea – take out bridge or key highway overpoasses ( Tanker trucks or explosives ) – then target alt transportation trains, busses – airports

1. The World Within The World by John D. Barrow, page 137, Oxford University Press, 1988.
Putting a Propagandist Under Arrest, by Ilya Repin 1880-1892
There is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon, and this requires that our understanding of weapons must have an awareness that breaks through all boundaries. - Qiao Liang / Wang Xiangsui
http://www.geocities.com/liudegast/nihilism.html#E

There is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon, and this requires that our understanding of weapons must have an awareness that breaks through all boundaries. - Qiao Liang / Wang Xiangsui
http://www.geocities.com/liudegast/nihilism.html#E

For resources on resiting militarism and soldier support networks, see:

http://www.duckdaotsu.org/resist.html